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# Daily Report

## Supplement

# Central Eurasia

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# Central Eurasia
## SUPPLEMENT

FBIS-SOV-95-071-S

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## *AT&T To Equip Space Communication Network

*954F1941A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian*
*21 Mar 95 p 13*

[Article by Yevgeniy Spiridonov: "Sirena-3 Relies on Satellite Communications: AT & T Tridom Company Will Supply the Sirena International Technology Corporation With $20.5 Million Worth of Telecommunications Equipment"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The airline companies of Yakutia and Arkhangelsk, Magadan, Tyumen, and other regions, which were among the first to replace their Sirena-2 automated system data-transmission network with a Sirena-3 network for an automated air transportation management system (a data transmission network with an X-25 packet switcher, interfaced with technology produced by the IBM corporation), have placed orders with the Sirena International Technology Corporation for the delivery of telecommunications equipment for developing a satellite communications system. A BIZES-SEGODNYA correspondent learned this in the company's office for satellite communications systems. As specialists there explained, what prompted the first users of the Sirena-3 system to develop a data-transmission network using satellite channels at the same time that they are reconstructing their ground system was their desire to cut the costs entailed in using the ground telecommunications equipment that exists today.

For example, the Yakutavia [Yakut Airlines] company has to pay up to 300 million rubles [R] a year for leasing just one channel on the Moscow-Yakutsk line, and to handle its business today, it requires several channels like this. In order to make up for its growing overhead, the airline company has been forced to pass the costs through to its passengers, but it has already reached the point in raising rates at which it is becoming obvious to its clients and to the air carriers themselves that the poor quality of service, which they had closed their eyes to when ticket prices were moderate, is becoming intolerable at today's rates. Because of its size, however, Sirena-2 is not capable of resolving this dilemma. Therefore, the airline companies, which are among the first to try to develop a satellite communications system, are counting not only on cutting the current costs of using ground systems by 20-30 percent but also on realizing a savings through the introduction of a cheaper (thanks to its high capacity) satellite data transmission system.

Satellite technologies were regarded as an element of the Sirena-3 system from the time it was designed, but before the project's practical implementation began, the introduction of those technologies were not so urgent. Moreover, it was supposed that the reliability of the Sirena-3 system would initially be ensured by establishing five data processing centers: three in Russia and one each in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The choice of suppliers of satellite communications equipment was also limited, since until recently COCOM forbade the sale of high technology to Russia.

Last April a single-center version of Sirena-3 was adopted (a centralized processing complex was located in Moscow, at the Main Computer Center for Civil Aviation), and in July the Sirena International Technology Corporation signed a general agreement with the American AT & T Tridom company for the delivery of a central control station (hub), 700 VSAT satellite communications peripheral stations, and software for them for the sum of $20.5 million. That also includes the cost of training Russian specialists.

According to the plan for organizing the satellite data transmission network, as we were informed at the office for the introduction of satellite communications, a list of the regions where VSAT stations will be installed first has already been drawn up. It designates 40 cities in Russia, including Arkhangelsk, Yakutsk, Magadan, Tyumen, St. Petersburg, Syktyvkar, Murmansk, Rostov-on-Don, and Yekaterinburg. The fact that they were given priority stems from the criteria that was adopted for setting priorities in developing the satellite telecommunications system. VSATs are needed first of all in regions where there are major users of the Sirena-3 system, in order to cut operating costs for leasing and reserving ground channels. After that come regions where the structure of ground communications channels is poorly developed. Also taken into account are the comparative costs of leasing ground and satellite networks and whether X-25 network equipment exists in regions as of the time that the satellite technologies are to be introduced.

According to information provided by the office for satellite communications systems, it is planned to install the first 40 VSATs this year, 600 more in 1996, and the rest in 1997. The schedule for the delivery of equipment by AT & T Tridom is also tied in with these plans. Since the operation of the VSATs is controlled by a central station, the schedule provides for the hub, which is to be located in the village of Medvezhyi Ozera (Moscow Oblast), to be set up first. According to the agreement with AT & T Tridom, this is supposed to occur no later than 180 days after the equipment is paid for. The agreement also stipulates that a test start-up of the system and the first five user stations will be carried out by the company's specialists.

According to Tatyana Fedorenko, the Sirena International Technology Corporation's deputy general director for marketing, in choosing a relay satellite, the corporation has followed three main principles: first, the area that the satellite covers should provide for the needs of Sirena-3 throughout Russia's entire territory; second, the relay should have a geostationary orbit so that the cost of the ground equipment can be lowered by simplifying the design of the VSAT antennas (it would not be necessary for it to track the satellite); third, the relay should ensure the dependability of data transmission. Since the corporation plans to take ownership of the entire satellite system complex and not just parts of it, the specifications

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of the satellite must be coordinated with the supplier of the space telecommunications equipment, i.e., AT & T Tridom.

According to Tatyana Fedorenko, at present the international technology corporation is considering commercial proposals from both foreign owners of satellite channels (PANAMSat, IntelSat) and Russian owners, since the license recently obtained from the Russian Ministry of Communications places no restrictions on the right to the technological use of satellites with respect to the satellite's ownership.

The Sirena-3 project provides for an interface with the Sita international network. The central processing complex will have its own data bank containing information on routes, flights, rates, the movement of passengers and cargo, etc. When necessary, the central processing complex will be able, on a contractual basis, to interact with such global systems as Sabre, Amadeus, Iberia, and Galileo. In addition, for commercial reasons the Sirena-3 system may have an interface with any common-carrier network, despite the fact that it is intended for serving the aviation industry.

As for the protection of information in the system from distortion or unauthorized access, the Sirena corporation itself is the first to have an interest in that, Mrs. Fedorenko says. It wants to derive a commercial benefit from the use of its own information. Moreover, if unauthorized entry into the system is permitted, given the dynamic nature of the air transport infrastructure, the whole arrangement for working with air passengers would be upset and the system would fall into chaos. Therefore, the confidentiality of data in the Sirena-3 will be guaranteed by software, and the fact that the data bases will be physically located in Moscow ensures the complete manageability of the information. What is more, in Mrs. Fedorenko's opinion, the fears that global information systems are fraught with the potential for information leaks are unfounded, in general. For example, Sirena-2's data on the international and domestic flights of Russian airline companies is stored in the Gabriel system in the city of Atlanta, but the interests of the airlines and their passengers do not suffer because of that.

## *More on MFA Federation Subjects Consultative Council Dec Session

*954Q0168A Moscow DIPLOMATICHESKIY VESTNIK in Russian No 2, Feb 95 (signed to press 21 Feb 95) pp 55-62*

[Report on meeting of the RF Subjects Consultative Council on International and Foreign Economic Relations under the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "International and Foreign Economic Relations of Russian Federation Subjects"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As already reported in the previous issue of DIPLOMATICHESKIY VESTNIK, the first meeting of the Russian Federation Subjects Consultative Council on International and Foreign Economic Relations under the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs was held in Moscow on 15 December 1994.

It was established for the purpose of improving the mechanism of coordination of foreign relations of Federation subjects in the interests of ensuring a uniform political line of the Russian state in relations with foreign countries and international organizations. All 89 Federation subjects expressed consent to participate in the work of this council.

Representatives of 74 Federation subjects took part in the work of the first council meeting. R. Chimayev, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the Chechen Republic, attended as an observer. Senior officials of the Administration of the Russian Federation President, of the government apparatus, and of federal bodies of executive power and deputies of the Federation Council and of the State Duma were introduced.

Speeches by a number of participants in the discussion of the basic goals and tasks of the new body, as well as the concluding speech by I.S. Ivanov, chairman of the Consultative Council, RF first deputy minister of foreign affairs, are published in abbreviated form below.

**M.A. Vybornov, minister of foreign relations of the Administration of Leningrad Oblast.**

I believe that the establishment of the Consultative Council is a natural phenomenon, because it is brought about by an objective need. Specific problems arise every day and demand solutions meeting both the specific interests of Federation subjects and the goals of implementation of Russia's uniform foreign political line. Purely from the geopolitical point of view, we have now become the most western part of continental Russia, which has an outlet to the Atlantic Ocean.

As of 1 January the border with Finland becomes the border with the European Union. We established excellent relations with our Finnish neighbor and signed direct treaties on cooperation with three provinces in Finland. Specific work is being done on the implementation of an interstate agreement between Russia and Finland in the area of border cooperation.

The resumption of old relations with former socialist countries is an urgent necessity. We were the first among Russia's regions, which signed a protocol with Poland's provinces. Such protocols, which are of a framework nature, include questions of cooperation in various areas.

For these purposes we have established a special oblast foreign trade organization, which has the status of a state foreign trade firm, as well as our consulting firm for servicing Russian and foreign investors. We have adopted the Charter of Leningrad Oblast, which clearly defines rights and duties, including of the Ministry of

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Foreign Relations. We deal with all aspects of international activity, primarily foreign economic aspects. In June 1994 we joined the Assembly of European Regions.

In my opinion, subsequently, during the organization of work it would be good for the Consultative Council to resume the practice that existed in the Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I have in mind the distribution of various information materials and instructions on a wide range of topics. These materials would not only provide consultative, information, and methodological assistance to Federation subjects, but would also serve to ensure a uniform political line of the Russian state in relations with foreign countries and international organizations.

I believe that it is necessary to more carefully prepare for the foreign visits of our delegations, especially governors, who are members of the Federation Council. During governors' visits the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and our embassies should be notified of them.

Assistance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the training of skilled specialists in various areas of foreign relations for regions is needed.

**V.N. Likhachev, vice-president of the Tatarstan Republic.**

We have waited for this moment for a very long time. This day was the result of the counter-process of regions and bodies of federal power. Very many thoughts occur in connection with the beginning of work of the Consultative Council. I presented part of the problems and our vision in an article published in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA on 29 November. It talks a great deal about the need to reform the work of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From my point of view, today's meeting indicates that a serious breakthrough has also occurred in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A turn toward regions is observed. It is a matter of seeing to it that this turn is not limited to individual episodes, but that a system deserving both the support and combination of our efforts be established. It seems to me that today, with due regard for the entire specific nature of Russia's foreign political and international activity, with due regard for the processes occurring in regions, this type of talk should be held not once in half a year, but at least once in 3 months, and provision should be made for such meetings in regions of the Russian Federation. It is best to study problems and flaws on the spot with due regard for local and regional experience.

The experience in the international activity of the Tatarstan Republic has a normative base—this is the well-known treaty with the Russian Federation. I must say with gratitude that we realize many provisions of this important document jointly with the departments of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs and through very active contacts on the part of Russian ambassadors and RF permanent representatives in international organizations.

Apparently, it should be stressed that a great deal depends on the executives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that, psychologically, all the structures and subdivisions of both the ministry's central apparatus and of Russia's institutions abroad really turn toward regions. The pluses of work and of mutual cooperation will be indisputable. It is no accident—if, for example, we talk about Tatarstan—that a number of international initiatives put forward recently have received not only the support of the Russian Federation President, not only of Russia's Government, but also of some international organizations. In particular, this concerns the initiative to open in the city of Kazan an international ecological information center and to establish an international center for children's folk art under the auspices of UNESCO and a number of other initiatives.

If we touch upon the most important problem, which we—members of the Consultative Council—could discuss in the first place, it is our contribution to the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations Organization. The UN has prepared a very long list of measures. We could discuss these measures within the framework of our council. An excellent conference under UNESCO auspices "Culture of Young Cities" was held in Naberezhnyye Chelny last year. Problems of culture could also be examined at our meetings.

If we want to take into consideration all the political realities and the indisputable fact that the building of new Russia is going on and the process of democratization is taking place in it, I would not be receptive in strict imperative form to the thesis that someone wanted to ruin Russia and that such a desire persists to this day. It is necessary to distinguish the forceful intention to ruin Russia from the aspiration to create a new Russia in a constructive manner, by political methods, in quite a civilized form, and through the conclusion of treaties and agreements. I think that both regions and the center have this kind of aspiration. I would like the efforts of our Consultative Council to be subordinate to this goal.

**A.S. Dzasokhov, deputy chairman of the parliamentary group of Russia's Federal Assembly.**

Legislative activity is the sphere that can unite us (the Federal Assembly) and the Consultative Council. I want to report to you that a new law on foreign economic activity is imminent. Drafters of the law reported to us that they support contacts with all the oblasts, krays, and republics of our federative state. The attempt to adopt this law at the first reading was unsuccessful, because very many questions arose. We press our economic and other committees to adopt this law. Other draft laws are also being considered. For example, the draft law with the renewal of provisions on departures and entries of Russian Federation citizens, as well as the very important draft law on the division of powers between federal bodies of power and Federation subjects. This is a matter of great political significance. In this case we will have to

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make use of the provisions in the reader: To create the law so that it consolidates and takes the existing reality into consideration.

I would like to express the proposal that we create a mechanism of constant interaction between the State Duma and the Federation Council, on the one hand, and the Consultative Council, on the other. In this connection it is desirable that lists of council members include representatives of both chambers of the Federal Assembly. The second wish is that we not be isolated from the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. A representative of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations should be included in the council.

I agree with the statements heard here today on the need to adopt a number of laws, including the law on the delimitation of powers and other legally binding acts, which would eliminate the noncorrespondence in the constitutions and charters of Federation subjects and in the Russian Federation Constitution. This will help us stabilize the situation in Russia's various regions.

The events in the North Caucasus cast doubt on some of our agreements, including at the level of our government.

Neither the West nor the East will rush to invest its capital in unstable and criminogenic regions. Against this background it is gratifying that the Russian Trans-Urals Region and the Far East have actively joined entrepreneurial activity. Of course, this is largely due to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations.

Finally, concerning mutual information. Indeed, we should see to it that collections of adopted laws and other documents, which, in fact, would be aids during the preparation of our delegations for foreign trips, are promptly sent through departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is extremely important. Our efforts should boil down to developing the potential of foreign trade, foreign economic, and cultural relations, including on behalf of the oblasts and republics of our state.

**V.V. Vinogradov, director of the Consular Service Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.**

Of course, the Consultative Council provides great opportunities for an exchange of views for interaction in practical terms. Furthermore, we have a tested mechanism of interaction—daily operational contacts through our representative offices in Federation subjects. By now 19 such representative offices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been established and operate. I would also like to say that in our country there was a limit to the opening of 20 representative offices in RF territory. It was stipulated by the presidential edict dated 25 February 1992 and, in fact, was exhausted. Upon the application of both Federation subjects and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs this limit was additionally expanded to 20 representative offices. The procedure for the establishment and financing of new representative offices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Chuvash Republic, Khakasia, and Kamchatka, Lipetsk, Samara, and Sverdlovsk oblasts was coordinated. We await answers to our proposals regarding similar appeals from the leadership of Buryatia, Dagestan, Tatarstan, Kalmykia, Krasnodar and Krasnoyarsk krays, and Amur, Arkhangelsk, Voronezh, Novosibirsk, and Perm oblasts. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in agreement with the Ministry of Finance assumes the financing of the wage fund for workers at representative offices. The administration of Federation subjects undertakes the expenditures on the maintenance of representative offices, including the leasing of official and residential premises, municipal payments, operation of transport and communication facilities, and protection. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also responsible for the provision of personnel for these institutions. We follow both the path of hiring local representatives and local residents for work at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of sending workers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on a mission to one city or another and to one region or another. Both of these alternatives are in effect. Therefore, everything depends, basically, on the wish of local authorities. If they have their own trained workers, who can perform these functions, we are pleased to hire these workers for work at our offices and to put them on the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as representatives or workers at the representative office. They undergo practical training not only in the consular department, but in all the subdivisions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Until recently the functions of representative offices were basically passport and visa functions. In 2 months of 1994 representative offices issued 14,000 passports for traveling abroad. Visa support was provided for foreigners' entry in almost 16,000 cases. More than one-third of the mentioned services were provided upon the direct appeals of local bodies of power. We direct them toward providing help and assistance to leaders of regions in such matters as official business trips abroad and participation in the preparation of treaties and agreements so as not to violate the Federative Treaty. Of course, in various regions the work of representative offices also has its own characteristic features. If we take Petrozavodsk (Karelia), our representative office participates in the activity of the working group for the development of Karelia-North Finland regional cooperation and of the Karelia-East Finland Consultative Commission. For example, the representative office in Khabarovsk participates in the work of the Commission for the Licensing of International Tourist Activity in Khabarovsk Kray. Our representatives work actively in the Adygea Republic and in the country's other regions. The role of representative offices increases, which meets the interests of Russian Federation subjects. However, we try to dispose our representative offices toward an ever more active participation in the economic activity of regions and in ensuring their foreign economic relations.

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At the requests of regions, through our foreign representative offices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we are given information, for example, on laws operating in one country or another and on trade customs in one locality or another abroad, so that our exporters and Russian businessmen may enter the foreign market more efficiently.

Our representative offices abroad also provide other assistance to Russians. For example, the RF consul-general in Antwerp helped one of our Russian firms to get back about 50,000 dollars, which an unscrupulous Belgian partner owed it. Several cases of attempts by unscrupulous Western partners to establish contacts with Russians were averted.

Passport and visa work is another direction in the activity of the consular service. Basically, this is technical work. It has now become complicated in many respects, because, first of all, Western countries impose tough restrictions on trips by Russian citizens. We want to let our Western partners understand that this one-sided and, I would say, discriminatory attitude toward Russian citizens must be stopped.

Now, literally every day, we receive dozens of letters containing complaints by Russian citizens about discriminatory measures on the part of foreign consular services. In fact, our tourism to Germany and the United States has decreased. Inturist gave me these data. Now our main flows of tourism are to Turkey, Cyprus, and the Arab Emirates. Incidentally, an agreement on a full visa-free regime of trips by Russians to Cyprus will be signed in Cyprus in the next few days. We want to further follow the path of strengthening the contractual base of our mutual visa relations.

With regard to visa support today any participant in foreign economic relations can invite a foreigner. However, I repeat, this is today. We are now looking into the question of the introduction of a so-called centralized invitation. It is a matter of civilized control of foreigners' entry and departure.

Discussing the passport activity of our representative offices, I would like to talk about one tendency, which, unfortunately, is observed not only in Moscow, but also in regions—when, in particular, managers of various large firms and enterprises begin to demand service and diplomatic passports for themselves. A diplomatic or a service passport indicates, first of all, the status of a person within the framework of the state system of administration, no more and no less. When a businessman travels with a diplomatic or a service passport, this evokes surprise and suspicion.

Regarding the symbols on our foreign documents I can say that the forms of our new diplomatic, service, and red passports are ready. We will introduce them at the beginning of 1995. Old general civilian passports with former Union symbols in current use will be in effect simultaneously until their expiration date. We will withdraw service or diplomatic passports during 1995 and exchange them.

**A.V. Blokhin, director of the Department for Contacts With Federation Subjects, the Parliament, and Socio-Political Organizations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.**

First of all, I would like to note that we have a frank and interested talk about the forms of interaction in the international sphere of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Federation subjects. Constructive proposals on the practice of their implementation are being discussed. The volume of international relations of Federation subjects has expanded. First of all, the complex socio-economic situation, the impossibility of solving many problems by the traditional method, with the help of central and federal bodies, and the shortage of financial resources allocated to federal bodies of power are some of the reasons for this. As is obvious, the attraction of foreign investments and the sale of finished products produced by Federation subjects, which, owing to the disruption of the country's internal economic relations and the general economic crisis, cannot be sold within the framework of the previous centralized system of economic management, are the goals of these kinds of contacts.

As I see it, the problem lies not in the number of contacts, there are more than enough of them, but in the fact that this vast number, we will say this, does not develop into the necessary quality. However, the existing negative examples, of course, do not mean at all that Federation subjects should not develop international and foreign economic relations. Conversely, this is a natural process, the manifestation of a fully understandable attempt to realize one's legitimate interests, which, moreover, are specified by the RF Constitution. We together should give thought to and find the place of foreign relations of Federation subjects in the general system of our state's international relations and develop an efficient mechanism of their realization, so that it fits into Russia's foreign political course. For an analysis of the experience in the realization of international relations under conditions of the Federation it is necessary to take, as the starting point, the provisions of the RF Constitution. If the Constitution does not have the appropriate articles, it is necessary to turn to the practice of other federative states and, adapting it to our conditions, to affirm it in the form of Russian laws. The principle of the Federation's supremacy in the area of international relations is indisputable.

In most federative states the coordination of international relations of Federation subjects pertains to the exclusive competence of the Federation's responsibility. However, Russia's Constitution, Article 72, paragraph V, states that the coordination of international and

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foreign economic relations of Russian Federation subjects is under the joint authority of the Russian Federation and its subjects. Therefore, the role of the consultative body as personified by our council is of special significance for Russia.

Now I would like to say a few words about the very concept of "coordination." For some reason very many people by the word "coordination" mean only one thing—control on the part of federal structures with respect to Federation subjects. It seems to me that this is a big error, because, in my opinion, coordination represents a unified mechanism of correlation of the interests of federal structures and Federation subjects. The Council of the Barents/Euro-Arctic Region international organization is a graphic example of cooperation. The point is that the very essence of this organization and of its structure presupposes a close coordination between central and regional bodies.

I would like to single out three or four basic factors, which we encounter in practical work. There seem to be two forms of agreements, which Federation subjects could realize under certain conditions; for example, the agreement at the level of federal bodies on matters directly concerning a specific region. Let us take the treaty between Russia and Cyprus on cooperation in Krasnodar Kray. This is a graphic example when regarding the problem of a specific region a treaty is concluded between two sovereign states in accordance with norms and international law. It seems to me that for Federation subjects this is a very promising path. However, this cannot be abused. These kinds of agreements should be concluded only if it is a matter of some very major problem. The agreement between Russia and Finland, where the text of the agreement itself provides for interregional cooperation between two countries, is another example. This gives the legal basis for the development of regional relations.

I will cite an example when an agreement violating international law and Russian legislation was concluded. One of the regions of the Russian Federation, I do not want to mention it here, concluded an agreement with representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany on the construction of an educational center. This agreement contained obligations, which the Federation subject was unable to fulfill, and this was obvious even at first glance. Neither the Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor Russia's Government was informed of this. A huge amount of money was spent and, when the German side fulfilled its obligations in a full volume, the federal government received from the leadership of this subject a request for the allocation of additional funds amounting to 9 billion rubles. Of course, the subject received nothing, because it did not coordinate its obligations in advance with the federal government.

In accordance with the aims of Russia's top leadership the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sees its task in maintaining constant contacts with Federation subjects and in giving them consultative and expert help in the realization of their interests and constitutional rights in this sphere.

I will touch upon another problem—representative offices of Federation subjects abroad. Such representative offices are established and financed by the Federation subjects themselves. They do not perform diplomatic and consular functions, do not have an appropriate diplomatic immunity, and cannot be open without the recommendation of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The procedure for the coordination of this matter is the following: The Federation subject as personified by its first head of executive power sends a letter to the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the intention to open its representative office abroad. The letter also contains substantiation and provisions regarding the nature of such a representative office. After an expert evaluation of this proposal by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its positive decision the final text of the provisions regarding the representative office, which is approved by the first head of executive power of the Federation subject, and the draft edict or the draft directive of the head of the administration on who is appointed the representative of the Federation subject are sent to the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs studies this matter with the foreign state and gives an answer to the Federation subject.

Of course, the expansion of foreign relations of Russian Federation subjects, if they are implemented within the constitutional framework, ultimately, corresponds to the interests of the regions themselves and of the Russian state as a whole, as well as to the cause of strengthening international stability. I would like to express our common conviction that the Consultative Council will not be transformed into some formal body. On our part we will promote the strict implementation of international and foreign economic relations of Federation subjects in the direction of Russia's general foreign political line and its international obligations.

**M.M. Gusayev, minister of nationality affairs and foreign relations of the Dagestan Republic.**

On behalf of Dagestan's leadership I would like to express gratitude to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the initiative to establish the Consultative Council. I believe that there is an urgent need to increase the awareness of Federation subjects of key questions concerning Russia's foreign policy and the development of the situation in the world and to involve their representatives in international negotiations and conferences, as well as in the solution of problems of international activity affecting the interests of Russian regions. A bulletin—a distinctive data bank, in which information on international and foreign economic relations of Federation subjects could be included, would serve the goals of increased awareness.

Difficulties connected with the lack of an efficiently elaborated and time-tested legal base arise in our

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country. We cannot wait until an appropriate legislative base is established and verified by practice. Specific problems must be solved daily. I think that in this respect the Consultative Council should provide practical assistance. First of all, it is a matter of the development of Dagestan's economic relations with border states, as well as of other questions of border cooperation. Dagestan borders on CIS countries and Iran. A total of 1,200 out of 1,700 km of the republic's border is with independent states.

The fate of the Caspian Sea is being decided now. We are also concerned about this problem, including the question of demarcation of maritime borders and of an efficient utilization of Caspian Sea resources, as well as about biological problems and questions of cooperation of states near the Caspian Sea. The next question that disturbs us is connected with divided nations. The Russian people are in the most tragic situation. The Russians in Dagestan are also native inhabitants of our republic. When official documents raise the question of the protection of ethnic Russians, this concept should be everywhere. In Azerbaijan today there are several hundreds of thousands of our compatriots, but, according to the Federative Treaty and articles of the Constitution, we have no powers to take care of them. What is to be done? A number of RF Government decrees on these matters were adopted. Not a single one as yet has been fulfilled.

The question concerning the conclusion of treaties and the delegations sent is the next one. We are correctly criticized that during the conclusion of agreements with other countries we exceed the bounds of our powers. Therefore, we need specific associates at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which would supervise Dagestan and provide assistance in this. Let us take Azerbaijan. Russia borders on this state only within the bounds of its subject—Dagestan. We resolve criminals' arrests on the border and other matters at our discretion, not knowing that there is an appropriate agreement. It is not clear why we were not invited to participate in the drafting of this agreement, under which there would be the signature of the Federation subject. Other documents directly concerning Dagestan are also signed at the federal level, but no one turns to us for advice. On our part we ask you to involve us in the preparation and signing of such agreements.

**V.P. Artamonov, minister of foreign relations of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia).**

The Sakha Republic (Yakutia) as a Russian Federation subject, implementing its international relations, is guided primarily by the general concept of RF foreign policy. From the moment of signing of the Federative Treaty and adoption of the Constitution of the RF and of its constituent republics Federation subjects have acquired a new status, including in matters of implementation of international and foreign economic relations. The Federative Treaty has reserved for RF subjects the right to independently participate in international and foreign economic relations. With the adoption of the Federative Treaty the status of republics has changed significantly and the framework of action of Federation subjects on the international arena has expanded. The international activity of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) is built on the basis of our national interests with due regard for the ethno-political, socio-economic, and historico-cultural affiliation of our people.

In politico-legal terms the republic in its foreign economic and international activity is guided by the RF Constitution, the Federative Treaty, and the Constitution of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) and acts within its competence as a Federation subject. In the last 2 years our republic has established business contacts with more than 40 states in the near and the distant abroad on all continents and has opened its representative offices in Kiev, Alma-Ata, Riga, and Tokyo. To date our republic has signed agreements with Latvia, Mongolia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Hungary, and a number of states and provinces of foreign countries.

The Sakha Republic (Yakutia) National Committee on UNESCO Affairs has operated in our country since 1991. The republic is a participant in the Northern Forum international regional organization, where our President M.Ye. Nikolayev was elected vice-chairman of this organization. Our republic is also a member-observer of the international organization of nations and nationalities not represented at the UN. As a member of the Northern Forum the republic participates in the elaboration of plans for international cooperation, in particular, such as the Northern Sea Route and the establishment of the Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the Arctic and of the Academy of Sciences of Northern Regions. We also consider ourselves a part of Asia and gravitate toward the Asian-Pacific Ocean Region. We try to establish economic, cultural, and scientific relations with all countries of this region. Thus, today our republic has the opportunity to develop foreign economic, cultural, and scientific relations with many countries.

The RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs, taking our republic's new status into consideration, has maximally promoted the activation of its participation in international affairs and continues to do so. Today we can state that our relations with the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs are good and fully satisfy us. Moreover, I would like to express gratitude to the ministry's structural subdivisions, as well as to its representative offices abroad, with which we maintain contacts. We do not have critical remarks directed at the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs and I would like to stress that the establishment of the Consultative Council has become an important step toward the creation of a reliable mechanism of interaction between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and regions.

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**A.G. Songal, chief of the Administration for International Affairs of the Administration of Kaliningrad Oblast.**

The establishment of such a body as the Russian Federation Subjects Consultative Council is a step in the right direction, which will make it possible to solve the problems facing us. I would like to mention that Kaliningrad Oblast is a part of Russia, where 1 million Russians live in a territory of approximately 100 square km. Then there are borders of sovereign states—Lithuania and Poland. The realization of such a new situation did not come right away, first of all, to federal bodies, since residents of the oblast felt these changes much earlier. I must say that many of the painful problems of misunderstanding, which existed between us and federal bodies, were resolved happily 2 or 3 years ago. The RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave us considerable assistance. With its assistance we solved specific problems of the region's survival. There are two basic problems here: The connection with the Russian Federation and ensuring the necessary conditions for economic development. It should be stressed that, largely owing to the professionalism and persistent work of specialists at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was possible to eliminate the acuteness of problems connected with our citizens' and freight transit. Although the problem of passenger transit through the territory of the Lithuanian Republic and Latvia has not been solved completely. It was possible to solve problems of the opening of border crossings, which hardly existed in the oblast. In fact, we now have them for all types of transport.

The representative office of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs and representative offices of the Lithuanian Republic and of the Polish Republic were opened in Kaliningrad and representative offices of Kaliningrad, in Poland and Lithuania. A mechanism of cooperation with border regions has been established and operates. We have agreements with five Polish border provinces. They were concluded within the framework of the existing agreement between the Russian Federation and the Polish Republic on cooperation between Kaliningrad Oblast and Poland's north-east provinces. In the last 2 years it has also been possible to set up the mechanism of realization of this agreement, which initially operated in the form of a "roundtable" and now, as a Russian-Polish Coordinating Council. This body has transferred cooperation between Russia and Poland into a practical plane. Twelve commissions and working groups operate.

Commission meetings are held regularly during the year and sessions of authorized delegates of representative offices are also being organized. An appropriate form of regional cooperation—the framework agreement—has been found. Yu.S. Matochkin, head of the Administration of Kaliningrad Oblast, is the authorized agent of Russia's Government for the realization of this agreement. Within the framework of the existing agreement he solves all practical problems on behalf of the federal government. We would like to have such a framework agreement with Lithuania, because the previously concluded agreement between the RSFSR and Lithuania is not satisfactory. For now negotiations with Lithuania are proceeding with difficulty. We also need the support of the center in the matter of transit through Poland and Belorussia. In my opinion, the problem of Kaliningrad Oblast in Russian-German relations deserves a more attentive and delicate approach. In Kaliningrad Oblast to this day there is no representative office of Germany. Germany's investments in the economy of Kaliningrad Oblast are still small, totaling several million dollars. Russian capital forms the basis in the joint Russian-German venture, which is building a road in the direction of Poland. At the same time, in the joint project with France on the modernization of communication French capital makes up 4 percent.

In foreign economic relations we experience difficulties not only with the attraction of investments, but also with the delivery of freight from Russia, which must pass about 20 custom houses. We have to spend a great deal of effort precisely in this direction. We hope that the established Consultative Council will give us assistance.

**I.S. Ivanov's Concluding Speech**

First of all, I would like once again to thank all those present for participating in the work of our first meeting. I have the impression that the meeting of the Consultative Council was held in a constructive channel and that like-minded persons, whose efforts were directed toward a search for mutually acceptable solutions, gathered there.

I think that the council must gather in order to solve specific problems, so that people leave this place not with empty hands and, if not with solutions, at least with outlined ways of solving problems. I would like to attempt to answer several questions raised at the meeting.

R.Kh. Garifulin, minister of foreign relations of the Bashkortostan Republic, made a proposal about the establishment of an information center under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In principle, this information center could be established under our DIPLOMATICHESKIY VESTNIK or another structure. We could establish it on a joint financial basis with regions and determine the range of problems, which must be illuminated in this publication. The bulletin could include various normative documents, reports of delegations, communiques on the opening of representative offices of Federation subjects, and other matters. It is desirable that this bulletin become a tool for the expansion of the interaction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and regions and contain a bank of data on international and foreign economic relations of Federation subjects. If we receive your support, then by the next council meeting we will have solved all organizational problems. The establishment under the consular service of a supernumerary firm, which would provide consular services for official delegations of Federation subjects going abroad, is the second proposal by the minister of Bashkortostan. We will try to look into this question and to send our proposals to Federation subjects. There was also the proposal to hear and adopt a decision on a set of

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questions connected with the customs regime at the next meeting, or at one of the meetings. This is especially important for Federation subjects having border trade.

We hope that with the assistance of the Consultative Council under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs we will manage to organize the coordination of the activity of federal ministries and departments in the area of international and foreign economic relations. As you know, the Coordinating Council of Regions exists under the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and, obviously, all of us together must give thought to how, on the basis of the competence of our ministries, to build relations between two such representative bodies. Taking your proposals into consideration, we intend to put forward to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations the initiative to create a mechanism of interaction.

I fully agree with the proposal by the council member from Kalmykia that our council engage primarily in the development of specific forms of interaction between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Federation subjects in the international sphere. There is also the proposal by I.P. Timokhin from Bryansk concerning the participation of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the meeting of the Council of Heads of Russia's and Ukraine's Oblasts for the solution of problems of border territories.

Improvement in the mechanism of coordination of foreign relations of Federation subjects in the interests of ensuring a uniform political line of the Russian state in relations with foreign countries and international organizations is the goal of the establishment of the Consultative Council. The basic, starting position should be the same for all regions and then, of course, we should take into consideration the specific nature of every Federation subject.

With due regard for your proposals the Secretariat of the Consultative Council will prepare a draft agenda for the second meeting and develop a plan of measures, which would include such important matters as the delimitation of powers between the Russian Federation and subjects in the sphere of international and foreign economic relations and the creation of the concept of border cooperation among regions, including a draft law on the status of the border kray, oblast, and republic within the Russian Federation.

I fully accept the criticism and remarks that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not provide sufficient information support for regions. This is our misfortune, which is brought about, first, by the shortage of personnel, second, by the lack of appropriate organizational structures, and, third, by the scarcity of financial resources. Every day from the U.S. Embassy the Federation Council and the Duma receive a bulletin, setting forth this country's position on basic international problems. An entire institute operates in the United States, which transmits all the information to them in a few minutes. In the U.S. Embassy this information is automatically printed out on duplicating machines and is distributed to all the authorities, to the notice of which they want to bring their point of view. You visited our ministry. You can also visit it today and become convinced of our limited resources. We are now forced to reduce the budget by another 30 percent, like any other ministry. And so, for now we will begin with the information bulletin. We will think how to solve this problem.

As you know, the functions of the Secretariat of the Consultative Council are entrusted to the Department for Contacts With Federation Subjects, the Parliament, and Socio-Political Organizations—a subdivision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs especially established for the coordination of international and foreign economic relations of Federation subjects. The Statute on the Department for Contacts with Federation Subjects, the Parliament, and Socio-Political Organizations and contact telephones of the department's executives have been distributed to you. We will await information from you. Above all, we want to establish daily informal contacts on all arising matters with regions.

Regarding their current problems members of the Consultative Council can turn to the indicated department and, as I assume, you can always expect competent help and assistance.

Regarding the results of today's meeting a shorthand record of the meeting and of the principal speeches, as well as a list of recommendations and proposals expressed by members of the Consultative Council, will be sent to all members of the Consultative Council.

Materials of the meeting will be published in publications of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs, disseminated among members of the Consultative Council, and sent to appropriate federal ministries and departments.

Now, taking into consideration the fact that we have agreed to discuss everything openly, in the spirit of mutual understanding, I would like to answer another question. The presidium received a request from an observer from the Chechen Republic with the suggestion that on behalf of our Consultative Council we turn to the Russian Federation President regarding the question of events in Chechnya. I assume, and this has already been discussed here, that the council was established for fully defined goals. If we begin to use the council for the solution of other problems not within its competence, the activity of this body will have no meaning. The representative of Kalmykia has just said that the leadership of this republic and the leadership of other Federation subjects have already determined their positions on this matter. The position of the Government and of the President of Russia is known. We will hardly be able to add anything. I propose that the statement by the observer from the Chechen Republic not be submitted for discussion. On behalf of council members I would like to express the hope that the representative from the Chechen Republic, who is here as an observer, will soon become a full-fledged member of our council.

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On the whole, in the opinion of the ministry's executives, the first meeting of the Consultative Council was held in a productive manner and in a constructive spirit and enriched us mutually. Still ahead lies a great deal of work on the solution of problems, which have become clearly visible as a result of the debate held here.

Permit me to wish you success in our common activity.

## *Edict Confirms Statute on Russian Foreign Ministry

### *Text of Edict

*954E0817A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 31 Mar 95 p 5*

[Text of Russian Federation Presidential Edict: "On Ratifying the Statute on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation," signed by President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin in Moscow on 14 March 1995, No 271]

[FBIS Translated Text]

1. The appended Statute on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation shall be ratified.
2. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, shall be given proposals on introducing changes stemming from the present edict into the appropriate standard statutes, within a month's time and in accordance with the established procedure.

[Signed] President of the Russian Federation B. YELTSIN
Moscow, the Kremlin
14 March 1995, No 271

### *Text of Statute

*954E0817B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 31 Mar 95 p 5*

[Text of Russian Federation Statute: "On the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation," date and place of signing unknown]

[FBIS Translated Text]

1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MFA of Russia) is a federal organ of executive power implementing state administration in the sphere of relations of the Russian Federation with foreign states and international organizations.

   The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation is subordinate to the President of the Russian Federation on questions assigned to the President of the Russian Federation by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, or in accordance with the legislative statutes of the Russian Federation.

2. In its activity, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation is guided by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the federal laws, edicts and directives of the President of the Russian Federation, decrees and directives of the Government of the Russian Federation, as well as by the present Statute.

3. The system of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation includes diplomatic representations and consular institutions of the Russian Federation, representations of the Russian Federation at international (inter-state, inter-governmental) organizations (henceforth referred to as representations abroad), representations of the ministry on the territory of the Russian Federation, as well as enterprises, institutions and organizations subordinate to it on the territory of the Russian Federation, established for provision of activity of the ministry (henceforth referred to as subordinate organizations).

4. The primary tasks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation are:

   —Development of a general strategy of foreign policy of the Russian Federation and presentation of the appropriate proposals to the President of the Russian Federation;

   —Realization of the foreign political course of the Russian Federation;

   —Coordination of international relations of subjects of the Russian Federation;

   —Provision of diplomatic means of protection of the sovereignty, security, territorial integrity and other interests of the Russian Federation on the international arena;

   —Protection of the rights and interests of citizens and legal entities of the Russian Federation abroad;

   —Provision of diplomatic and consular relations of the Russian Federation with foreign states, and relations with international organizations;

   —Coordination of activity and control over the work of other federal organs of executive power for purposes of ensuring the implementation of a unified political line of the Russian Federation in relations with foreign states and international organizations.

5. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, in accordance with the tasks placed upon it:

   —Develops and submits to the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation, in accordance with the established procedure, proposals on questions of relations of the Russian Federation with foreign states and international organizations on the basis of analysis

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of information on the entire complex of bilateral and multilateral relations and international problems;

—Develops drafts of international treaties of the Russian Federation, prepares proposals on concluding, fulfilling, terminating and interrupting the effectiveness of treaties, and in accordance with the established procedure submits these proposals for review by the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation; Conducts negotiations with foreign states and international organizations;

—Generally oversees the fulfillment of international treaties of the Russian Federation; Participates in the preparation of proposals on bringing the legislation of the Russian Federation into line with its international-legal obligations;

—Participates in the development of policy and specific measures for ensuring the rights and freedoms of citizens of the Russian Federation, its defense and security, implementation of conversion of its defense industry, as well as expansion of trade-economic and financial relations, scientific-technical, cultural and other exchanges of the Russian Federation with foreign states and international organizations;

—Realizes through diplomatic means the efforts of the Russian Federation in ensuring international peace, global and regional security, including with consideration for the obligations of the Russian Federation as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, participant in the common European process, and other regional mechanisms;

—Ensures the participation of the Russian Federation in the activity of the United Nations Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and other international organizations, conferences and forums, and aids in increasing the role of the Russian Federation as a member of the world community in the resolution of global and regional international problems;

—Provides the necessary conditions for functioning of the central apparatus, representations abroad, representations of the ministry on the territory of the Russian Federation and subordinate organizations; Submits to the President of the Russian Federation and to the Government of the Russian Federation proposals on the organizations, financial and other questions associated with their activity, in accordance with the established procedure;

—Gives permission to interested organs of executive power for dissemination of official information on questions concerning the foreign political course of the Russian Federation, including publication of dates of upcoming visits by leaders of the Russian state abroad and by leaders of foreign states and international organizations to Russia, as well as for illuminating the course of such visits;

—Aids in the dissemination abroad of information regarding the foreign and domestic policy of the Russian Federation, and the country's social-economic, cultural and spiritual life;

—Participates in the protocol provision of inter-state exchanges at the high and highest levels, and also implements control over adherence to diplomatic and consular privileges and immunities;

—Aids in implementing inter-parliamentary and other foreign relations of the Federal Assembly;

—Informs foreign represenatations on questions of foreign and domestic policy;

—Ensures the functioning of a unified state system of registration and accounting of international agreements of the Russian Federation;

—Ensures the permanent safekeeping of originals (certified copies, official translations) of international treaties of the Russian Federation, archive materials on the foreign policy of Russia, and performs accounting and application of documents kept in permanent safekeeping;

—Implements staffing of the central apparatus, the representations abroad, the representations of the ministry on the territory of the Russian Federation and subordinate organizations; Organizes the training, re-training and advanced training of cadres of the diplomatic service;

—Organizes consular work on the territory of the Russian Federation and abroad;

—Aids in the development of relations and contacts with fellow countrymen living abroad;

—Formulates passport-visa documentation in accordance with the established procedure;

—Ensures implementation of diplomatic-courier communication;

—Administers questions of citizenship within the limits of its competency;

—Provides assistance in the functioning of foreign diplomatic and consular representations on the territory of the Russian Federation and, for purposes of ensuring fulfillment of international obligations of the Russian Federation, within the limits of its competency implements control over the activity of the enterprises, institutions and organizations serving them;

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—Cooperates with the organs of state power of the Russian Federation, organs of state power of subjects of the Russian Federation, organs of local self-government, and public associations;

—Performs capital construction and reconstruction on the territory of the Russian Federation and abroad of facilities of subordinate organizations and representations abroad; Manages housing construction, and also implements centralized financing and material-technical provision of representations abroad;

—Fulfills other functions specified by Russain Federation legislation.

6. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russain Federation, for the purpose of fulfilling the tasks assigned to it, has the following rights:

—To receive, in accordance with the established procedure, from the organs of state power of the Russian Federation, the organs of state power of subjects of the Russian Federation, the organs of local self-government, as well as enterprises, institutions and organizations, (regardless of their organizational-legal forms and departmental affiliation), documents, reference and other materials necessary for resolution of questions entering into the ministry's competency; To forward information in accordance with the established procedure to the said organs, enterprises, institutions and organizations;

—To implement control over the correspondence of Russian Federation legislation to international-legal drafts of international treaties of the Russian Federation;

—To submit for review by the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation proposals on development of drafts of legislative statutes on questions of foreign policy and the diplomatic service, in accordance with the established procedure;

—To submit, in accordance with the established procedure, proposals on instituting ministry representations on the territory of the Russian Federation;

—To make decisions of a normative character in accordance with the established procedure, which are mandatory for fulfillment by other federal organs of executive power, organs of executive power of subjects of the Russian Federation, organs of local self-government, as well as enterprises, institutions and organizations, regardless of their organizational-legal forms and departmental subordination, in their implementation of international contacts;

—To resolve, in accordance with the procedure established by the Russian Federation legislation, questions associated with the creation, reorganization and liquidation of subordinate organizations, and appointment of their representatives to their duties and dismissal from them; To perform inspections and verifications of financial-economic activity;

—To utilize, in accordance with the established procedure, extra-budgetary funds received from provision of consular and other types of services for financing the development of the ministry's material-technical base, for social needs and for material incentives of its workers.

7. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation is headed by the minister, who is appointed to his duties and dismissed from them by the President of the Russian Federation upon nomination by the Chairman of Government of the Russian Federation.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation has deputies who appointed to the position and dismissed from it by the President of the Russian Federation, and delegates responsibilites to them.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation bears personal responsibility for fulfillment of the tasks charged to the ministry and for fulfillment of its functions.

8. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation:

—Manages the activity of the ministry, approves statutes on its structural subdivisions, as well as statutes (directives) on its subordinate organizations; Defines the competency of officials within the system of the ministry in resolving organizational, cadre, financial, production-economic and other questions;

—Issues directives and instructions, gives directions on questions of activity of the central apparatus of the ministry, its representations abroad, representations of the ministry on the territory of the Russian Federation, and subordinate organizations;

—Submits proposals in accordance with the established procedure on appointment or recall of envoys of the Russian Federation in foreign states and representatives of the Russian Federation to international (inter-state, inter-governmental) organizations, on appointment or dismissal of heads of state and governmental delegations of the Russian Federation;

—Represents the Russian Federation at bilateral and multilateral negotiations, signs international treaties of the Russian Federation at the direction of the President of the Russian Federation or the Government of the Russian Federation;

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—Represents the ministry in interrelations with organs of state power of the Russian Federation, organs of state power of subjects of the Russian Federation, organs of state power of foreign states, as well as with international organizations;

—Approves the structure and the staff roster of the ministry's central apparatus and its representations on the territory of the Russian Federation within the limits of the established wage fund and the number of its workers, as well as the estimate of expenses for their maintenance, within the limits of the budget allocations approved for the corresponding period;

—Approves the staff roster of representations abroad within the limits of the established wage fund and number of workers, as well as the estimate of expenses for maintenance of the representations abroad within the limits of specified budget allocations;

—Within the limits of his competency, appoints and dismisses managerial workers of the ministry's central apparatus and representations abroad, as well as other workers within the system of the ministry;

—In accordance with the established procedure, nominates workers who have distinguished themselves for awarding of state prizes of the Russian Federation and for granting of honorary titles of the Russian Federation;

—In accordance with the established procedure, bestows diplomatic ranks ranging from attache to advisor 1st class inclusively, and also submits requests to the President of the Russian Federation for bestowing the diplomatic ranks of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary 1st and 2nd Class;

—Exercises other rights in accordance with the Russian Federation legislation.

9. A governing board is formed within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, whose complement includes the minister (chairman of the governing board), his deputies (by duties), as well as other administrative workers of the ministry system.

   The members of the ministry's governing board, aside from the persons entering into its complement by duty, are approved by the President of the Russian Federation.

   The governing board reviews the most important questions of activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and makes the appropriate decisions.

   The decisions of the governing board are adopted by a majority of the votes of its members in the form of statutes, and are implemented, as a rule, by directives of the minister. In the case of differences of opinion between the minister and the governing board, the minister implements his decision, reporting in accordance with the established procedure to the President of the Russian Federation or the Government of the Russian Federation on the differences which have arisen. The members of the governing board who hold a specific opinion on the adopted decision may also report on it respectively to the President of the Russian Federation or to the Government of the Russian Federation.

10. For purposes of developing scientifically substantiated proposals on questions of foreign policy of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation may form scientific-consultative, methodological and expert councils.

    The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation approves the membership complement of the councils and the statute on them.

    Organizational-technical provision of the activity of the said councils is performed by the central apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

11. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, in accordance with the established procedure, publishes journals, bulletins and other printed publications on questions relating to its activity.

12. Financing the activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation is performed at the expense of federal budget funds, allocated for maintenance of federal organs of executive power.

13. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation is a legal entity and has a stamp bearing the likeness of the State Seal of the Russian Federation and its name, appropriate stamps and seals, and accounts in banking institutions of the Russian Federation, including foreign currency accounts.

14. Control over the activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation is implemented, in accordinace with the appropriate directions of activity of the ministry, by the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation.

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## *New Envoys to Slovenia, OAS Appointed

*954Q0170A Moscow DIPLOMATICHESKIY VESTNIK in Russian No 2, Feb 95 (signed to press 21 Feb 95) pp 69-70*

[Article: "New Appointments"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The following appointments were made by Edict of the President of the Russian Federation: **Nikiforov, Aleksey Leonidovich**—Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Slovenia.

Nikiforov, A. L., born 1937, Russian. In 1960, graduated by Moscow State University of International Relations; in 1973, by Higher Diplomatic School. Fluent in English, French, Serbo-Croatian, and Hindi.

Has been in the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MFA] since 1960. Worked in various diplomatic assignments in the ministry's central apparatus and abroad.

In 1973-1980, first secretary, counsellor of the USSR Embassy in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia; in 1983-1989, counsellor of the USSR Embassy in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In 1990-1992, first deputy chief of the 3rd European Administration of USSR MFA. In 1992-1994, first deputy administration chief, European Department of Russian MFA. Since January 1994, first deputy director of 1st European Department, Russian MFA.

Has diplomatic rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. **Chernyshev, Vladimir Ivanovich**—Permanent Observer of the Russian Federation at the Organization of American States in Washington, United States.

Chernyshev, V. I., born 1929, Russian. In 1953, graduated by Moscow State Institute of International Relations, USSR MFA. Fluent in English, Spanish, and Portuguese.

In the MFA system since 1953. From 1953 through 1991, worked in various diplomatic assignments abroad and in the ministry's central apparatus. Since 1992, chief of the State Protocol Service, Russian MFA.

Has diplomatic rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiar

## *MFA Symposium on Russian Banks' International Operations

*954Q0170B Moscow DIPLOMATICHESKIY VESTNIK in Russian No 2, Feb 95 (signed to press 21 Feb 95) p 75*

[Article: "Symposium 'Russian Banks' International Operations'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 19-21 January a symposium entitled "Russian Banks' International Operations" was held at the Press Center of Russian MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MFA]. The symposium had been organized by the Russian MFA Economic Cooperation Department [DES] and Diplomatic Academy. Participants in the work of the symposium included representatives of the Federal Assembly, the president's administration, and the apparatus of the RF Government. Russian banking circles and the scientific public were broadly represented. A number of foreign banks (Bank of America, Deutsche Bundesbank, Chase Manhattan Bank, etc.) also sent their representatives.

The participants were addressed by A. S. Chernyshev, RF deputy minister of foreign affairs; P. S. Smirnov, director of MFA DES; and S. K. Romanovskiy, rector of the RF MFA Diplomatic Academy. A large amount of interest was evoked by reports on the basic trends in the policy of Russian Central Bank; the improvement of Russian banking legislation; problems of adaptation of Russian banks to the requirements of the world currency and financial system; long-range trends in investments of Western banks in Russia; and problems of currency and financial cooperation among Russia, the CIS countries, and Eastern Europe.

Then the work was conducted in two sections dealing with the topics: "Banking System and Investment Climate in Russia" and "Activity of Russian Banks Abroad." The topic in the center of attention of the first section was the role of the banking sector in expanding the influx of foreign investments, the development of the domestic market in securities, and the formation of industrial-financial groups. The second section concentrated on a discussion of the problems of exporting capital from Russia, and the prospects for the activity of Russian banks abroad. An important place was occupied by questions of international cooperation in the currency and finance area, and the role of international financial organizations (IMF, IBRD, EBRD) in investment projects in Russia, and primarily in the banking sphere.

A topic that became a separate object of discussion at the symposium was the problems and prospects of the participation of Russian banks in economic activity in the Asia-Pacific Region [APR]. That topic was discussed within the framework of a round table entitled: "Reproduction of Financial Resources in the APR," in the work of which representatives of the administration of the Eastern oblasts of Russia participated.

The symposium participants had the opportunity to become directly acquainted with the activity of the State Duma Subcommittee on Banking Legislation.

On the whole the initiative of RF MFA was deemed to be beneficial by all the symposium participants. Special emphasis was made of the pertinence of the format that had been chosen for the meeting—at the juncture of the interests of diplomacy, the legislative and executive authority, entrepreneurs, international financial organizations, and scientific circles. To a considerable extent the success of the symposium was promoted by the preparatory work that had been done by the MFA foreign representations in interaction with the Ministry's central apparatus and the Diplomatic Academy.

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## Cooperation With Finland on Refugee Policy

*95EN0195Z Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 10 Mar 95 p 7*

[Article by Riitta Vainio: "Russia Too Is Setting Up Refugee Center"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Finland is helping to formulate a refugee policy. The Russians are at present negotiating in Finland. A Finnish citizen will be participating in the planning of Russia's first refugee center right from the start. At the same time an exchange of trainers of refugee workers will be initiated between the two countries.*

The registration of refugees and the determination of refugee status have begun in St. Petersburg for the first time in the history of Russia.

Finland is helping to accelerate the formulation of a Russian refugee policy at the level required by international agreements.

Immigration officials of the city of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad area are right now in Finland negotiating cooperation on refugees between Finland and Russia.

### Refugee Center for Terijoki

They are planning to set up Russia's first refugee center in Terijoki or the east side of St. Petersburg. The center could hold from 200 to 300 people at a time. The idea is to finance the center with funds provided by the CIS countries.

Finland's possible participation in its funding will be decided on later.

"Whether Finland contributes to it will depend on the direction in which the system begins to evolve," negotiation official Esko Kiuru of the Foreign Ministry said on Thursday. He is responsible for the coordination of the migration and asylum policies at the ministry.

"Each country is obligated to see to it that its own problems are resolved. Now that we see that they are trying to move in the right direction, we want to help them strengthen this development," Kiuru said.

### Local Level Will Be Decisive

According to Sergey Tarashevich, the director of the St. Petersburg Migration Office, they are looking for a direction in which to orient their refugee policy in Russia. Defining it is foremost in the work of the officials who supervise immigration into both the city of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad area.

"Russia is a big country and it's difficult to resolve matters like these. The main emphasis in implementing the policy will be at the local level," he said.

According to Tarashevich, there is a total of 13,000 refugees in the city of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad area and all told 500,000 in Russia.

Refugees coming from former Soviet territory constitute a particular problem for Russia. Their affairs have been in the foreground in the local refugee policy up to now.

### 10,000 Illegal Refugees

"The fact that Russia's southern border is very transparent intensifies the problem. Refugees coming from Afghanistan can go directly to St. Petersburg very easily by train," he said.

It is estimated that there are 10,000 illegal refugees in the St. Petersburg area. Refugees from so-called distant foreign countries are granted temporary, three-month residence permits that are extended.

Now they are trying to see to it that the matter can be settled for every refugee and his family within three months.

### One Family Obtained Permission To Stay

Over 300 cases have to be dealt with at the present time. According to Tarashevich, the first decisions have been made.

The first decisions were negative because the conditions required by law were not met: They had not been persecuted in their homeland and they had not been subjected to physical violence in their country.

One affirmative decision was made in the case of an Afghan family of nine. They are at present looking for a home for the family.

A negative decision is followed by deportation, but the deportation procedure is indecisive.

Since the deportation procedure does not work, the Interior Ministry decides whether to grant the refugee a temporary residence permit or to deport him. Tarashevich said, however, that refugees are not detained in prisons.

### Border Surveillance Tightened

In accordance with orders issued by the president and the government, Russia's aim is to stiffen its refugee policy.

According to their plans, there will be separate immigration control posts for the border-crossing points. It will be their job to prevent illegal entry into the country and regulate the number of entrants.

The first posts have been instituted in St. Petersburg and the Leningrad area. They are to begin their activities in the near future. Aid for immigration control was also discussed during the negotiations on cooperation conducted in Finland.

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## *Illegal Import of Hazardous Wastes Continues

*95P50097A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Apr 95 p 4*

[Article by Tatyana Kharlamova: "Poison—By Transit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently 220 tonnes of poisonous industrial wastes were delivered from Australia to Russia. More and more often foreign firms are sending hazardous freight to our country.

Up until now Russia had no law which would protect us from arbitrary actions by unscrupulous entrepreneurs, making money by importing industrial wastes. This is at the expense of our health, since these wastes are extremenly toxic. Last year the Basel convention on control over cross-border shipments of hazardous wastes was ratified. But this law does not completely resolve all the painful problems. The Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources [Minpriroda] considers that only a complete ban on the import of hazardous wastes for any purpose—either burial or processing—can change the situation. Now a draft law on implementing the Basel convention is being prepared. But this takes time...

The steamship "Dmitriy Donskoy" docked at the port in St. Petersburg. But its unloading was unsuccessful. It was decided to subject the humanitarian cargo from a foreign firm—coal for Tver—to an expert evaluation. It turned out that only 25 percent [of the cargo] in the hold was coal while the remainder was household and industrial wastes. An ordinary humanitarian package with a poisonous filling. And, it would seem, such a noble affair.

The steamship stayed and stayed in the port and the businessmen realized that this would hardly "turn out well" for them so the ship set sail for Murmansk. But this northern port was frozen and the unlucky "Dmitriy Donskoy" was once again held up. The fate of its freight is still unknown.

Beginning in 1992, foreign firms using various pretexts were actively shipping industrial wastes to Russia and after processing them in our enterprises they were receiving nickel, cobalt and other valuable products.

These attempts are increasing more and more. Last year, under the guise of raw material, they shipped one thousand tonnes of waste to the Orsk—Khalinovskiy combine, the processing of which can cause no small damage to the environment and to people's health. The combine's management, despite the fantastic profits the deal had promised, refused it. The reason: the enterprise's lack of technology for safe processing. The freight was returned to St. Petersburg. Suddenly the customs workers discovered some kind of errors in its official registration. And here is thee paradox: the useless freight was confiscated "for the state." Minpriroda sent a letter to the government requesting that the issue be resolved correctly by returning the freight to its owner.

"The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations handles the licensing of cross-border shipments," comments Vladimir Ivanov, chief of the wastes section of the Department of State Ecological Monitoring. "But granting certain types of licenses is only possible with Minpriroda's permission. It is necessary for each importer to present a certificate of the freight being shipped, its origin and composition. These conditions are rarely fulfilled."

Dutch, Spanish, Israeli and even Australian firms, taking advantage of the unstable economic situation in Russia, are searching for loopholes that make it not only simple, but also advantageous for them to rid their flourishing countries of hazardous substances, the processing of which would harm the environment and which is forbidden by local legislation.

For example, as a division of the international Greenpeace Council organization learned that recently Australia shipped to Russia 220 tonnes of poisonous industrial wastes under the guise of cobalt-containing secondary raw material. In addition to cobalt, this "secondary raw material" produced by the Australian company contains cadmium, lead, nickel, germanium, arsenic and other highly toxic substances.

The participants in the deal received permission for the import from the Russian Federation Economics Ministry. However, the necessary permission from the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Reources was, naturally, not received. To find a Western company capable of processing similar wastes is practically impossible. It is an extremely expensive procedure, which cannot realistically be carried out with ecologically safe means.

The poison contained in such toxic compounds causes serious damage to the functions of an organism, including genetic, and often leads to death. It is no accident that in many developed countries, Germany, for example, strict norms have been established stipulating the complete absence of cadmium in the air of work zones.

But they often forget about ecological safety when the matter concerns a lot of money. The Stavropol enterprise "Lyuminofor" agreed to handle waste processing. Without Minpriroda's permission, 225 tonnes of hazardous raw material was delivered here. After processing, cobalt was exported to the Netherlands. We were left with secondary wastes, even more poisonous and suitable only for burying.

Incidentally, long ago Lyuminofor was already included on the list of the most serious environmental polluters. As a result of this enterprise's activity, the level of cadmium in ground waters exceeds the maximum permissible concentration by 40,000 times and for nickel, by 940 times.

"Officials are frankly rejoicing over the ratification of the Basel convention, naively believing that it will protect Russia from imported wastes. They have learned

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nothing from the example of French wastes, which were shipped in violation of the convention and warehoused in St.Petersburg," stated Oganes Targulyan, coordinator of the Greenpeace company.

Australia, having sent its wastes to Russia, also violated the convention. Firms of other countries also violate it, earning a lot of money because of the huge differences in processing and storage prices between us and Western countries. In the last two years alone, 2,338 tonnes of wastes were delivered to Russia from abroad.

The consequences of semi-processing have long been known in many regions. First of all in the Urals and in certain rayons of Siberia, Orsk and Stavropol. Here the amount of hazardous substances in the air and water exceeds the norm by many times.

At this moment 80 billion tonnes of solid industrial and consumer wastes have been accumulated on the country's territory. Is there a way out of this situation? In the opinion of employees of the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources, there are two ways. First of all, the introduction of new leading low-waste technology.

"Take, for example, the cellulose-paper industry," Vladimir Ivanov says. "If you compare wood processing done by us and done in Finland, their output of finished product is much higher and there is a minimum of waste."

In the existing nature protection legislation there are practically no requirements for protecting the environment while using specific toxic wastes. The requirements for ecological safety are uncoordinated and unsystematized and do not relate to really dangerous substances. A whole series of normative and informational documents are needed. And the main thing is a complete ban on importing wastes.

Recently it became known that Lyuminoform once again received permission to import 1,550 tonnes of Australian wastes. And this operation was once again supposed to circumvent the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources. Again! If, for example, the delivery of 500 tonnes of wastes costs $635,000, the price received as a result of processing cobalt and nickel would amount to two million dollars. The difference is essential.

## *RF Interests in Asia-Pacific Region Considered

*954F1981A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian*
*24 Mar 95 p 3*

[Article by Valeriy Denisov: "Russia and the Asia-Pacific Region: Do Setbacks Preclude Successes?: Moscow Applies for Membership in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The new geopolitical and economic situation that is emerging in the Asia-Pacific region is hallmarked by efforts on the part of states in the region to strengthen their own positions and achieve tangible results in terms of social and economic development. One persistent trend in regional political and economic affairs has been an desire by countries in Asia and the Pacific basin for integration, assurance of stability and security, and establishment of dialogue. The economic breakthrough made over the past decade by states in the Asia-Pacific region is impressive. Today countries in the region account for approximately 60 percent of the world GNP ($4.5 trillion) and 40 percent of world trade ($1.1 trillion).*

Quite understandably Russia, as a major Eurasian power, cannot and should not remain on the sidelines of the changes occurring in the region. Our main task is to join integration processes in the Asia-Pacific region, eliminate sources of tension, and strengthen the foundations of stability and good-neighborliness in the region.

What are Russia's current political and economic positions in the Asia-Pacific region? It is plainly evident that of late Moscow has markedly stepped up its efforts aimed at strengthening various relations with the Asian and Pacific states. Among other things, we are maintaining relations of constructive partnership, genuinely equal cooperation and good-neighborliness with China. A recent visit to Beijing by A. Kozyrev confirmed a mutual desire to deepen bilateral relations. It is also important to note that Russia has declared that it will strictly comply with the 1991 border regulation agreement, despite demands by the governor of Maritime Kray that the document be revised.

Russia intends to develop its relations with Japan in strict accordance with international standards and without any linkage whatsoever to the so-called "territorial issue." A dialogue between the Russian and Japanese ministers of foreign affairs (March 1995) demonstrated that both sides are striving to accumulate positive potential on a basis of pragmatic interests. Specifically, agreement has been reached to begin negotiations on fishing issues in the South Kuril Islands region.

Russian-South Korean relations are based on principles of constructive and mutually complementary partnership. Relations between the Russian Federation and the Korean People's Democratic Republic are being brought out of their state of decline. On the whole, relations are developing in a positive way between Russia and Mongolia, the countries of Indochina and ASEAN.

Unfortunately, the Russian Federation's economic position in the region remains weak. The Russian Federation's 1994 foreign trade with the Asia-Pacific region was less than 1 percent of the region's total trade volume. Persistent efforts are being made to join regional organizations. The Russian Federation has joined the Pacific Economic Council (PEC) and has been accepted by the Council for Pacific Economic Cooperation (CPEC). Its

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top priority now is to join another respected intergovernmental organization, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Our application for membership in APEC has already been submitted.

One of the most important objectives of Russian policy in Asia and the Pacific Ocean is to ensure stability and security and eliminate potential conflicts. Although the Cold War is over, the struggle for military and political leadership in the Asia-Pacific region continues. The new geopolitical situation in Asia and the Pacific basin has revealed a firm intention on the part of the United States not only to maintain but actually to reinforce its position. And the military factor remains the most important element in American strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. The recently approved "new strategic initiative for East Asia" envisions keeping a powerful U.S. military contingent of more than 100,000 military personnel in the East Asian countries. In the opinion of American experts, it would be unacceptable to reduce the U.S. military presence in the region, as that would create a "dangerous power vacuum" which the Asian countries would attempt to fill by expanding their own military might.

Russia favors an active and constructive dialogue on issues of security in the Asia-Pacific region, participating, specifically, in informal meetings on security and cooperation between the Northeast Asian countries (the Russian Federation, the United States, the PRC, the Republic of Korea and the Korean People's Democratic Republic). Moscow is also a participant in a trilateral dialogue (Russian Federation—United States—Japan) on security in the northern part of the Pacific Ocean and the Asia-Pacific Council on Security Issues. It could be said that Russia has made a breakthrough by becoming a participant in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). A program put forward in Bangkok in July 1994 by Russian minister of foreign affairs A. Kozyrev toward solving the region's pressing problems—reinforcement of the nuclear non-proliferation regime (development of an arms trade code and register) and greater efforts in the fight against organized crime, maritime piracy and drug smuggling—was positively received by the Asian and Pacific countries.

Russian ideas on strengthening confidence-building measures in the military realm seem particularly timely. Moscow is already proposing that discussion begin on issues like transparency of military doctrines (publication of "white books" on defense), increased contacts between military agencies, notification of military maneuvers, invitation of foreign observers to attend maneuvers, and restrictions on the length of maneuvers. Particular attention should be paid to issues connected with the implementation of confidence-building measures in the area of Asia-Pacific naval affairs.

It is only natural that, since it supports the establishment of dialogue mechanisms for reinforcing security in the Asia-Pacific region, Russia must also maintain at an appropriate level—i.e. at the level of reasonable military sufficiency—its own defensive potential, which is an essential component of the regional balance of power.

We are taking specific steps toward resolving conflict in the Asia-Pacific region, especially with regard to reduction of tension on the Korean Peninsula and over Cambodia. Moscow has consistently supported and continues to support strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime in Korea and strict adherence by both Koreas to the provisions of the South-North Declaration of Korean Peninsula Denuclearization signed in 1991.

A difficult situation has also arisen in connection with the truce accord in Korea. The withdrawal of North Korean and Chinese representatives from the Military Truce Commission has virtually halted the operations of that body. It is felt that the issue of replacing the truce accord with a new structure must be resolved with participation by all parties involved.

As you can see, Russian diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific area is becoming much more active, thus fostering the expansion of cooperation and reinforcement of the foundations of stability and security in Asia and the Pacific basin. At the same time this also creates favorable conditions for Russia to join integration processes in the region.

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## Political Issues

### *Federation Council Deputy Defends Russian Nationalism

*954F1965A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Mar 95 p 3*

[Article by Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich Pavlov, RF Federation Council deputy and Commission for CIS Affairs deputy chairman, responding to an article by V. Solovey in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 7 March 1995: "Long Live Patriotism!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] I always read NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA with great interest. True, it publishes articles by Muscovites almost exclusively and expresses a purely Muscovite view, one that is defined by life in Moscow.

As a deputy from an outlying area—Tyumen Oblast—I would like to express my disagreement with some points in an article by an expert from the Gorbachev Foundation.

First of all I would like to know how many people at the Gorbachev Foundation are from places other than Moscow, and whether the foundation is capable of expressing the opinion of all Russia, or just of a small group of Moscow Westernizers. Judging by the aforementioned article, just a small group of Westernizers.

I am also dubious about the terminology used in the article: "the Russian president's Chechnya expedition," "the war party," etc. How can one have an "expedition" in one's own country? Why is Oleg Soskovets, who has done so much to restore Groznyy, a "war party"? Then what is Dudayev? Dzhokhar the Builder?

Perhaps such terminology could be used in a seminar, in one's own circle, but printing these propagandistic labels in a newspaper article is sure to enrage many people.

The Gorbachev Foundation expert goes on to express increasing alarm that "the vector of Russian citizens' mass sentiments is ever more perceptibly tending in the direction of traditional Russian and imperial values."

Once again, it is not clear what is wrong with Russian values. This requires explanation. "Imperial values" clearly refers to protection of one's manufacturers against unscrupulous foreign competition, efforts to preserve Russian influence in regions of vital importance to it, in high-technology markets, etc. If something else is meant, then that should be made clear. Unfortunately, instead of a serious analysis of the Russian State's problems, problems that affect the future of her people, we find a collection of mythologized labels and arguments on the level of the usual internal Moscow squabbles.

Farther along in his article V. Solovey's proceeds to make strange comparisons: democracy and liberalism, wittingly or unwittingly, are contrasted with great power ambitions, national pride and the greatness of Russia. Why are all these terms listed in quotation marks, as if the author were saying that national pride or Russian greatness were off limits to us, or not even attainable at all?

Then V. Solovey takes a real turn for the worse: criticizing our country's leaders for moving from quasi-democratic slogans to quasi-statist ones, he suddenly reproaches it.... over Stalin!

"By appealing at a critical moment in the history of the country and the regime to the 'great Russian people' (those offensive quotation marks are not mine), the Soviet leader exploited Russian nationalism as a powerful mobilizing factor..."

And what is wrong with that, if Russian patriotism can help defend the country and truly be a powerful mobilizing factor? Should the Russians have become the slaves of the "master race"? Anything to keep them from discovering their Russian patriotism.

Also typical is V. Solovey's delineation between the country and the regime as applied to 1941, in the manner of General Vlasov, and his delineation between the ruling regime and Russia, between the government and society, right here in 1995.

Of course, the two should not be perceived as identical, but seeking out sources of antagonism and overly dramatizing existing conflicts is not to Russia's benefit, either. Why take the same path as the leftist Trotskyites, i.e. why divide and tear apart society?

The Gorbachev Foundation expert was particularly upset by the fact that "in 1994 it was the regime that attempted... to enlist the aid of Russian nationalist sentiments." The president is lambasted for visiting the Ilya Glazunov exhibit, for making an appeal for restoration of the Church of Christ the Savior, and even for meeting with the Patriarch and Solzhenitsyn and declaring his support for Russians in the near abroad.

Now just imagine the president of France being castigated for seeking to enlist the nationalist sentiments of the French, or the president of the United States for appealing to Americans' nationalist sentiments. Why does Mr. Solovey want to deny Russia the right to nationalist sentiments?

The quite reasonable policy of protecting our country's national interests is labeled "nationalization," as if other countries are pursuing a de-nationalized policy.

If the Gorbachev Foundation is staffed by such sterling internationalists who would deny Russia the right to patriotism, then they should be consistent on this point with regard to other countries as well.

Nothing of the kind: it is Russia and her leaders who are blamed for expanding weapons sales, striking anti-American chords in the president's speech to the CSCE, and wanting to sell nuclear power plant equipment.

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That is to say, without even putting forward any creative effort they simply recite the arguments of those who would slander Russia, who would like to deny our country high-technology sales markets under concocted pretenses. Something, incidentally, that they have been highly successful in accomplishing.

But it is typical that no one approaches U.S. trade positions from the same angle, or the facts that the United States has literally filled the world with its weapons, that the mere appearance of its aircraft carriers on the scene destabilizes a situation and increases tension, that the United States is not fulfilling the pledges it has made to provide loans to Russia, that it has carried out missile tests which violate the ABM Treaty, and much more.

Perhaps I am naive and just fail to comprehend, but in Siberia we simply cannot understand that when in Moscow one may only write and promote things that show Russia in a negative light and embellish everyone else (to put it mildly). I for one think that people in Moscow should be defending Russia's interests, not those of the United States or its dependent states. Obviously the Gorbachev Foundation expert thinks otherwise.

But these things are all trivial in comparison with the truly anti-Russian gems that adorn the end of the article. After defining defense of Russia's state interests and appeals to Russian citizens' patriotism as injections of "doses of nationalism," V. Solovey attempts to frighten our country's leaders with the horrors of "letting the genie out of the bottle."

Yes, indeed! Proponents of Russia's integration into the world economy and culture have colluded to the point that they even want to deny Russia something that the smallest and most backward states possess: national identity, patriotism and protection for national-state interests.

History teaches that all deeds of any significance have been performed by individuals who were inspired by patriotism and by love for their people and their Motherland. The things that frighten V. Solovey inspire my constituents.

They see patriotism as a solution to Russia's economic and political problems, and it is patriotism that makes them tolerate their present difficulties, that makes all of us believe in a great future for Russia. Long live patriotism!

### *Russia-Chechnya Confederative Union Treaty Principles Debated

*954F1967A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Mar 95 p 3*

[Article by Valentin Vakhtangovich Mikhaylov, State Duma deputy from 27th electoral district (Tatarstan Republic): "In Search of a Constitutional Solution"; response to article by V. Lysenko in 17 Dec 94 edition of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA]

[FBIS Translated Text] The author believes that the present situation might be rectified by a compromise based on the conclusion of the "Treaty of the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic on a Confederative Union and the Mutual Delegation of Authority." In this case, the Chechen Republic would be a "sovereign state with a much greater degree of autonomy than Tatarstan." The author believes that "only this type of treaty can help both sides emerge from their present political and military impasse without losing political face."

In this context, I would like to express my own point of view.

In contrast to some deputies, I do not feel that a member of parliament from the party advocating the independence of Scotland should not make suggestions contrary to the Constitution. There is also a party in Bavaria with a platform advocating an independent Bavaria. It once had deputies in the Bavarian regional assembly, but now the mood of the voters has changed and there are no deputies from that party.

The important thing, however, is that the ideas those deputies defend in parliament are the same ones they supported in their election campaigns. That is why they can continue to defend their point of view in parliament, even if it includes support for the independence of the part of the state from which they were elected. There is no question that V.N. Lysenko, who was the nominee of the "YaBLoko" election bloc, also supported the idea of preserving the integrity of Russia as a single federated state, and his exclusion from the faction does not relieve him of the responsibilities he assumed when he joined the bloc. Furthermore, he is the chairman of the State Duma Subcommittee on the Development of Federated Relations.

The main problem, however, lies elsewhere, and it is something that seems extremely important to me. I have to report that neither this initiative nor many of the chairman's other initiatives were discussed in the subcommittee or even brought to the attention of the members of the subcommittee. The chairman makes frequent trips to republics and oblasts, apparently in pursuit of important parts of his program, but I, a member of the subcommittee, was never informed of where, when, and why Vladimir Nikolayevich was traveling. Furthermore, I knew nothing about the views he was propounding there. I learned from the recent article that some of them are diametrically opposed to my own views.

Under these conditions, I felt I had to explain my own point of view to the readers of the newspaper and my constituents. I assure you that I am still a confirmed advocate of a single Russia. I believe that the federation,

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as the form of government Russia chose, has nothing to do with the weakness of the center and the inefficacy of federal laws.

I can clearly see, however, that there were significant opportunities for negotiation, especially in the middle of December, and that the RF Constitution should have served as the foundation for these negotiations. I am certain that it is not the main obstacle, although it might look like this on the surface. The absence of new proposals, the tough negotiating tactics, the inflexibility of the politicians, and the excessive involvement of military and law-enforcement agencies in the political process are some of the reasons for the lack of success then, in December.

Now I would like to say a few words about the projected confederated union of the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic. It has its origins in the text of the treaty between the Russian Federation and the Tatarstan Republic and is a slightly altered version of the treaty that was discussed during one of the rounds of the talks by delegations from the Russian Federation and Chechen Republic in 1992-1994.

The Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Constitution of the Chechen Republic are both acknowledged in the draft treaty. In addition, it stipulates the obligation of the two sides to jointly "exercise certain powers" in: 1) questions of war and peace, 2) the defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity, 3) the coordination of international and foreign economic ties.... Even the beginning of the list indicates that compliance with the treaty in some cases would create serious and, in my opinion, insoluble conflicts between the two sides, and in other cases would acknowledge the complete autonomy of the Chechen Republic. Another item on the list is "10) the coordination of the management of common power engineering facilities and transportation systems...." If they are common, they need management, and not the coordination of management.

The section on joint prerogatives goes on to list "13) the coordination of the activities of law enforcement agencies, the interaction of security agencies, the drafting and implementation of special programs in the fight against crime, carjacking, and crimes in rail and air transport...." It is completely obvious to me, however, that under the proposed conditions, we could have the same kind of "coordination" we had in 1992-1994, and this applies to virtually all of these subsections.

It is significant that disagreements over the exercise of these prerogatives would be settled according to a procedure agreed upon by government agencies of the Russian Federation and Chechen Republic.

There is a similar statement in the treaty between the Russian Federation and Tatarstan. It is significant that no disagreement has ever had to be settled in this manner yet, but these disagreements could arise from contradictory provisions in the two constitutions and differences in the legislative instruments of the executive branches of government on the two sides.

Therefore, the draft in question can only arouse completely groundless illusions. It cannot serve as the basis for an efficacious system.

And what about the parallels with Tatarstan? That treaty also acknowledges the two constitutions, which have conflicting fundamental provisions. That treaty also has a section on joint prerogatives, and many people have said that it could serve as an example for others.

The secret here lies in the fact that the substantial shortcomings of legal regulation are counterbalanced by the trust between President M. Shaymiyev of the Tatarstan Republic and President B. Yeltsin of the Russian Federation and by the agreements they have reached on the personal level.

The draft in question, on the other hand, is based on two conflicting constitutions and cannot rely on the trust between the leaders of the two sides.

If we take a look at international experience, we can find around 10 attempts to form a confederation. All of them were short-lived and demonstrated the instability of this form of government. Another important factor is that all of them were planned during periods of stable, and even friendly relations between the negotiating parties.

In view of all this, I feel that the draft would tend to create illusions without adding anything constructive to the resolution of the present conflict. For this reason, I deeply regret its association in the reader's mind with the name of the Subcommittee on the Development of Federated Relations.

The deputies of the State Duma Committee on Federation Affairs and Regional Policy knew nothing about the draft until more than a month after the publication of V. Lysenko's article in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, but I feel that the comments I have made in this rebuttal are still relevant.

## *Poll Lists Leading Politicians for March

*954F2004A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 31 Mar 95 pp 1-2*

[Article by Aleksandr Kinsburskiy, under "Political Olympus" rubric: "100 Leading Politicians in March: Generals Again Retreat Into Shadow, Yuriy Luzhkov Reinstates His Positions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **At our request, the Vox Populi popular opinion research service, together with NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA itself, continues to determine the top 100 most influential Russian politicians each month, listed according to rank (1st to 100th) and average score, giving the "weight" of each of them—both including and not including the indication of their influence (positive or negative) on Russia's domestic and foreign policy in the last month.**

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**Besides the names of the politicians recognized as the leaders in February, the preliminary list also includes the names of 50 state and public figures who were active in March. The extent and indication of their political influence was determined by experts: directors of the central mass media, well-known political observers, and political scientists.**

**As always, a scale was used to evaluate the amount of influence, where "10" signifies a maximum and "1" signifies a minimal degree of authority. If last month a politician played no role whatsoever in Russian politics, in the experts' opinion, he is given a score of zero. The list offered below of the Russian politicians who, according to the experts, had the greatest influence on Russia's politics in March, was compiled based on the average scores, with and without considering the reason for their popularity. The survey was conducted from March 20 to March 22 of this year.**

| No. | Name, First, Patronymic | Average Score, without consideration of sign | | Average Score, with sign | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | March | (February) | March | (February) |
| 1. | Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich | 8.11 | (9.08) | +0.66 | (-2.21) |
| 2. | Chernomyrdin, Viktor Stepanovich | 7.53 | (8.22) | +6.08 | (+6.36) |
| 3. | Luzhkov, Yuriy Mikhaylovich | 7.23 | (6.89) | +4.26 | (+5.11) |
| 4. | Dudayev, Dzhokhar Musayevich | 6.47 | (7.61) | -5.08 | (-7.57) |
| 5. | Rybkin, Ivan Petrovich | 6.40 | (6.83) | +6.38 | (+4.57) |
| 6. | Korzhakov, Aleksandr Vasilyevich | 6.38 | (6.93) | -1.98 | (-5.08) |
| 7. | Chubays, Anatoliy Borisovich | 6.32 | (6.33) | +2.23 | (+1.97) |
| 8. | Grachev, Pavel Sergeyevich | 6.30 | (7.46) | -3.64 | (-5.98) |
| 9. | Soskovets, Oleg Nikolayevich | 6.13 | (6.69) | +0.49 | (-0.24) |
| 10. | Shumeyko, Vladimir Filippovich | 5.96 | (6.70) | +0.19 | (-1.80) |
| 11. | Yerin, Viktor Fedorovich | 5.72 | (6.24) | -2.15 | (-3.74) |
| 12. | Kozyrev, Andrey Vladimirovich | 5.70 | (6.13) | +1.49 | (+1.26) |
| 13-14. | Kovalev, Sergey Adamovich | 5.51 | (6.43) | +2.00 | (+3.79) |
| 13-14. | Filatov, Sergey Aleksandrovich | 5.51 | (6.17) | +0.96 | (+1.32) |
| 15. | Ilyushin, Viktor Vasilyevich | 5.28 | (6.02) | +1.36 | (-0.39) |
| 16. | Lobov, Oleg Ivanovich | 5.26 | (6.06) | -0.60 | (-2.50) |
| 17. | Zhirinovskiy, Vladimir Volfovich | 5.23 | (5.57) | -3.87 | (-4.30) |
| 18. | Stepashin, Sergey Vadimovich | 5.11 | (5.98) | -1.75 | (-3.39) |
| 19. | Ilyushenko, Aleksey Nikolayevich | 5.08 | (4.87) | -2.66 | (-2.59) |
| 20. | Gaydar, Yegor Timurovich | 5.04 | (5.31) | +2.00 | (+2.33) |
| 21. | Yasin, Yevgeniy Grigoryevich | 4.91 | (5.23) | +3.66 | (+4.12) |
| 22. | Yavlinskiy, Grigoriy Alekseyevich | 4.87 | (5.51) | +3.57 | (+3.95) |
| 23. | Yakovlev, Aleksandr Nikolayevich | 4.75 | (4.75) | -0.64 | (+0.15) |
| 24. | Livshits, Aleksandr Yakovlevich | 4.74 | (5.28) | +3.45 | (+3.08) |
| 25. | Shakhray, Sergey Mikhaylovich | 4.72 | (5.49) | +1.04 | (-0.29) |
| 26. | Zyuganov, Gennadiy Andreyevich | 4.60 | (5.02) | -0.26 | (-1.44) |
| 27. | Aushev, Ruslan Sultanovich | 4.55 | (5.67) | +2.79 | (+4.90) |
| 28-29. | Baturin, Yuriy Mikhaylovich | 4.49 | (4.89) | +2.81 | (+3.35) |
| 28-29. | Abdulatipov, Ramazan Gadzhimuradovich | 4.49 | (4.83) | +3.49 | (+4.78) |
| 30. | Lebed, Aleksandr Ivanovich | 4.45 | (5.04) | +2.04 | (+2.67) |
| 31. | Barsukov, Mikhail Ivanovich | 4.38 | (5.52) | -2.21 | (-3.09) |
| 32. | Poptsov, Oleg Maksimovich | 4.21 | (4.44) | +2.47 | (+3.51) |
| 33. | Shaymnev, Mintimer Sharipovich | 4.17 | (4.64) | +2.83 | (+4.83) |
| 34. | Govorukhin, Stanislav Sergeyevich | 4.11 | (—) | +1.45 | (—) |
| 35-36. | Aleksiy II | 4.08 | (4.49) | +3.47 | (+3.45) |

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| No. (Continued) | Name, First, Patronymic | Average Score, without consideration of sign | | Average Score, with sign | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | March | (February) | March | (February) |
| 35-36. | Panskov, Vladimir Georgiyevich | 4.08 | (4.23) | +1.98 | (+2.11) |
| 37. | Nemtsov, Boris Yefimovich | 4.06 | (4.37) | +3.17 | (+4.17) |
| 38. | Yushenkov, Sergey Nikolayevich | 3.98 | (4.53) | +0.83 | (+2.13) |
| 39. | Poltoranin, Mikhail Nikiforovich | 3.89 | (3.59) | -0.75 | (-1.58) |
| 40. | Gonchar, Nikolay Nikolayevich | 3.87 | (3.86) | +2.53 | (+3.50) |
| 41. | Fedorov, Boris Grigoryevich | 3.85 | (4.39) | +1.98 | (+0.93) |
| 42. | Kokoshin, Andrey Afanasyevich | 3.83 | (3.98) | +2.62 | (+2.38) |
| 43. | Satarov, Georgiy Aleksandrovich | 3.79 | (4.49) | +2.02 | (+2.62) |
| 44-46. | Gromov, Boris Vsevolodovich | 3.74 | (4.74) | +2.08 | (+3.53) |
| 44-46. | Paramonova, Tatyana Vladimirovna | 3.74 | (3.88) | +1.85 | (+2.97) |
| 44-46. | Primakov, Yevgeniy Maksimovich | 3.74 | (4.71) | +1.92 | (+2.97) |
| 47. | Shoygu, Sergey Kuzhugetovich | 3.70 | (4.72) | +3.15 | (+4.62) |
| 48. | Kiselev, Yevgeniy Alekseyevich | 3.68 | (4.13) | +1.55 | (+2.74) |
| 49-50. | Zaveryukha, Aleksandr Kharlampiyevich | 3.64 | (3.70) | +0.92 | (+0.85) |
| 49-50. | Lapshin, Mikhail Ivanovich | 3.64 | (3.62) | +0.51 | (0.52) |
| 51. | Glazyev, Sergey Yuryevich | 3.58 | (4.17) | +1.49 | (+1.51) |
| 52. | Galazov, Akhsarbek Khadzhimurzayevich | 3.51 | (4.43) | +1.79 | (+2.05) |
| 53. | Yarov, Yuriy Fedorovich | 3.47 | (3.78) | +1.77 | (+2.48) |
| 54-55. | Ilyukhin, Viktor Ivanovich | 3.45 | (3.38) | +0.11 | (-0.03) |
| 54-55. | Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr Isayevich | 3.45 | (4.77) | +2.04 | (+3.11) |
| 56-57. | Skokov, Yuriy Vladimirovich | 3.40 | (3.33) | +0.40 | (+0.33) |
| 56-57. | Golembiovskiy, Igor Nestorovich | 3.40 | (3.73) | +1.64 | (+2.56) |
| 58. | Boyko, Oleg Viktorovich | 3.38 | (3.06) | +0.83 | (+0.69) |
| 59-60. | Zadornov, Mikhail Mikhaylovich | 3.30 | (3.71) | +2.02 | (+2.66) |
| 59-60. | Tumanov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich | 3.30 | (3.40) | +2.49 | (+3.51) |
| 61. | Lukin, Vladimir Petrovich | 3.28 | (3.43) | +2.17 | (+2.29) |
| 62. | Sobchak, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich | 3.26 | (4.08) | +1.32 | (+2.11) |
| 63. | Nikolayev, Andrey Ivanovich | 3.23 | (4.13) | +2.68 | (+3.84) |
| 64. | Nosovets, Sergey Anatolyevich | 3.17 | (3.55) | -0.77 | (-1.44) |
| 65-66. | Tuleyev, Aman-geldy Moldagazyyevich | 3.13 | (3.15) | -0.25 | (-0.64) |
| 65-66. | Fedorov, Nikolay Vasilyevich | 3.13 | (3.56) | +1.58 | (+2.11) |
| 67. | Dolgolaptev, Anatoliy Vasilyevich | 3.11 | (3.79) | +1.09 | (-0.15) |
| 68-69. | Kovalev, Valentin Alekseyevich | 3.09 | (3.73) | -0.91 | (-1.42) |
| 68-69. | Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeyevich | 3.09 | (2.49) | +0.49 | (+0.69) |
| 70-71. | Shafranik, Yuriy Konstantinovich | 3.06 | (3.58) | +1.47 | (+1.88) |
| 70-71. | Zatulin, Konstantin Fedorovich | 3.06 | (2.79) | +0.72 | (+0.58) |
| 72-73. | Kolesnikov, Mikhail Petrovich | 2.91 | (4.02) | +1.30 | (+0.17) |
| 72-73. | Stroyev, Yegor Semenovich | 2.91 | (3.06) | +1.53 | (+1.96) |
| 74. | Lakhova, Yekaterina Filippovna | 2.87 | (3.17) | +1.51 | (+2.14) |
| 75. | Vengerovskiy, Aleksandr Dmitriyevich | 2.85 | (3.33) | -0.85 | (-0.40) |
| 76. | Stepanov, Viktor Nikolayevich | 2.83 | (3.19) | +1.79 | (+2.58) |
| 77. | Pochinok, Aleksandr Petrovich | 2.77 | (2.92) | +1.42 | (+1.53) |

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| No. (Continued) | Name, First, Patronymic | Average Score, without consideration of sign | | Average Score, with sign | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | March | (February) | March | (February) |
| 78-79. | Baburin, Sergey Nikolayevich | 2.74 | (2.61) | -0.51 | (-0.74) |
| 78-79. | Mavrodi, Sergey Panteleyevich | 2.74 | (2.74) | -2.17 | (-2.43) |
| 80. | Isakov, Vladimir Borisovich | 2.66 | (2.64) | -0.26 | (-0.30) |
| 81-82. | Davydov, Oleg Dmitriyevich | 2.64 | (3.63) | +1.43 | (-2.41) |
| 81-82. | Barkashov, Aleksandr Petrovich | 2.64 | (—) | -2.15 | (—) |
| 83-85. | Volskiy, Arkadiy Ivanovich | 2.62 | (3.38) | +1.81 | (-2.55) |
| 83-85. | Kostikov, Vyacheslav Vasilyevich | 2.62 | (4.28) | -0.68 | (-0.46) |
| 83-85. | Mityukov, Mikhail Alekseyevich | 2.62 | (3.14) | +1.32 | (-2.39) |
| 86. | Tarpishchev, Shamil Anvarovich | 2.58 | (3.48) | -0.26 | (-2.20) |
| 87. | Rutskoy, Aleksandr Vladimirovich | 2.57 | (2.98) | -1.04 | (-1.60) |
| 88. | Nikolayev, Mikhail Yefimovich | 2.53 | (3.09) | +1.94 | (-2.38) |
| 89. | Khakamada, Irina Mutsuovna | 2.51 | (2.74) | +1.68 | (-2.03) |
| 90-92. | Ryabov, Nikolay Timofeyevich | 2.47 | (2.40) | -0.49 | (-0.97) |
| 90-92 | Romanov, Petr Vasilyevich | 2.47 | (2.73) | -0.17 | (-0.76) |
| 90-92. | Resin, Vladimir Iosifovich | 2.47 | (2.86) | -0.96 | (-2.00) |
| 93. | Tyazhlov, Anatoliy Stepanovich | 2.45 | (3.06) | +1.45 | (-2.00) |
| 94. | Ilyumzhinov, Kirsan Nikolayevich | 2.43 | (2.68) | -0.91 | (-0.79) |
| 95-96. | Anpilov, Viktor Ivanovich | 2.42 | (2.70) | -1.72 | (-2.21) |
| 95-96. | Krasavchenko, Sergey Nikolayevich | 2.42 | (2.58) | +1.09 | (-1.11) |
| 97. | Rossel, Eduard Edgardovich | 2.40 | (2.59) | +1.60 | (-1.91) |
| 98-99. | Lysenko, Vladimir Nikolayevich | 2.34 | (2.17) | +1.57 | (-1.03) |
| 98-99. | Yegorov, Nikolay Dmitriyevich | 2.34 | (3.53) | -0.60 | (-2.59) |
| 100. | Fedulova, Alevtina Vasilyevna | 2.30 | (3.02) | +1.15 | (-2.16) |

For the March ratings of the 100 leading Russian politicians, there is generally a characteristic decrease in evaluations of influence in comparison with the February data: the average score for Alevtina Fedulova (last place) was less than for the last politician in the February top 100—Valentina Sergeyeva—by 0.47. A decrease in ratings has been noted for 82 people in the published list, with nine decreasing by a full point or more. They are: Vyacheslav Kostikov (83-85), Nikolay Yegorov (98-99), Pavel Grachev (8), Dzhokhar Dudayev (4), Mikhail Barsukov (31), Ruslan Aushev (27), Mikhail Kolesnikov (72-73), Sergey Shoygu (47), and Boris Gromov (44-46). It is not difficult to see that the decrease in evaluations has affected the entire group of state leaders directly involved in the Chechen war, from which it follows that its role in Russian politics, in the experts' opinion, is gradually declining. The significant decrease in negative evaluations given by the experts to the main actors in the military events in the Northern Caucasus—Dudayev, Grachev, Yerin, Lobov, Stepashin, and Yegorov—also bears witness to this.

The changes in the first 10 are relatively small: Sergey Kovalev (13-14), who was in 10th place in February, has left, while Anatoliy Chubays, ascending from 11th place to seventh, has arrived. It is worth noting that of all the inhabitants of the very summit of the political Olympus last year, only Moscow mayor Yuriy Luzhkov was able to raise his rating.

In March, State Duma Deputy Stanislav Govorukhin (34) and Aleksandr Barkashov (81-82), leader of the Russian National Unity party, became members of the top 100 politicians for the first time. Another 12 people returned to the top 100 after some absence: Mikhail Gorbachev, former USSR president (68-69); Sergey Baburin (78-79), leader of the Russian All National Union party; Sergey Mavrodi (78-79), State Duma deputy; Vladimir Isakov (80), chairman of the State Duma committee on legislation; Irina Khakamada (89), State Duma deputy; Nikolay Ryabov (90-92), chairman of the Central Election Commission; Petr Romanov (90-92), deputy chairman of the Federation Council; Kirsan Ilyumzhinov (94), president of Kalmykiya; Viktor Anpilov (95-96), leader of the Russian Communist Workers' Party; Sergey Krasavchenko (95-96), deputy chief of the Russian presidential administration; Eduard Rossel (97), Federation Council member; and Vladimir Lysenko (98-99), co-chairman of the Republican Party.

Missing from the list of the top 100 leading politicians this time are: Emil Pain, Sergey Belyayev, Yevgeniy

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Shaposhnikov, Vladimir Babichev, Ella Pamfilova, Yuriy Boldyrev, Vasiliy Lipitskiy, Aleksandr Shokhin, Aleksandr Nevzorov, Mikhail Krasnov, Murtaza Rakhimov, Gavriil Popov, Aleksey Bolshakov, and Valentin Sergeyev.

The list of the 10 state and public figures who made, according to the experts, the greatest positive contributions to Russian domestic and foreign policy in March, looks like this:

1. Ivan Rybkin, State Duma chairman (+5.38),
2. Viktor Chernomyrdin, prime minister (+5.08),
3. Yuriy Luzhkov, mayor of Moscow (+4.26),
4. Yevgeniy Yasin, minister of the economy (+3.66),
5. Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, leader of the YABloko faction (+3.57),
6. Ramazan Abdulatipov, Federal Assembly deputy chairman (+3.49),
7. Aleksiy II, patriarch of Moscow and all Rus' (+3.47),
8. Aleksandr Livshits, Russian president economic assistant (+3.45),
9. Boris Nemtsov, Nizhegorod Oblast governor (+3.17),
10. Sergey Shoygu, minister of emergency situations (+3.15).

On the other hand, the list of Russian politicians who have exerted, according to the experts, the strongest negative influence upon the course of events in the last month, looks like this:

1. Dzhokhar Dudayev, president of the Chechen Republic (-5.08),
2. Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Russian Liberal-Democratic Party (-3.87),
3. Pavel Grachev, minister of defense (-3.64),
4. Aleksey Ilyushenko, acting procurator general (-2.66),
5. Mikhail Barsukov, Main Protection Directorate chief (-2.21),
6. Sergey Mavrodi, State Duma deputy (-2.17),
7. Viktor Yerin, minister of internal affairs (-2.15),
8. Aleksandr Barkashov, leader of the Russian National Unity party (-2.15),
9. Aleksandr Korzhakov, head of the Russian Security Service (-1.98),
10. Sergey Stepashin, Federal Counterintelligence Service director (-1.75).

It should be noted that the distance between the maximum positive and maximum negative evaluations was 10.5 points in March, while in February it was almost 14 points. In other words, there was a marked decrease in the dispersion of extreme opinions due to the fact that the experts gave the Russian politicians extreme scores less frequently.

Finally, the answers to the monthly question: **"Which of the Russian politicians included in the preliminary list would now have the greatest chance to win the Russian presidential elections if they were held in the near future?"**—were as follows (the number of experts naming one or another politician):

| | March | (February) |
|---|---|---|
| V. Chernomyrdin | 25 | (28) |
| B. Yeltsin | 21 | (28) |
| G. Yavlinskiy | 19 | (22) |
| V. Zhirinovskiy | 18 | (24) |
| G. Zyuganov | 16 | (11) |
| Yu. Luzhkov | 11 | (11) |
| A. Lebed | 9 | (9) |
| I. Rybkin | 8 | (12) |
| B. Gromov | 4 | (2) |
| Yu. Skokov | 4 | (3) |
| S. Govorukhin | 2 | (—) |
| S. Kovalev | 2 | (0) |
| M. Lapshin | 2 | (1) |
| B. Nemtsov | 2 | (1) |
| A. Rutskoy | 2 | (4) |

The following were each named by one expert, as well: Yu. Baturin, O. Boyko, A. Volskiy, V. Gerashchenko, D. Dudayev, A. Kozyrev, N. Ryzhkov, A. Solzhenitsyn, Ye. Stroyev, and B. Fedorov.

## "Poll Results on Popularity of Potential Presidential Candidates

*954F1847A Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No 11, 16-22 Mar 95 p 6*

[Article by Vsevolod Vilchek: "The View Before the Battle"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the end of last year, the residents of several large Russian centers were asked: Who of the political figures would get the most votes in the city if the presidential elections were held in the near future? They were permitted to name more than one candidate so the sum of the answers may significantly exceed 100 percent. The citizens, however, did not show great enthusiasm.

We cite the first 10 names.

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| | Yekaterinburg | Voronezh | Rostov | Nizhniy Novgorod | Novosibirsk | Samara |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ye. Gaydar | 14.5 | 4.5 | 5.0 | 5.5 | 8.0 | 9.5 |
| B. Yeltsin | 29.0 | 18.0 | 35.0 | 16.0 | 19.0 | 12.5 |
| V. Zhirinovskiy | 17.5 | 18.5 | 13.5 | 9.5 | 19.5 | 10.5 |
| G. Zyuganov | 2.5 | 12.0 | 6.5 | 3.0 | 6.5 | 6.0 |
| A. Lebed | 6.5 | 6.5 | 2.5 | 3.5 | 5.0 | 8.5 |
| B. Nemtsov | 6.5 | 6.0 | 5.5 | 47.5* | 1.5 | 5.0 |
| A. Rutskoy | 2.5 | 8.0 | 9.0 | 5.5 | 10.0 | 10.0 |
| S. Shakhray | 7.5 | 4.5 | 8.0 | 1.0 | 5.5 | 5.5 |
| V. Chernomyrdin | 4.5 | 4.0 | 7.5 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 5.5 |
| G. Yavlinskiy | 19.5 | 19.0 | 19.5 | 15.0 | 16.0 | 22.0 |

*In February, the confidence level for B. Nemtsov rose to 58 percent in Nizhniy Novgorod.

First, we should note how sharply the picture differs between the provinces and the Moscow pedestal of honor, where Yu. Luzhkov holds the highest place (31.5 percent), then, slightly lower, come G. Yavlinskiy and A. Lebed; B. Yeltsin holds seventh place, yielding sixth to V. Chernomyrdin, while Zhirinovskiy is 14th, leaving 13th to G. Zyuganov.

To a greater degree than Moscow, the provinces preserve the remains of their confidence in the president, but B. Yeltsin remains the unconditional leader only in cities where the popular mood is more or less optimistic: in Rostov and his native Yekaterinburg. The darker the mood, the fewer that trust in B. Yeltsin, but pessimism rarely pushes people in one direction. For example, at first glance the situation seems very similar in Novosibirsk and Nizhniy Novgorod, but the leaders are figures whose positions are diametrically opposed. It is obvious that in times of crisis, local leaders begin to play a decisive role, while in cases where there are no clear local leaders, there are only three people capable of occupying the open niche: V. Zhirinovskiy, who is successfully putting his roots down in soil prepared by communists; G. Yavlinskiy, in places where even with the common problems there is less social antagonism and where there is still hope for the social-democratic way; and out in the boondocks, where people still haven't figured out that we have passed the point of no return, the number one person is most likely to be G. Zyuganov.

In response to the question of how they would evaluate the state of affairs in the country, nearly a quarter of the city residents couldn't say or refused to answer, while the opinions of the rest were distributed as follows (in percentages of the number surveyed):

| | Yekaterinburg | Voronezh | Rostov | Nizhniy Novgorod | Novosibirsk | Samara |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| "The worst part is behind us, the country has started to emerge from the crisis." | 7.0 | 8.0 | 18.0 | 5.5 | 6.5 | 5.5 |
| "So far, there have been no visible improvements, but in principle, this is the right way." | 22.5 | 15.0 | 28.5 | 18.5 | 18.0 | 17.5 |
| "The reforms have come to a dead end; grave trials await us." | 47.0 | 62.0 | 30.0 | 54.0 | 55.0 | 62.0 |

## *Zhirinovskiy on Presidential Plans, Economic Platform

*954E0813A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian 25 Mar 95 p 2*

[Interview with Vladimir Zhirinovskiy by unidentified DELOVOY MIR correspondent, under the heading: "Were I To Become President"; place and date not given: "Were Russia Not Robbed, You Could Live Well In It Under Any System"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

[DELOVOY MIR] It has become traditional in Russia for each new political leader who has come to power to try to modernize to this extent or the other the format of the political structure that has taken shape hitherto. Do you, Vladimir Volfovich, intend to follow the example of your predecessors? If so, what kind of transformations await the country in the sphere of the supreme legislature, the government, and the office of president? The greatest criticism as of late has been heard in regard to this institution, which is new for Russia, for it makes it possible in its present form to concentrate practically uncontrolled power in a single pair of hands. Do you intend to seek to limit it, if so, to what extent? In what way and in what kind of timeframe?

[Zhirinovskiy] I agree. Truly, it has become a bad tradition in Russia that each new leader starts new reforms. There is even the saying: "A new broom sweeps clean."

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It is, in addition, customary to abuse the previous leader. As you recall, the Stalin era ("cult of personality") was condemned under Khrushchev, the Khrushchev era ("voluntarism"), under Brezhnev, the Brezhnev era ("stagnation"), under Gorbachev.

Under the reformer Khrushchev exports of raw material to the West, which had been terminated by Stalin, were resumed. The first price rises (for vodka, meat, and butter) began. The people, however, were called on to build communism.

Under the reformer Brezhnev our raw material, energy sources, and food went to the West in what was now a river in spate.

Less than half the basic farm products that we had produced remained in the country, the rest went overseas.

The usual price rises did not save the situation and exasperated the people. Ration cards were introduced in the country everywhere, therefore. Even in Vologda Oblast butter was sold by ration card. The British and other West Europeans, on the other hand, were eating Vologda butter to their hearts' content.

We had not built communism yet but it was declared that developed socialism had been built here.

Under Andropov and Chernenko we suddenly found ourselves "at the initial stage of developed socialism," that is, we had moved backward. Raw material and food continued to flow serenely to the West, however.

Under Gorbachev new reforms called "perestroyka," "acceleration," "glasnost," and "democratization" began.

In practice, "perestroyka" was a failure. "Acceleration" was accelerated failure.

"Glasnost" began to operate in one, antipatriotic, direction. And "democratization," when put to the test, proved to be the democratization of thievery. Inasmuch as earlier our country had been robbed mainly by the upper party stratum (which received for our raw material and food foreign currency, which it put in its accounts in Western banks and invested in Western companies), under Gorbachev the number of thieves exporting our raw material, food, and consumer goods increased hundreds and thousands of times over.

Under the democrats (this same communist upper stratum) the reference points and slogans were changed even more drastically. Now we are building not socialism but capitalism (a "civilized society," as our former party apparatchiks say), and the plunder of the people by the ruling upper stratum has assumed unprecedented proportions. How about if only the drastic increase in prices which began under Gaydar and which ruined millions of Russians. Raw material, however, is going to the West at such an unprecedented rate that our domestic industry no longer has anything from which to make its products.

It is not surprising that whereas during the Great Patriotic War industrial production declined by one-third, now it has declined here 50 percent. Plants are closing. Millions of Russians are without work. All this is called reforms also.

If you are inquiring about my opinion as regards all kinds of revolutions, reforms, perestroykas, and accelerations, I see nothing good in them. People only suffer from such upheavals.

Reforms cannot be pursued if they do not bring improvements but, on the contrary, cause a deterioration in people's lives. The people are tired of upheavals and are dreaming of stability, of firm compliance with the laws.

As far as various improvements in the political system are concerned, we are seeking them even now. Our Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, victorious in terms of the party slate at the 12 December 1993 elections, is constantly presenting important initiatives. We are legislators, and this is our job.

What do we propose for an improvement in the political system?

First, we believe that parliamentary elections should be conducted only by party slate. This would be the most honest because the electorate would then know precisely for what kind of political force it was voting.

If, however, elections are conducted not by party slate but by majority first-past-the-post constituencies, people will not know whose interests the person whom they have elected will in actual fact defend. For he could tell the electorate one thing and subsequently do quite another. This, in fact, is what is now happening in the Duma with the majority of deputies elected by constituency.

An individual can be bought. But it is far more difficult suborning an entire party.

If a party fails to keep its promises, people will no longer vote for it. I am sure, for example, that the electorate will hardly cast its vote for the "democrats," who have wrecked and robbed the country.

Second, I am a supporter of the introduction of the imperative mandate. This means that if a deputy is unwilling to carry out the will of the party and the will of the voters, the party should strip him of his deputy's mandate and bring in to take his seat in parliament another, more deserving person.

Third, I would conduct simultaneously parliamentary and presidential elections and a referendum on amendments to the constitution. Let the electorate vote for its favorite party: for its deputies to enter parliament, for its candidate to become president, and for its amendments to become a part of the constitution.

Then we would get a president who relies on the support of parliament inasmuch as the majority of deputies

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would be representatives of his party and a constitution to which his party would make the requisite amendments. There would not then be chaos in the government of the country. No one could sabotage the adoption of important laws (as the "democrats" are now doing). And no one could dump the blame for his own failures on others.

[DELOVOY MIR] How do you envisage the state structure of Russia? What kind of action will you take to transform it, if such is contemplated? What methods for the achievement of these ends do you consider acceptable and justified? What kind of timeframe, in your view, might be realistic in achieving them?

[Zhirinovskiy] Russia must remain a democratic republic, in which everyone respects the law. So the first task is to achieve compliance with legality.

What methods do I consider acceptable? Legal methods.

What kind of timeframe might be realistic? Several months.

[DELOVOY MIR] Russia's economic position today is the most painful question. What kind of economic measures are envisaged by your election program which could raise production in all spheres of the national economy and thereby eliminate the causes of the instability and negative phenomena which are shaking our society? Opinion polls show that our voters have come to regard with mistrust promises of the "lie down on the rails, but not raise prices" or "lower the price of vodka" type. Now the electorate is demanding substantiated and practicable steps in the direction of an improvement in the living standard.

What kind of economic program, in your view, could resolve this problem the most effectively? Within what kind of timeframe? What measures need to be adopted for this first and foremost?

How do you see the future structure of the national economy of Russia: of a planned, market, mixed, or some other nature? What kind of methods will you employ in the event of your being elected president to achieve this goal?

[Zhirinovskiy] I have never come out with slogans of the "lie down on the rails" type. As far as the promises to lower the price of vodka (lowering the cost of a half-liter bottle to 1 ruble [R], for example) are concerned, there is nothing impracticable in this, in my opinion. The present government has proved this brilliantly. Vodka prices have been reduced. A bottle of cheap vodka now costs R4,000-5,000, that is, $1. And before, when vodka cost R8-10, 74 kopeks were given in exchange for a dollar, that is, even less than a ruble. So the cost of vodka has now become even less than R1 per bottle.

I fully agree that Russia's economic position is the most painful question. Let us see why our country is in crisis. Three-fourths of the world's natural resources are concentrated in Russia. Consequently, other countries account only for one-fourth.

Again, which countries? Asian, African, and Latin American.

West Europe has nothing (except, perhaps, brown coal). Japan has nothing either. The United States is full of its own mineral resources, but this country prefers to use others', consuming from 40 to 60 percent of the raw material recovered in other countries (Russia included). As far as the West European states and Japan are concerned, they are plundering Asia and Africa and Latin America.

People are plundering us also and want to plunder us even more.

Throughout its existence Russia has had to fight defensive wars: against the Livonian Order, the Teuton Order, the Rzeczpospolita, Sweden, Austria, Prussia, France, Turkey, Britain, Japan, Germany, Finland, Romania, Hungary, Italy.

Russia is a rich country, on which European riff-raff have always cast a covetous gaze.

Do you know that before the revolution the pay of an unskilled laborer in Russia was the equivalent (in comparable prices, of course) of the pay of a minister of a leading Union ministry of Brezhnev's time?! And a skilled worker received two or three times more. An engineer received 20-30 times more. The stores were full. There was no unemployment because Russian industry was developing intensively. We were not particularly shipping raw material to the West. In accordance with an edict of Nicholas II, the sale overseas of no more than 12.8 percent of all that was produced, mined, and cultivated in Russia was allowed. It is not surprising that with such a good life Russian people had large families, five or six and sometimes even 10-12 children.

Lives were very poor in the West. People are living well now at our expense. A.P. Chekhov has a splendid humorous story about a Frenchman who came to Russia, called at a restaurant, and was horrified at how much Russian people ate. Coming from a poor country, he could not understand this. And how much has been written in our country about the thriftiness and prudence of the German?! There is even the expression: "Tight-fisted as a German." The French, British, Italians, Japanese, and so forth are of exactly the same nature. It is said of Russians, however: "the generous Russian soul."

People overseas would bow to the Russian nobleman, merchant, worker, and peasant (before the revolution they also could permit themselves foreign travel) and would try to ingratiate themselves with us in a way that they do not now try to ingratiate themselves with the Americans.

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To Europeans Russia seemed a paradise, to which they rushed to make some money. German, French, and British intellectuals considered it their good fortune to get fixed up as live-in tutors of the children even of small-scale Russian merchants ("a German for the children"). The Swiss worked as bouncers ("doormen") in Russian restaurants.

Do you know that in 1912 the United States broke off relations with Russia? And do you know why? Because the Russian tsar had limited the admittance of Americans to Russia. They were straining to get here. They wanted to live here for a while, to do some trading, to do some swindling, to do some stealing.

West European aristocrats and militarists dreamed of the conquest of Russia. If they headed for far-off South America in search of the fabled land of El Dorado and if they were went by the bloody, fiery whirlwind of colonial wars through Africa, Asia, and Australia, can they not have wanted to have conquered a real, not mythical, El Dorado, the rich country of Russia situated right alongside them?!

It was for the sake of this great West European (and subsequently American and Japanese) dream—the plunder of Russia and the enslavement of the Russian people—that the first Masonic lodges were formed back in 1717.

The main European Masonic lodge is called Great East. It is Russia that always was for West Europeans the Great Rich East, which had always enticed them and against which they had always dashed their heads.

Napoleon Bonaparte, who had united Europe and who in 1812 hurled it against Russia, was a Mason of the Great East lodge. Adolf Hitler was a Mason also (of the German Thule lodge). The cannibalistic plans of Napoleon and Hitler: for the disarticulation and annexation to Europe of the territory of Russia; for the conversion of Russian people into slaves producing raw material for the West and their gradual extermination—this was, in fact, the plan of the Masons that they had adopted back in 1717. And this plan is being implemented now by the Masonic agents who seized power in our country back in 1917.

To achieve its goal Masonry waged against Russia not so much overt as secret wars.

As you will recall, all Russian revolutionaries: the Decembrists (that is, members of Russian Masonic societies), Populists, revolutionary democrats, the People's Freedom Party, anarchists, socialist revolutionaries, Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, Trotskiyites, dissidents, Democratic Russia, Russia's dross (Russia's Choice, Yabloko, Party of Russian Unity and Accord, Women of Russia, and so forth), rejects, internationalists, and cosmopolitans, cleaved to a Western orientation, were stuffed with Western ideas, and lived on "donations" of Western countries. They are all agents of the West, that is.

The October revolution was made on money of the German General Staff, and Democratic Russia and the discards conducted their election campaign with funds obtained from Western sponsors (this word translates as "keeper").

1717—creation of the first Masonic lodges.

1817—annihilation of the Indians in North America.

1917—revolution in Russia.

2017—annihilation of Russia.

Such is the Masonic plan broken down by century.

The annihilation of our people began immediately following 1917. Only recently have we learned that the most appalling, most massive repression occurred not in 1937 but in 1917-1919. Owing to the shipment of food to the West in the 1920's, more than 40 million persons died of starvation, in the 1930's, 12 million.

Now the genocide continues. Owing to a lack of raw material (inasmuch as it is being exported to the West), plants are closing and people are without jobs, living in want, and going hungry. Even those who are still in receipt of wages and pensions cannot purchase the bare necessities because of the price rises. Russians are, understandably, afraid to have children. The birthrate is declining. Mortality is rising. The people are dying out. According to the calculations of the great Russian scientist D.I. Mendeleyev, the Russian population should by our time have risen to 500-600 million. And how many are we in actual fact?! How many of us will there be in several years' time?!

Have any measures been adopted in our country to put an stop to the plunder of Russia by the West? Yes. In 1945, after the war, I.V. Stalin (having preliminarily smashed the Masons and Trotskiyites in 1937-1938), put an end to exports of raw material to the West. The West responded to us for this with the cold war, on account of which our country was plunged into the most burdensome arms race. Despite this, we were able in the four postwar years even to restore the war-ravaged economy, create a powerful defense potential and the atomic and hydrogen bombs, and get into space. But after the death of I.V. Stalin, supplies of raw material to the West were resumed by the subsequent leaders. And our lives got worse and worse.

Communist (and now also democratic) propaganda constantly told us the lie that the main reason for our difficulties is our inability to work. The Russian is lazy and does not like to work, allegedly. In actual fact, though, in terms of energy-output ratio the Russian worker is three times superior to the black South African miner. In terms of the level of worker personnel's qualifications, Russians are in fourth place in the world. We would be in first place were it not for the backward technology, which has not changed since Stalin's times.

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Thus the main reason for the economic crisis our country is experiencing is the fact that we are being robbed.

The crisis can only be terminated by us having stopped the plunder. We need, therefore, to close the borders to the exportation of Russian raw material and energy resources, which I have proposed to the Government of Russia. There has been no response as yet, unfortunately.

If we stop exporting raw material, we will saturate our industry with it. Agriculture will obtain energy resources. The plants will once again start to manufacture the products that we need. The markets will be filled with inexpensive merchandise and food. Unemployment will end. The economy will be revitalized.

This, in my view, is the economic program that could most effectively tackle the problems confronting our country. Within what kind of timeframe? Very quickly.

What do I see as the future structure of the national economy of Russia: of a planned, market, mixed, or some other nature?

You should understand that our country is so rich that were it not being robbed, you could live in it under any system. Even under a free market economy (which no country has).

I am an enemy of all breakups and upheavals.

The state-owned enterprises operated well with us—let them remain state-owned.

A private sector has emerged here and is working well, particularly in services—let it stay.

We have kolkhozes and sovkhozes that are operating well—let them stay.

Farmers have emerged, and things are turning out pretty well with them also—let there be farmers too.

[DELOVOY MIR] The functions of the president include the management of international relations also. How might you characterize Russia's present position in the world arena? What changes, in your view, are necessary in this sphere? What will the foundation of Russians' relationship with countries of the near and far abroad be in the event of your being elected president? What will the methods of the achievement of this goal be?

[Zhirinovskiy] As of the start of the Gorbachev era Russia began to yield its positions in the international arena.

What is the chief purpose of international policy? To safeguard Russia's security. And for this it is necessary to neutralize one's enemies and support the enemies of one's enemies.

The Christian commandment "Love thy neighbor" is unacceptable here. Gorbachev should have known that Metropolitan Filaret, the outstanding 19th century religious and public figure, said in this connection: "Hate the enemies of Christ, fight the enemies of the fatherland, love your own enemies." Consequently, you cannot love the enemies of the fatherland. This is high treason.

Who is our enemy? Whoever wishes to rob, enslave, and kill us. For whoever it is essential to brutally take away our wealth. That is, our enemy are the developed capitalist states. This is for now. When, however, we become weaker, somewhat weaker states will be hankering after our resources.

Who is our friend? Whoever also is subjected to robbery on the part of the developed capitalist states. Even in the animal world the weak unite against the strong. Antelopes come together in a herd to defend themselves against hyenas. Having banded together in a flock, the tiny humming birds drive off the big black kite.

The government of our country pursued, therefore, a correct policy of support for national liberation and other anti-imperialist movements in countries of the third world also subjected to plunder on the part of the West. The USSR was entirely correct to feed the so-called socialist states that were members of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA.

It was total stupidity on the part of Gorbachev and his perestroyka-ites to renounce their (albeit not disinterested) friendship. And how do we evaluate our communist upper stratum's betrayal of the leaders of other communist parties?!

I believe that it would be in Russia's interests to revive the anti-imperialist solidarity of the peoples.

We should support only such internation associations as are objectively aimed against the states wishing to pillage us. Judge for yourselves, do we need the United Nations if it is bossed by the Western powers? On the other hand, why should we not support the Organization of African Unity, the Arab League, or the Organization of American States in its dispute with West Europe or, on the contrary, West Europe in the dispute with the United States.

Both Japan and China are hankering after our land in the Far East. Japan's relations with the United States are little by little beginning to deteriorate at this time, and China is becoming increasingly strong.

In Europe we should make common cause (as did pre-revolutionary Russia) with the Orthodox, Slav, and other peoples of East Europe, our historical allies.

We supported Egypt, which was subjected to Anglo-Franco-Israeli aggression. And were right to do so. We should act in support of all states that have been subjected to aggression on the part of the Western powers.

It is painful for me, a patriot, to watch Russia now straggling in the rear of American policy. We must oppose all economic sanctions (for they strike primarily

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at ordinary people, old people, and children). Especially since these sanctions are currently being employed against our natural allies: Iraq, Yugoslavia, Libya, Cuba.

It is all the more foolish to take part in sanctions in that this hits not only at the political but also the economic interests of Russia. Iraq, for example, owes us $9 billion and is prepared to pay. Approximately the same amount is owed us by Yugoslavia and Libya and Cuba. We, however, are on our knees, virtually, asking the International Monetary Fund for a loan of $6 billion instead of taking our legitimate $9 billion from Iraq.

As far as our present policy in relation to states of the near abroad is concerned, it also is fundamentally wrong. The near abroad means territory chopped off from Russia on which anti-Russian nationalists have declared themselves "independent republics." Russian people there are being subjected, as a rule, to discrimination and exploitation such as that to which the black population of South Africa was not subjected. Despite this, the Government of Russia continues to render the near abroad assistance, digging out 30 percent from its budget annually. A variety of criminals is coming to us from the near abroad. I believe that such assistance to these states needs to be terminated, and the borders closed, to prevent us being robbed (Estonia, for example, stealing and reselling our nonferrous metals, has become the world's biggest exporter of them). We need, in addition, to introduce for citizens of the near abroad visa entry conditions, as for regular foreigners. You wanted to be independent, well, be so!

Were we to pursue such a policy, you may be sure that these states would themselves ask to be let back into Russia. And we would take them, not as republics but as provinces.

[DELOVOY MIR] Your relations with the news media have not always been smooth. Do you intend in the office of president to somehow modify the present status of the news media? And what kind of changes in this sphere might be expected in the event of your election?

[Zhirinovskiy] I believe that the news media should not be conducting antipatriotic and anti-Russian propaganda. Antipatriotic and antistate propaganda is banned in any civilized country. It should be banned with us also.

The press should not be in the hands of agents of influence of the West.

Unfortunately, the "glasnost" proclaimed by Gorbachev did not give the Russian people freedom of the press but strengthened, on the other hand, the positions of the elements who were pro-West and who were bought by the West.

As under the communists, so under the democrats also our news media are dominated by the type of people of whom V.V. Rozanov said that there is simply no word for "conscience" in their native language.

Under the democrats you may do what you like: lie, slander decent people, pour dirt on the Russian people and their history, spread filthy pornography. The only thing you cannot do is stand up for the Russian people or name the true culprits of their tragedy. Otherwise the democratic procuracy will immediately intervene here (or hired killers will be engaged).

In spite of our laws and in spite of all the pontification about human rights (the right, specifically, to disseminate and obtain information), the democrats have instituted more than 50 sets of criminal proceedings against patriotic journalists. Many (Kuzmich-Tsikunov, Pridorogin, Kislov, Yumin, Lipatnikov, for example) have been killed, and the killings have not even been investigated.

I advocate true freedom of the press. Freedom for all, not just for Russophobic villains. Nothing (other than morals, of course) should limit the freedom of creativity. No one has the right to prevent journalists telling people the truth.

[DELOVOY MIR] Just over a year ago you said confidently that your election as president of Russia would be a good present for your 50th birthday. Do you retain this confidence today? On what is it based?

[Zhirinovskiy] The people have learned how to figure out the programs of political parties and politicians. They trust only those who tell the truth and sincerely wish Russia well. For this reason I am confident of victory. The LDPR has a clear-cut program of salvation of the fatherland, and we will implement this program as soon as we come to power.

[DELOVOY MIR] Whom do you consider your main rivals at the presidential elections?

[Zhirinovskiy] The sole realistic rival is the present president B.N. Yeltsin.

[DELOVOY MIR] Who, in your opinion, could today be considered a modern politician? What traits should he possess?

[Zhirinovskiy] I believe that a politician should be a patriot and an honest man. In addition, he should have a good grasp of the problems confronting the country and see the ways of resolving these problems.

## *Parliament 'Criminalization' Likely if Immunity Retained

*954F2032A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Apr 95 p 4*

[Article by Vitaliy Savitskiy, RF [Russian Federation] State Duma subcommittee chairman: "Guilty, But Not Convicted. Among the Publicly Elected Officials There Are People Who Are Involved in the Criminal World"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Only here, in Russia, could the proverb arise: "Until the thunder rumbles, the muzhik will**

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**not cross himself." Our "muzhiks from politics" also, as a rule, are sifting through piles of mistakes which have not been taken into consideration, instead of preventing them. I am saying this because I understand very well that if the immunity granted to deputies is retained, after the elections of 1995 we may have an absolutely criminalized parliament.**

We have become accustomed to the words, "deputy inviolability," but, it seems to me, we do not always understand what this means. Imagine that you are speaking with a publicly elected official (of a local, republic or all-Russian scope) and he, suddenly, reaches into your pocket and takes out your wallet. You can say good-bye to your money, because deputy inviolability keeps you from filing a criminal case against the deputy. If the other deputies see this robbery—do not hope for their eyewitness testimony: Deputy immunity also allows deputies to evade the natural civic duty of giving testimony.

From the standpoint of the citizen, we are all equal before the law. From the standpoint of the Christian, we are all equal before God. But from the standpoint of the deputy, they, the deputies, are "more equal" than all the rest of us. They are above the law. Once having been elected, they (alas, I am forced to write "we") become the chosen ones.

If we look at the figures, the operative data of the General Prosecutor's Office for 1993-1994, we can easily see what this leads to. In the Republic of Tatarstan, 28 deputies committed crimes, in Mordovia—22, in Voronezh Oblast—18, in Kirov Oblast—17, in Tversk Oblast—16...

What kind of crimes did the deputies commit? All kinds—from misappropriation to murder. Eighty-eight crimes were committed against property, 66 work-related crimes, 26 cases of hooliganism, 22 crimes against life and health, and there were 29 cases in which deputies violated traffic safety regulations. In other words, they got behind the wheel while drunk, created accident situations, and so forth.

It is remarkable: If the law enforcement agencies know that the crime was committed by a deputy, they cannot file a criminal case against him. But if they do not know, they can file the case and conduct it until they get down to the truth, after which they put the case into the archives. Whom does such a procedure benefit? The mafia structures have understood very well that the mandate saves them from legal prosecution. Once you become a deputy, you can commit crimes, and it will be very easy for you to evade responsibility. This is a disgusting and vile logic, but today there are a great number of people who think in just this way.

Let us recall how the social strata of persons participating in the elections has changed. In December of 1993 these were leading (or not very) politicians. In the Spring of 1994, representatives of large financial structures appeared on the scene, and already in the Fall of 1994—"leaders" of criminal groups openly participated in the preliminary elections and elections to local organs of power. And what will happen in 1995? The dynamics are obvious.

I am convinced that, by not depriving the deputy of Skorochkin's immunity, the duma has thereby signed its own death sentence. If Skorochkin had borne the same responsibility before the law as all other citizens, he would, most likely, have been alive today. Perhaps he would have been arrested, and would have lived in an isolation facility. Perhaps he would have been hiding out in England, but he would have been alive.

Sergey Mavrodi said rather frankly that he is fighting for the deputy mandate not in the least because, with the mandate, it would be easier for him to "get along" with the law enforcement agencies. And so what? Has this surprised or frightened anyone? No. Everyone has already become accustomed to the fact that publicly elected officials form a certain caste to which the laws do not apply.

In the General Prosecutor's Office they can tell you about a deputy of a local soviet who engaged for quite a long time in thievery, and his actions could not be suppressed. They can tell you about a deputy who hit his neighbor with an axe, or about another one who stabbed his own wife with a knife. Or about how a group of persons violated the law—all were arrested except the deputy, who always comes out of the water dry. I know the names of these people, but I cannot divulge them: After all, there has not been a trial (nor could there be), and their guilt has not been proven.

During these same years of 1993-1994, accusatory sentences were issued by the courts only in regard to 13.7 percent of the total number of deputies who had committed crimes.

The reader has the right to ask: And what is the situation with deputy immunity in other countries? Immediately, I must say that everywhere (and this standard must also be retained in Russia), deputy immunity extends to deputies in regard to their parliamentary activity. That is, neither at the moment of specific deputy activity, nor after it may a person bear criminal responsibility for his parliamentary activity. But this does not extend to criminal violations! For example, in England in case of committing a criminal act, all are equal before the law. In the USA, the concept of deputy inviolability does not exist. In France, deputy immunity exists, but in 30 years the parliament of France has never once rejected a petition by law enforcement agencies in regard to deputies, if such petition concerned criminal cases. So that, as it turns out, we are once again ahead of the entire planet.

Twice I have posed the question of introducing changes into the federal law, "On the Status of a Deputy of the Federal Assembly," in regard to Articles 18, 19 and 20 (deputy immunity). And both times my proposals did

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not pass. I believe that the voters would be interested in knowing how their deputies voted on this question (I will cite only certain names). And so, the following voted in favor of repealing deputy immunity: V. Bauer, D. Volkogonov, Ye. Gaydar, A. Gerber, G. Yegorov, I. Zaslavskiy, B. Zolotukhin, M. Kiselev, M. Molostvov, A. Murashev, A. Nuykin, L. Ponomarev, V. Savitskiy, V. Tatarchuk, G. Tomshin, S. Yushenkov, and G. Yakunin... Altogether, 41 persons, or 9.2 percent, voted against this proposal. Among them were: I. Anichkin, N. Astafyev, S. Baburin, V. Bolshakov, I. Bratishchev, A. Vengerovskiy, Yu. Vlasov, Ye. Gusarov, B. Denisenko, V. Isakov, Ye. Lakhova, G. Lukava, A. Lukyanov, V. Marychev, A. Nevzorov, S. Semago, V. Chikin, and A. Shabad... A total of 72 persons (or 16.8 percent) do not want to part with their right to special treatment under the law, and 5 (or 1.1 percent) abstained...

Well, and what about the other 70-some percent? What about them? The answer will be paradoxical... They did not vote! Out of 446 persons, only 121 voted. The record in this sense belongs to the "Yabloko" group, which refused to vote in its full complement.

I am not the judge of my comrades in parliament, and do not pretend to analyze their reasons for such open passiveness. However, it is obvious that most of the publicly elected officials prefer to pretend that the problems of deputy immunity do not exist altogether.

Aside from the legal, there is another aspect to this problem—the moral one. When crime is rampant in the country, when the most popular people are being murdered, it is immoral for publicly elected officials to demand inviolability for themselves. The entrepreneurs do not have such inviolability, nor do the journalists, nor even the priests.

After two unsuccessful attempts to resolve this problem in parliament, I am forced to appeal to the press. I understand that I am taking a risk in trying to bar the path into parliament for representatives of the criminal structures. I have already been threatened a number of times. During my meeting with voters in Chelyabinsk, they shot out the windows of the hotel where I was staying. It is very important for the public to understand: The preservation of deputy immunity will ultimately lead to the fact that the criminal world will seize both the republic and the local organs of power. Criminalization of the representative organs of power will be a real national tragedy. For the present time, this tragedy can still be averted. And we should not wait for the thunder to peal. If, God forbid, it does peal, we will not even have enough time to cross ourselves.

## *Lack of Legislation To Stop Fraud, Speculation Bemoaned

*954F2018A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Apr 95 p 9*

[Article by Valeriy Guryev, chief of department of the Main Directorate for Economic Crimes of the MVD of Russia, and Aleksandr Goloviznin, senior operational authorized agent for especially important matters of the Main Administration for Economic Crimes of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia: "There Are No Laws in Russia Capable of Stopping Con Men"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **If you open the new Criminal Code of Russia, you will not find a single article that stipulates responsibility for illegal enterprise. In the summer of 1993 the former Supreme Soviet, after long debate, introduced a number of new components to the Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, including this one. However, hopes that legislators will continue the development of modern legal norms and will arm us with the necessary legal acts and the rights of citizens that would make it possible to defend both the interests of the state as well as the rights of citizens were not justified. Everything has been turned back. For whom is this advantageous? Only for those who continue to rob the country and the people with impunity.**

### Nothing Is Simpler Than Deceiving the Consumer

When colorful and multicolored flea markets were set up in squares and stadiums, corruption, crudity, low-quality commodities, overcharging, and swindling seemed only temporary concomitants of the approaching era of universal prosperity. It was thought that at any minute market relations, competition, and the fight for customers would put everything in its place, and we would begin to live in a civilized and developed society. The warnings of criminalists and practical workers concerning the necessity implementing state control over the development of the consumer market were ignored, or were interpreted as an intention to plunge the Fatherland into a Beria-Stalin GULAG and to "put the country on rations." But time decided in its own way.

The total number of crimes registered last year in this sphere increased by almost one-third in comparison with 1993. The number of embezzlements exposed increased by more than 50 percent. More than 4,300 cases of illegal enterprise in the sphere of trade were registered. Such types of crimes as the production and sale of commodities that do not meet safety requirements (increase by a factor of 3.2) and swindling (increase by a factor of 2.5) grew at the fastest rates.

The most widespread transgressions of the law affecting the interests of citizens remained false weights, overcharging, and other forms of defrauding consumers. In 1994, 24,000 crimes of this type were disclosed, which is 20 percent more than in 1993.

It is typical that we are being defrauded not only by butchers and fruit vendors but also by their bosses. But both their requirements and the scales of the shady transactions are a little bigger. Thus, a criminal case is being investigated in the capital in relation to the general director and the chief bookkeeper of one of the vegetable bases that is now a joint-stock company of the closed type. The operators established a whole network of small

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wholesale markets under their aegis, marketing products through them with additional trade surcharges. Employees of 38 Petrovka documented a case of defrauding 500 citizens to the tune of 3.4 million rubles. As a matter of fact, a significantly large number of residents of the city suffered. What is amazing here is that Moscow has become one of the most expensive cities in the world, where swindlers of various calibers who are stuffing their pockets feel untrammeled.

**Death Occurred as a Result of Poisoning**

Russia's losses in the war with the vodka mafia are inestimable. The death rate as a result of poisoning by substitutes is set at a figure in the tens of thousands of persons. These are the direct victims of the consumption of adulterated drinks!

In 1994 the internal affairs organs exposed and eliminated more than 1,500 underground shops engaged in production of alcoholic products. About 7.2 million bottles of wine and vodka articles and more than 2.8 million liters of alcohol of homemade manufacture were confiscated in shops and from the trade network.

It is known that the cost of preparation of industrial alcohol is cheaper than that of food alcohol, inasmuch as its production uses nonfood products, and, in conformity with the law, no excise taxes are levied on it.

Operators of the Krasnoyarsk Kray UEP [Administration for Economic Crimes] have established that the region's largest producer of industrial alcohol, the Krasnoyarskiy BKhZ Joint-Stock Company, sells up to 80 percent of its production wholesale to commercial structures that do not have licenses for its sale. Although for the sake of appearances in contracts a stipulation is made that the alcohol will be used in industrial shops, no real mechanism for control over this has been developed. The entire product is sold by peddlers to the people of the kray. As a result, 763 persons died last year in Krasnoyarsk Kray from alcoholic beverage poisoning. More than 4,000 cases of illegal sale of industrial ethyl alcohol were exposed, and the activity of 32 underground shops for the manufacture of adulterated vodka was stopped. A similar picture is typical of all oblasts of the republic where there are enterprises that produce industrial alcohol.

The trouble is that, aside from the militia, the problem does not interest anyone. The legislators are engaging in political intrigues and the state organs that have been called on to support this sector of work refer to the absence of a normative base. The courts have generally withdrawn from economic problems, at best punishing the underground producers of poison with suspended prison sentences.

The flow of poor-quality alcoholic beverages is being supplemented with imports. During the year more than 3 million bottles of alcohol that is dangerous to life and health and 200,000 liters of alcohol were removed from sale. If you add to this 1.3 million conventional cans of products and 33,500 tonnes of other food products, it becomes clear that supervision over the quality of consumer commodities imported onto the territory of Russia is being conducted in an extremely ineffective way. As a rule, a dangerous product is exposed only during sale through the trade network on the domestic market, i.e., after it has crossed state and customs borders. The State Customs Committee, the State Committee for Sanitary-Epidemiological Oversight, and the State Committee on Standardization, Metrology, and Certification of Russia have not established a reliable system of control over food products imported into the country.

We are leafing through a thick volume of observed data containing concentrated information on disclosed cases of deliveries of commodities from abroad that are dangerous to life and health. In the warehouse of one Moscow firm two tonnes of sausage, eight tonnes of ham and brisket each, and four tonnes of liver sausage were found. The delivery was from Holland, but the certificate of quality was Belgian. It does not meet GOST [State Standard] requirements according to bacteriological and organopeptic indices, and intestinal bacilli and molds were found in food products.

In Nizhniy Novgorod a merchant from Armenia tried to sell a batch of poultry of Hungarian and Yugoslav production for a sum of R43 million. According to the conclusion of expert analysis, the meat can be used only as feed for cattle, inasmuch as the chickens were killed as long ago as 1986!

There is still more. Beef from Italy was discovered in Tula with toxic botulism, and in Chelyabinsk, gammon from Belgium contaminated with salmonella...

**Financial Swindlers Robbed Investors of R20 Trillion**

Criminalists are especially alarmed by the unprecedented dissemination in the country of various kinds of financial fraud and shady transactions. Forgetting the favorite childhood story of "The Adventures of Buratino," citizens of Russia, racking their brains, rushed to enrich themselves, burying their money "in a field of miracles in a country of fools." The amount of damage from the actions of swindlers in the last year alone exceeded R20 trillion ($5 billion according to the exchange rate on 1 January 1995).

The internal affairs organs are trying within the limits of their powers to stabilize the situation in some way; however, the legislation now in effect only permits us to register the official statements of victims (during last year more than 3 million official statements from defrauded investors were registered). Today a criminal case can be instigated only when a company refuses to meet its obligations, and the management lies low. But by that time the money, as a rule, has been skimmed off and converted, and the accounts are empty.

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It is paradoxical but a fact that the overwhelming majority of such cases have no prospects, inasmuch as there are no laws in the country that prohibit illegal financial or trust activity. What is more, in the new draft Criminal Code even the article on responsibility for illegal private business undertakings in the sphere of trade vanished in a strange way. Who is so solicitously looking after con men in the legislative organs? Our subunits in the localities have just been formed, accumulated experience, and a new judicial practice was created, and now an effort is being made to put an end to it all. But people are wondering why they are being robbed with impunity. Ask your own deputies about this, and think about whether you know whom you voted for...

For us, as practical workers, it is distressful to hear from highly placed lawyers-theoreticians or politicians concerning the fact that in demanding to bring the legislation of the country into conformity with norms that are generally accepted in developed countries, we allegedly are only justifying our inability to work. More profound motives are concealed behind such demagogic reasoning: a desire to justify the actual inaction of the Duma itself, which has not moved even one step along the path of lawmaking during the 16 months of its "work," and also the aspiration before the new elections to preserve its face as the people's "protectors."

The Duma's demonstratively expressed distrust of the Ministry of Internal Affairs can serve as a corroboration of this version. They found the guilty party!

However, this smacks of politics, and employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs just do not engage in politics.

## *Novikov on Rehabilitating Victims of Political Repression

*954E0785B Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 28 Mar 95 p 3*

[Interview with Aleksey Novikov, by Aleksey Karpychev, under rubric "Rating the Decisions": "Benefits for 'Enemies of the People': We Are Restoring Justice With Respect to the Victims of Political Repressions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The letters to the editor of ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI frequently include questions pertaining to the execution of Russian Federation Law "Rehabilitating the Victims of Political Repressions." In conformity with that law, a number of normative acts have been adopted that made it possible to reinforce the legal base necessary to restore justice with respect to persons whose fates were ruined by political repressions. The editorial office has asked Aleksey Novikov, a consultant in the RF President's Administration's Department on Questions of Rehabilitating the Victims of Political Repressions, to answer our readers' questions.**

[Karpychev] The Commission on Rehabilitating the Victims of Political Repressions, under the President of the Russian Federation, receives a rather large number of letters from various places. To what do they attest?

[Novikov] The commission actually does receive many letters and requests from the Russian oblasts and krays, and from the near abroad. The letters are complicated ones that require coordination and consultations with the appropriate departments and, therefore, unfortunately, it is not always possible to answer them by the established deadlines. Despite the certain amount of variety among the evaluations expressed by the authors of the letters, one can nevertheless recognize the main feature: with the adoption of the Law "Rehabilitating the Victims of Political Repressions," the rehabilitation process has taken on a completely new quality. Limitations on the rehabilitation of the victims of the political repressions during the entire period of existence of the Soviet state have been removed. Legislation has defined the procedure of individual rehabilitation and compensation of the material damages, which procedure makes it possible to restore justice with respect to hundreds of thousands of innocent persons who suffered. The state is attempting, with a consideration of the real opportunities, to expand the benefits and compensations to those who have been rehabilitated.

[Karpychev] What can be said here specifically?

[Novikov] After the signing by the President of the Russian Federation on 3 September 1993 of the Law "Making of Amendments and Additions to the RSFSR Law 'Rehabilitating the Victims of Political Repressions,'" in 1994 the government adopted a number of normative documents defining the procedure for executing individual statutes of that law.

First of all, this is the Statute on the procedure for granting benefits to rehabilitated individuals and to individuals who have been recognized as having suffered from political repressions.

I cannot fail to mention another important document—the Statute on the procedure for returning to citizens the property that was illegally confiscated or withdrawn, or that was removed in some other way from their possession as a result of political repressions, and for providing replacement for the value of that property or the payment of monetary compensation.

Amendments and additions were made to the Statute on the procedure for paying monetary compensation to individuals who have been rehabilitated in conformity with RSFSR Law "Rehabilitating the Victims of Political Repressions."

The government has also adopted the decree "Burial of Rehabilitated Individuals At Government Expense in the Event of Their Death."

[Karpychev] The children of persons who had been repressed for political reasons suffered no less than their parents did. They also were shipped off to places of banishment or exile and were "enemies of the people."

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What benefits have been stipulated for them? Judging by the mail, this is a fairly acute question... Where should they turn?

[Novikov] You are absolutely right: it is always painful to read letters and to listen to stories told by people whose childhood was ruined by political represssions. Thus, the fate of the children is no less tragic than the fate of their repressed parents.

Children up to the age of 16 years who, together with their parents, were in places of incarceration, banishment, exile, or a special settlement; children up to the age of 18 years who were left without the care of one or both parents; and children, irrespective of their age, whose parents were executed by firing squad or who died in places of incarceration, are recognized as having suffered from political repressions.

The spouse and parents of individuals who had been executed by firing squad or who died in places of incarceration are also considered to have suffered from political represssions.

At such time it is necessary to devote attention to the fact that children who reached the age of 16 years and whose names were placed on the records at their parents' places of special settlements are recognized as having been repressed and are subject to rehabilitation.

Applications for recognition as having suffered from political repressions should be sent to the republic, kray, and oblast agencies of the procuracy—in those instances when the repressions were carried out in accordance with decisions issued by courts and nonjudicial agencies ("special meetings," "*troykas*," etc.). Or they should be sent to agencies of internal affairs at the same level—in those instances when the repressions were carried out in an administrative procedure. It is necessary to append to the application a copy of the official statement concerning the rehabilitation of the person who had been repressed, as well as the documents confirming the kinship relationships with the repressed individual: a birth certificate, certificate of registration of marriage, or, if such documents are lacking, a court decision that establishes the fact of birth.

Persons who have been recognized as having suffered from political repressions and who are pension recipients or disabled have the right to the benefits that have been established by the law, including:

—special [out of turn] rendering of medical assistance and a 50-percent reduction in the cost of prescription medicines;

—free travel on all types of urban passenger transportation (other than taxis), as well as general-purpose motor and water transportation (other than taxis) within the confines of the administration region of residency;

—free travel on suburban rail and water transportation and on suburban motor buses;

—a 50-percent reduction in the amount of payment for housing and utilities, within the limits of the norms stipulated by legislation, as well as the cost of fuel that is purchased within the limits of the norms established for sale to the population living in homes without central heating;

—first-priority installation of a telephone; and a number of other benefits.

An identification card of identical format is issued by the local agencies of the executive authority to persons who have suffered from political repressions who have the right to those benefits.

In conformity with the legislation that is in effect, persons who have suffered from political repressions have the right to a somewhat lesser volume of benefits than rehabilitated individuals do, and that question is raised rather frequently by the authors of letters. They consider this situation to be unjust. It would seem that, when preparing the new amendments to the RF Law "Rehabilitating the Victims of Political Repressions," an attentive attitude should be taken to their opinion.

[Karpychev] Another question that is frequently encountered in the letters to the editor is: how does the legislation that is in effect resolve the question of returning the property that was confiscated as a result of political recessions?

[Novikov] It was already mentioned that in August 1994 the RF government confirmed the Statute that defines the procedure for returning the property, replacing its value, or paying monetary compensation. Unfortunately, the development of that document has been prolonged by almost a year, and that has caused the just indignation of the authors of the letters.

I would like to turn attention to the basic factors in the established procedure.

First, the property is returned or replaced, or monetary compensation is paid for it (if that property was confiscated on the territory of the Russian Federation as a result of political represssions) to the rehabilitated owners of the property, or, in the event of their death, to immediate heirs in equal shares: to children (including adopted ones), spouse, and parents (adoptive parents), and to a child of the decedent, born after the decedent's death.

Second, questions of returning property, replacing its value, or paying monetary compensation are considered by the commissions on restoring the rights of rehabilitated victims of political represssions at the place of location or sale of that property as of the moment of application of the repression. It is specifically to those commissions that it is necessary to send the applications, appending to them notarized copies of the rehabilitation

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documents and other materials confirming the fact of confiscation of the property, and, for heirs, in addition, documents confirming the right of inheritance: in particular, notarized copies of the certificate of death of the rehabilitated individual; marriage certificate, for a spouse; birth certificate, for children and parents; and adoption, for adopted children and adoptive parents.

It is very important to bear in mind that the application must be made within three years after the effective date of Article 16 of RF Law "Rehabilitating the Victims of Political Repressions," which contains the statutes concerning the return of property. That article went into effect as of the moment of the confirmation by the RF government of the previously indicated statute, that is, on 12 August 1994. In the event of a later rehabilitation, the application must be made no later than three years from the moment of receiving the rehabilitation document.

## *Yeltsin, Duma Criticized for Steps on Chemical Disarmament

*954F1997A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 30 Mar 95 p 9*

[Article by Lev Fedorov, doctor of chemical sciences and president of the Union for Chemical Safety: "Chemical Disarmament: From Tragedy to Farce and Back"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Leaving for a tour of the Federation entrusted to his charge, the president of the Russian Federation hurriedly issued edicts which simply could not wait. Pavel Syutkin had for a whole year been acting chairman of the Committee for Convention Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons in the president's office. Time has now finally been found, and the successor of the notorious General Aleksandr Kuntsevich will be in full charge of the committee. Mr. Pavel Syutkin will have to show what he can do as a diplomat—negotiations with the population of the regions where the chemical weapons will be destroyed lie ahead. Not by himself, it is true.

The presidential edict "Preparation of the Russian Federation for the Discharge of International Commitments in the Field of Chemical Disarmament" was signed in such a hurry that it was forgotten to ask the State Duma here to give some thought to ratification of the actual convention which the president wished logically to fulfill. When the convention is ratified by the Duma and takes effect, there will be a new, unofficial, ratification—by the population of the locations where the chemical weapons will be destroyed. And it is hard to vouch for its results, in any event, the public meeting that was held recently in the city of Pochets of Bryansk Oblast close to the place where aviation chemical munitions are stored affords the authors of the edict no grounds for complacency.

Three years have elapsed since the Committee for Coordination of the Activity of Organs of State Administration in the Formulation and Implementation of a Unified State Policy in the Sphere of Chemical Disarmament was formed—the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense together could not cope, it would seem. Eighteen months ago the president ordered the creation of a Government Commission for the Selection of Areas for the Location of Facilities for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons, which was headed by Oleg Soskovets, to help it. The president has now ordered the completion of the building of a well-oiled system of a farewell to chemical warfare, having created the Interdepartmental Commission for Chemical Disarmament under the leadership of Yuriy Baturin, the president's national security assistant.

It is hard to say whether five cooks will cope with what was beyond the Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Ministry of Defense duo. But I would like to call attention to the fact that at the present time there is in Russia not a single body to evaluate the environmental and medical damage caused by the socialist state in the shape of the Ministry of Defense-Ministry of Chemical Industry-Ministry of Health triumvirate in the preparation for chemical warfare. Everyone wants thus far merely to warm themselves for a while in the destruction of chemical weapons. And Yuriy Baturin's commission is no exception, although it is clear, it might have seemed, that the environmental danger is no small component of national security.

Together with the Committee of the Russian Federation for Chemical and Petrochemical Industry and other ministries and departments, Pavel Syutkin's committee is preparing a draft law on social protection of the populace in connection with the destruction of chemical weapons. It cannot be forgotten, for that matter, that not only those who could suffer in the future at the time of the destruction of production plants but also those who have already suffered, making chemical weapons at these same plants, need to be protected. I would recall by way of example that only 250 persons (occupational invalids to a man) survived following the hell of the urgent production of mustard gas and lewisite in the war years. But they simply cannot prove to our Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Social Protection that the weapons did not make it to the front but came crashing down on the manufacturers themselves in the rear and that it is the height of immorality to consider these people rear-service drudges, not invalids of the Great Patriotic War.

Not only those for whom it will be unpleasant to live close to the locations of the future elimination of chemical weapons but also those who have survived following numerous actions in the destruction of chemical weapons in the past are in need of protection. Lest my observation appear inappropriate, I would note that in the coming years we will have to part with 40,000 tonnes of war gas, whereas in the past the USSR had a further 120,000 tonnes on top of these, which have been lost somewhere and whose ecological "tracks" the commissions and committees are not contemplating uncovering. Thousands of people, who have already experienced destruction efforts, have found themselves unembraced by future concern.

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Over two months have elapsed since 13 January 1995, when the Convention on Chemical Weapons would have commenced operation had it been ratified by the parliaments of the United States, Russia, and Japan. But it has not begun to operate because our Duma has other thoughts as yet (it is hardly appropriate to talk about other parliaments—we have enough problems with our own). I mentioned the Japanese parliament not because I suspect Japan of the secret possession of chemical weapons but because the president's pre-departure haste was evoked, it would seem, by the "gas attack" in Tokyo. There are many more victims of the state's "gas attack" on the population with us, and there will be even more if the population is once again excluded from the chemical disarmament process.

## Military & Space Issues

### *Problem of 'Space Junk,' Possible Cleanup Method

*954E0798A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Mar 95 p 8*

[Interview with Georgiy Tulinov, doctor of Physics-Mathematical Sciences and director of the Scientific Research Institute of Applied Geophysics and Boris Bodin, deputy chief of the Russian Space Agency's Administration for State Space Programs, by Ruslan Ignatyev: "Cleaning Outer Space: A Unique System Is Being Created. Its Developers Are Russian Scientists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today nearly 2,000 satellites of all sorts are traveling in near-earth space in various orbits. New spacecraft are regularly being launched into space. Each of them operates on average for 5-6 years. The majority of the satellites that have broken down are being transformed later into so-called space junk. Wreckage of spacecraft, entire fragments and other wastes in free flight are being attracted to each other and they are forming distinctive trains in orbit that are tearing along at a furious speed—eight kilometers per second. The possibility of their collision both with unmanned and also with manned spacecraft has recently emerged. And this is already a threat to the lives of the people who work in space. The formation of space "dumps" could result in unpredictable consequences...

**Georgiy Tulinov, doctor of Physics-Mathematical Sciences and director of the Scientific Research Institute of Applied Geophysics, said:**

[Tulinov] If pollution of near-earth space is carried out at these rates, it will result in a substantial restriction of man's activities in space. The destruction of spacecraft occurs practically on a daily basis and wreckage and entire structural members are orbiting around the Earth. These flights can last for a very long time. As a result, junk is accumulating and certain orbits are being cluttered up.

An aircraft's encounter with a celestial fragment several centimeters in size could result in an accident or even a serious catastrophe. Furthermore, radioactive contamination has not been excluded while taking into account the growing probability of a collision of pieces of space junk with a satellite that has a nuclear power plant on board. Intensive pollution of space with chemical substances is also occurring. That is why the issues of man-made effects on near-earth space are being examined at a special session of the Security Council.

[Ignatyev] Do methods exist today to clean the junk from space?

[Tulinov] Work is occurring in this direction. Various projects have been proposed. Here one can examine, say, special inflatable shells which would sweep up this junk, move it into lower orbits, and later the wastes would burn up during entry into the atmosphere's thick layers. In short, these super-durable spheres would act as sort of an enormous broom. This affects only small particles or fragments.

Ideas have also been expressed on large objects. For example, plans have been proposed to remove depleted satellites. But they have remained at the draft stage. All of this (from the energy and financial point of view) is very expensive. Nevertheless you can't avoid this problem since "mountains" of wastes will appear in orbit in 20 years.

Indeed, an effective method for destroying dangerous objects has been widely utilized: the resources of the depleted satellite were blown up. But this technique resulted in the formation of small junk.

[Ignatyev] Has the optimal variant been found?

[Tulinov] Yes. There is a system that is already being introduced—this is an improvement of the technology of the objects themselves. That is, methods are being utilized that would permit not the destruction of the satellites, but would move them out into more remote orbits, into Lunar orbit or make them satellites of the Sun. Such operations have already been conducted. A special device has been mounted in the spacecraft and the appropriate information has been loaded into a program. As soon as the object has become obsolete, the automated device activated and the satellite was transported into deep space.

Other systems are also being developed to remove junk from space. However, there is much research and experiments ahead. I need to say that objects with dimensions from a micron to several meters are included in space junk. We have talked about what is already understood but there are aspects that are little known or entirely unknown. The possible geophysical consequences in the biosphere that could be associated with the man-made effect on near-earth space have practically not been studied.

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Only monitoring of large fragments of space junk is being provided at the present time. Only individual experimental data exist on the remaining directions of space pollution. Obtaining a complete picture of what is occurring will help the experts to develop effective methods to protect space from dangerous man-made objects...

**ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA also asked Boris Bodin, deputy chief of the Russian Space Agency's Administration for State Space Programs, to comment. This is what he said:**

[Bodin] The problem of polluting near-earth space is urgent and important not only from the point of view of man's space activity but for the preservation of life on Earth in general. We need to anticipate how this may turn out for us and what kind of threat is coming from space.

The satellites themselves that have depleted their resources and that are aimlessly rotating in orbit do not pose a danger. A technique to resolve this issue exists in world practice. So, the Americans have developed a system for removing and returning spacecraft to Earth using the reusable Space Shuttle. Satellites are repaired and launched once again. These are large objects that can be controlled.

Fragments that have been formed as a result of the destruction of the stages of spacecraft and during the explosion of spacecraft cause special alarm. According to our data, today nearly 10,000 of these fragments that are 10 centimeters or more in size are in near earth space. Add to that more than 1,500 spacecraft. Naturally, there is the possibility of a collision but the main thing is that the number of man-made objects is growing with each passing year and, therefore, the danger of all sorts of accidents is increasing.

Therefore, we need to provide for comprehensive measures. Systems that exclude blowing up spacecraft in space must be developed. Today we cannot produce excess junk and we are obliged to clean up after ourselves.

Right now steps are being taken to reduce the quantity of dangerous man-made objects. Research is being conducted, the technical appearance of these systems is being determined, and different variants are being developed. And although today the probability of a collision with spacecraft and satellites is small, we must calculate everything already right now.

And the last thing, our Buran could operate like the Shuttle—to return satellites. This Russian spacecraft was 20 years ahead of its time. These technologies must also be developed during the resolution of the problem associated with space pollution.

## Federal Assembly

### *Law on Passing Laws From Duma to Federation Council Discussed

### *Constitutional Court Interprets Constitution

*954E0792A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Mar 95 p 11*

[Decree, under rubric "In the Name of the Russian Federation": "Decree of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court on the Matter of the Interpretation of Part 4 of Article 105 and Article 106 of the RF Constitution, Moscow, 23 March 1995"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The RF Constitutional Court, made up of Chairman B. A. Tumanov, judges E. M. Ametistov, M. V. Baglay, N. T. Vedernikov, N. V. Vitruk, G. A. Gadzhiyev, Yu. M. Danilov, V. D. Zorkin, A. L. Kononov, V. O. Luchin, T. G. Morshchakova, V. I. Oleynik, Yu. D. Rudkin, N. V. Seleznev, V. G. Strekozov, O. I. Tiunov, O. S. Khokhryakova, and B. S. Ebzeyev,

with the participation of I. M. Kostoyev and A. I. Kovalenko—representatives of the Federation Council that sent the inquiry to the RF Constitutional Court—as well as representatives of subjects of the legislative process with an immediate self-interest in the results of the interpretation, who had been invited to the session—M. A. Mityukov and V. B. Isakov, representatives of the State Duma, and M. A. Krasnov, representative of the President of the Russian Federation,

guided by Article 125 (Part 5) of the RF Constitution; paragraph 4, Part 1, and Parts 2 and 3 of Article 3; paragraph 2, Part 2, of Article 21; and Article 105 of the Federal Constitutional Law entitled "The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation,"

has reviewed in an open plenary session the matter of the interpretation of Part 4 of Article 105 in connection with Article 106 of the RF Constitution.

The ground for reviewing the matter, in accordance with Part 1 of Article 36 of the Federal Constitutional Law entitled "The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation," was the inquiry of the Federation Council of the RF Federal Assembly concerning the interpretation of Part 4 of Article 105 and Article 106 of the RF Constitution.

The basis for reviewing the matter, in accordance with Part 2 of Article 36 of the Federal Constitutional Law entitled "The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation," was the revealed indefiniteness in the understanding of the principles stated in Part 4 of Article 105 in connection with the prescriptions of Article 106 of the RF Constitution, as a consequence of which it is necessary to clarify whether the 14-day time limit established by Part 4 of Article 105 of the RF Constitution for reviewing and approving federal laws in the Federation

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Council extends to federal laws dealing with questions the list of which is provided in Article 106 of the RF Constitution.

Having listened to a statement by reporting judge V. G. Strekozov, the explanations by representatives of the Federation Council, and the statements made by those who had been invited, and having studied the presented materials, the RF Constitutional Court has **decreed:**

The RF Constitution, in regulating the legislative process, defines that legislative drafts are submitted to the State Duma (Article 104, Part 2) and that federal laws are enacted by that house (Article 105, Part 1). Laws enacted by the State Duma are passed to the Federal Council for review (Article 105, Part 3), which action has the purpose of guaranteeing the taking into consideration of its opinion in the legislative process and provides it with the opportunity to express its consent or lack of consent with the State Duma with respect to any law.

In conformity with Article 105 (Part 4) of the RF Constitution, a federal law is considered to be approved by the Federation Council if more than half the total number of the members of that house have voted for it, or if, within 14 days, it has not been reviewed by the Federation Council. Thus, the Federation Council itself decides which of the laws that have been enacted by the State Duma are subject to review at its session.

An exception to this general rule has been established by Article 106 of the RF Constitution, which article provides a list of federal laws that are subject to mandatory review in the Federation Council.

At the same time, Article 106 of the RF Constitution does not establish a special deadline for reviewing those laws in the Federation Council. Having begun a review of a law within the 14-day period that has been stipulated by Article 4 of Article 105 of the RF Constitution, the Federation Council is required, by means of a vote, to make a decision concerning the approval or rejection of the law. The expiration of the indicated deadline does not free the Federation Council of that obligation. A law that has been enacted with regard to any of the questions listed in Article 106 cannot be considered to be approved if the Federation Council has not completed its review. Correspondingly, the law in this instance is not subject to signing by the head of state.

If the review in the Federation Council of federal laws that have been enacted with regard to questions listed in Article 106 of the RF Constitution has not been completed within the period of time established by Part 4 of Article 105, that review must be extended to the next session of the Federation Council and must be completed by the making of a decision.

On the basis of what has been stated, in accordance with the meaning of Article 105 and 106 of the RF Constitution, and also with a consideration of the practice that has developed in the legislative process, and guided by Articles 72, 74, and 75 of the Federal Constitutional Law entitled "Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation," the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation has **decreed:**

1. The review in the Federation Council of a federal law that is subject, in conformity with Article 106 of the RF Constitution, to mandatory review in that house must begin, in accordance with Part 4 of Article 105 of the RF Constitution, no later than 14 days after it has been passed to the Federation Council.

2. If the Federation Council, within a period of 14 days, has not completed the review of a federal law that has been enacted by the State Duma and that, in accordance with Article 106 of the RF Constitution, is subject to mandatory review in the Federation Council, that law is not considered to be approved, and its review is extended to the next session of the Federation Council, pending the making of a decision concerning its approval or rejection.

3. The interpretation contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the resolution part of this Decree does not extend to federal laws that are recognized by the Federation Council itself to be subject to mandatory review in the Federation Council if they were enacted by the State Duma with regard to questions that are not listed in Article 106 of the RF Constitution.

4. In accordance with Article 106 of the Federal Constitutional Law entitled "The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation," an interpretation given by the RF Constitutional Court is official and mandatory for all representative, executive, and judicial agencies of state authority, agencies of local self-government, enterprises, institutions, organizations, officials, citizens, and their associations.

5. In accordance with Article 79 of the Federal Constitutional Law entitled "The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation," this Decree is final, is not subject to appeal, and goes into effect immediately after its promulgation.

6. In accordance with Article 78 of the Federal Constitutional Law entitled "The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation," this Decree is subject to immediate publication in SOBRANIYE ZAKONODATELSTVA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, and other official publications of agencies of state authority of the Russian Federation. The Decree must also be published in VESTNIK KONSTITUTSIONNOGO SUDA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII.

[Signed] Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
No. 1-P

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## *Constitutional Court Judge Dissents

*954E0792B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Mar 95 p 11*

[Article by V. O. Luchin, RF Constitutional Court judge: "Special Opinion of RF Constitutional Court Judge V. O. Luchin in the Matter of the Interpretation of Part 4 of Article 105 and Article 106 of the RF Constitution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Being in disagreement with individual principles stated in the 23 March 1995 Decree of the RF Constitutional Court with regard to the matter of the interpretation of Part 4 of Article 105 and Article 106 of the RF Constitution, and being guided by Article 78 of the Federal Constitutional Law entitled "The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation" and paragraph 38 of the Rules of the RF Constitutional Court, I consider it to be desirable to express my special opinion with regard to the substance of the question.

The ground for reviewing the matter, in accordance with Part 1 of Article 36 of the Federal Constitutional Law entitled "The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation," was an inquiry by the Federation Council of the RF Federal Assembly concerning the interpretation of Part 4 of Article 105 and Article 106 of the RF Constitution.

The basis for reviewing the matter, in accordance with Part 2 of Article 36 of the Federal Constitutional Law entitled "The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation," was the revealed indefiniteness in the understanding of the principles stated in Part 4 of Article 105 in connection with the prescriptions of Article 106 of the RF Constitution, as a consequence of which it is necessary to clarify whether the 14-day time limit established by Part 4 of Article 105 of the RF Constitution for review of federal laws by the Federation Council extends to federal laws dealing with questions the list of which is provided in Article 106 of the RF Constitution, and whether it is necessary to proceed from the hypothesis that the time limit for reviewing federal laws dealing with questions indicated in Article 106 of the RF Constitution, since that time limit has not been defined at the constitutional level, is subject to independent definition by the Federation Council in the Rules of the Federation Council, First Convocation.

The Decree of the RF Constitutional Court proceeds from the general deadline for reviewing federal laws in the Federation Council, while simultaneously recognizing the different legal consequences of failure to observe it for various types of laws: those which it reviews alternatively, at its own discretion, and those which are subject to mandatory review by it in conformity with Article 106 of the RF Constitution.

The 14-day time period established by Part 4 of Article 105 of the RF Constitution, in my view, is not general for reviewing by the Federation Council of the federal laws arriving from the State Duma. The 14 days pertain only to those laws the review of which depends entirely upon the Federation Council itself and is not mandatory for it. Moreover, Part 4 of Article 105 of the RF Constitution has as its goal the establishment not so much as the time limits for review, as the conditions and methods by which the Federation Council approves those laws. It does not have an organic link with Article 106 and cannot in any way shake the "mandatory nature of review" of the federal laws listed in it. The latter cannot be considered to be approved by the Federation Council if they have not been reviewed by it. Automatic approval is precluded, irrespective of when the "mandatory review" was begun or when it was completed.

The imposition by this decree of the Constitutional Court upon the Federation Council of the obligation to begin, in accordance with Part 4 of Article 105 of the RF Constitution, the review of a federal law that is subject, in conformity with Article 106 of the RF Constitution, to mandatory review in that house "no later than 14 days after it has been passed to the Federation Council," in my opinion, does not evolve from Part 4 of Article 105 of the RF Constitution and does not have an legal support in it. If, for example, by virtue of the necessity of additional study of that law, or for other reasons, that requirement has been violated, will any other legal consequences ensue? No, and in that instance the law is not considered to be approved and is not subject to signing by the head of state. The mandatory nature of its review is not eliminated by the elapsing of the 14-day deadline, just as it is not eliminated by the lack of coincidence between the previously established and the actual duration of the review. The "mandatory nature" as applicable to Article 106 of the RF Constitution was formulated outside of any specific time coordinates. It is possible to perceive this circumstance variously, but it cannot be ignored.

The extension of the 14-day deadline to federal laws that are subject, in accordance with Article 106 of the RF Constitution, to mandatory review in the Federation Council, even if only as of the beginning of the review, is devoid of any sense, since this does not create any legal obligations for the house, does not in any way influence the legal status of the corresponding laws, and does not overcome their legal imperfection. The expiration of the indicated deadline does not free the Federation Council from the obligation to begin and complete the review of that law. Any law listed in Article 106 is not considered to be approved if the Federation Council, by means of a vote, has not made a decision concerning its approval of rejection. I might also note that Part 4 of Article 105 of the RF Constitution also makes no mention at all about the "beginning of the review" of any federal laws in the Federation Council. Nor was the question raised from this point of view in the Federation Council's appeal to the Russian Constitutional Court.

In essence, the Constitutional Court declined to answer the question of whether the Federation Council, First Convocation, can independently establish a deadline for the "mandatory review" of federal laws since it has not been defined on the constitutional level.

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I am proceeding from the conscientiousness and responsibility of the Federation Council and from the confidence that it will not begin to drag out the legislative process artificially, and that it will attempt, with a consideration of the real possibilities, to achieve an accelerated review of the laws dealing with questions stipulated in Article 106 of the RF Constitution.

Thus there is no necessity to force on the Federation Council any deadlines for reviewing that category of federal laws. Inasmuch as the deadlines for "mandatory review" have not been defined in the Constitution (it is not precluded that this will still have to be done), they can be established by the Federation Council independently in its Rules.

With a consideration of what has been stated, I have come to the following conclusions:

1. The principle stated in Part 4 of Article 105 of the RF Constitution to the effect that a federal law is considered to be approved by the Federation Council "if, within a 14-day period, it has not been reviewed" does not extend to federal laws concerning questions stipulated in Article 106 of the RF Constitution. This pertains both to the beginning and the end of their review.

2. The Federation Council, First Convocation, can independently establish in its Rules the deadlines that guarantee the prompt review of federal laws concerning questions stipulated in Article 106 of the RF Constitution.

[Signed] V. O. Luchin, Russian Federation Constitutional Court judge.

## Regional Affairs

### *Regional Authorities, Oil Supplying Companies Conflict Detailed

*954F1937A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 21 Mar 95 p 3*

[Article by Aleksandr Bekker: "Yuriy Shafranik: Only By Means of a Shock: Conflict Between the Fuel and Energy Complex and the Agro-Industrial Complex as a Mirror of the Russian Revolution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nefteyugansk and Moscow—All last year the United States oil industry was cruelly shaken by a nonpayments crisis. In an attempt to persuade customers to pay for fuel, the presidents of Chevron, Texaco, and Amoco flew to confer with the governors of the states of Iowa, California, and Oklahoma. The latter attempted to justify the debts by citing local farmers' lack of money, and a little later they made a reciprocal visit to the oil fields. Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary vigilantly monitored the problem, but to no avail. The nonpayments continued, heating up the situation in the country to a fevered pitch.

That, of course, was fantasy, but with respect only to geography. This really happened in our country. In February 1994, officials of the YuKOS Petroleum Company made the rounds of the heads of administration of nine oblasts in central Russia. In order to try to solve the nonpayments problem, the following was done: oil producers from the Yugansknefteqaz [Yugansk Petroleum and Gas] Joint-Stock Company that belonged to the petroleum company supplied raw material without prepayment to YuKOS' petroleum refineries in Samara. The latter, producing gasoline and oil, also shipped them unpaid-for to their marketing organizations located in Lipetsk, Voronezh, Bryansk, and other oblasts in the central region. The company's total commodity credit came to 145 billion rubles [R]. Its management figured that in response to the goodwill gesture, the farms would buy fuel and lubricants from the marketing organizations before the planting season, the marketing organizations would pay off their debt to the refineries, and the latter would settle accounts with the Yugansk petroleum producers. That way agricultural work would proceed without a hitch and the payment chain would be untangled.

While YuKOS proposes the administration heads dispose. In six oblasts the fuel was, for all practical purposes, commandeered from storage facilities and sent to the farmers for free. When the petroleum company asked when the debt would be repaid, Yegor Stroyev, head of the Orel Oblast Administration, for example, replied with communist bluntness: "Maybe never."

Within YuKOS the scandal was extinguished with difficulty. Company President Sergey Muravlenko used every bit of his prestige to try to persuade his team that what had happened was a regrettable mistake and that they needed to work as though there had been no problem. In August he and his colleagues from subsidiary enterprises met once again with the heads of administration in Lipetsk.

With letters of guarantee from the oblasts and a one-month deferment of payments, fuel was once again shipped to customers, but as far as settlements were concerned, the harvest season was almost an exact repeat of the planting season. Of course it was the company's key unit, the YuNG [Yugansk Petroleum and Gas] Joint-Stock Company, that found itself in the most serious situation; debts to it approached R1 trillion by the end of the year.

Of course, the problem of nonpayments in the fuel and energy complex cannot be reduced solely to the "malicious intent" of the farmers and the state bureaucrats who indulge them. A certain share of the causes of the crisis is attributable to high taxes, the breakdown of economic ties, and the inflation of costs in industries supplying the oil producers with materials and equipment. Nonetheless, I believe that the subjective element, which used to be called payment discipline, has now come to the fore. Let's leave aside, for the time being, the

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industrial enterprises and CIS debts. The February budget made special provision for expenditures for the purchase of fuel and lubricants for the agro-industrial complex. Last year the oil producers got 28 percent of the funds specified under this budget category. It would be better to ask the heads of administration just where the rest of the money allocated by the Ministry of Finance went.

They were asked about this recently in Nefteyugansk, where they gathered for their latest session with YuKOS. The answer given by Yevgeniy Savchenko, the head of administration from Belgorod, was so simple: "The money was spent for urgent needs of the oblast." Given this view of payments, R50 billion in taxes, one-quarter of the city budget, failed to go for the needs of the city of Nefteyugansk. Guests were informed of this by Vitaliy Sevrin, the mayor of Nefteyugansk, who had something else to say too: "By procuring petroleum products without paying for them you are cutting off the branch we are sitting on." Over the past year the debt of the fuel and energy complex's customers rose by a factor of 4.5, reaching R43.7 trillion. In this connection, investment programs were rapidly curtailed, first and foremost investment in oil extraction. This same industry had the largest drop in production, which declined by 37.2 million tonnes (10.5 percent) last year alone. In this sense YuKOS failed worse than its competitors from LUKoil, Surgutneftegaz [Surgut Petroleum and Gas] and Sidanko.

Understandably, people in the company's subdivisions did not wait quietly while the debt noose tightened. By last autumn many filling stations in the nine oblasts assigned to YuKOS had simply run dry. Both the Yugansk petroleum producers and the petroleum refineries, ignoring their commitments, shipped their "product" for barter or to customers with "real" rubles, regardless of their location. YuNG's General Director Mr. Gulyayev estimates that up to 50 percent of the petroleum went for direct ties; that is, to supply the gasping production facilities with cement, pipes, and reagents. Moreover, in order to do this YuNG was forced to open 12 offices in oblasts.

When the trend of selling oil in circumvention of regular clients gathered momentum, the heads of administration got seriously worried. In the final analysis, the cycle of planting and harvest seasons happens every year. The governors, on the one hand, started establishing alternative sources for supplying fuel and lubricants for which they somehow contrived to find financing, and on the other, started building bridges to their general supplier, YuKOS. The latter's management could not openly break off relations with the nine governors without political consequences, either. Thus, the meeting in Nefteyugansk was unavoidable. "We do not have the right to part without a solution, no matter how tough it proves to be," said Yuriy Shafranik, minister of Fuel and Energy, to those who were present.

The memorandum that was drawn up reflecting the meeting's results included a petition to the government to transfer the excise tax on petroleum to petroleum products, a request to issue treasury bonds to help repay the state's debt for agricultural goods, and a request to include the interest on loans in the price of petroleum products. As for the key question, consumer debt, the following was decided: YuKOS pledged to provide full supplies of fuel for the planting season, and the heads of administration promised to provide the company with a schedule for the repayment of debts.

I will not venture to judge how tough such a solution is, but in terms of parity, it appears to be seriously wanting. For all practical purposes, the oblasts took the "real thing" in return for a legally insignificant piece of paper. It seems that at that moment the oblast leaders would have even signed a document on the "divorce" of YuKOS from the state, merely in order to chain the oil producers to the "galleys" once again. The oblast heads gladly agreed to a reorganization of YuKOS, and consequently its subsidiary enterprises transferred all rights to the sale of output and the settlement of accounts with customers to the mother company. In approving this management plan, the governors probably believed in their heart of hearts that it would be much easier to deal with President Muravlenko alone—that is, to force him to supply fuel and lubricants without payment—than to try to "break," one by one, the officials from YuNG, the refineries, the marketing organizations, and YuKOS itself, each of whom would be fighting for themselves. Ultimately, if it proved necessary to "squeeze" Muravlenko, the nine oblast heads together could enlist the premier as well. The threat, however imaginary, that you might be blamed for "starving to death" half of central Russia would move anybody. One should not forget that the controlling block of shares in the YuKOS company belongs to the state.

Mr. Generalov, the petroleum company's vice president, gave me a detailed description of the mechanism for settlements with customers, trying to persuade me of the efficiency of concentrating the financial flows in YuKOS. He was unable to tell me, however, why this arrangement, which had already been adopted by LUKoil, failed to work: that company's debts to its refineries from Langepas, Uray, and Kogalym had reached R1.4 trillion by the end of 1994. There are no realistic means of forcing customers in the regions to pay for fuel. The governors can promise, especially just before the planting or harvest seasons, that they will put pressure on the flagrant debtors, but in reality, nonpayments to the oil companies are not a priority problem for the local authorities. They are not even a secondary problem. The main thing is to get the crops in and harvest them on time, while maintaining a saturated market in the oblast and normal prices for the consumer basket, and not to allow unemployment.

The sources of nonpayments for petroleum, it appears, became established at the time when the companies were

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attached, like serfs, to certain regions. Socialist elements were "stitched into" the market fabric when, for example, Gossnab [Is this still, or again, the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply?] attached enterprises to one another and set limits for deliveries. "In 1993 there was no other solution," Yuriy Shafranik believes. "Had we given free reign to LUKoil, Surgut and YuKOS, there would have been chaos. Do you understand?" I understand, but I do not know how to define a situation in which the oil producers, before asking about debts, ask the farmers about the depth at which seeds have been planted, and heads of administration, with a knowing look, ask about pressure in the wells. What do you call a "market" in which payment for supplied gasoline is made a year later in sugar, butter, and meat? As a matter of fact, the oil producers' autumn mutiny and direct approach to clients who could afford to pay was an attempt to break up unnatural relations and get closer to a normal market.

The worst thing of all, however, is that forcible attachment to regions reinforced administrative principles in the economy. The heads of administration, like the CPSU obkom secretaries before them, have gathered all the levers of administration in their own hands. They can issue a command to confiscate fuel that does not belong to the oblast or, while not paying the petroleum producers, subsidize low procurement prices on the farms. They are becoming an irreplaceable drive mechanism for the bureaucratic market. The governors' sense of their own importance noticeably manifested itself in Nefteyugansk when Mikhail Narolin, head of the Lipetsk Administration, in front of a full auditorium, turned to the vice-president of YuKOS and said: "You, Lobov, ought to be shot." Mr. Lobov had angered Mr. Narolin by refusing to let the oblast have fuel and lubricants in the autumn as a gift, shipping them instead to creditworthy clients through commercial firms.

The donor role of the fuel and energy complex in a noncompetitive, wasteful economy is an objective reality: about 40 percent of the energy resources delivered to customers remain unpaid-for. The agro-industrial complex and a good many industrial branches and their plenipotentiaries in the upper echelons of power have an interest in not just maintaining the status quo for the transitional period but actually making the donor role of the fuel and energy complex an element of strategy. In this connection it should be recalled that the strategy of financing the industrialization of India with exports of raw materials resulted in a profound crisis in state finances and a rise in foreign debt in the 1980s. In contrast, South Korea, realizing the costs of such a strategy in time, rejected it.

I do not want to deliver truisms about the hen that laid the golden eggs, so let us mention three figures: 30 percent of the value of industrial output, 40 percent of budget revenues, and about 50 percent of export earnings are supplied by the fuel and energy complex. The workers of Yuganskneftegaz refuse to understand why, while pumping oil that is not just lying around for the taking, they go three to four months without pay. It is difficult for those accustomed for many years to increasing production to carry out the constantly changing orders: "shut the valve; open the valve." One of them remarked bitterly: "We are pawns in a game we don't understand."

A third failure of the attempt to arrange the mutual settlement of accounts between YuKOS and its customers in the oblasts may become the final bell for President Muravlenko and YuNG's Director Gulyayev, and the problem is not just stockholders' meetings; in fact, the executives are protected by a block of votes. The problem is the moral atmosphere that may form around company heads who have suffered a fiasco. Sergey Muravlenko, by his own admission, is not certain that the new YuKOS mechanism will work. The "payments" failure of the LUKoil, YuKOS, and Surgutneftegaz oil companies would give a trump card to the supporters of strengthening state regulation and price controls. It is typical that already the state, taking Purneftegaz [Pura Petroleum and Gas] away from the Sidanko company, has turned it over to the Rosneft state enterprise. On the wave of an exacerbation of the nonpayments crisis, the idea of reviving a state monopoly in the form of a National Petroleum Company would also sail through.

I do not mean to bang the heads of the fuel and energy complex and the agro-industrial complex together. It is obvious that little good can come of not planting the crops and not harvesting them, but it is also obvious that without reform in the agrarian sector, without a mechanism for bankruptcies, it will be hard to put commodity-money relations into operation. The choice is simple: either a market or war communism with requisitions of fuel from the storage facilities, just as grain was once raked out of peasant granaries. In 1991 Boris Yeltsin, whom some economists tried to frighten with the socioeconomic consequences, forbade the Gaydar team to decontrol prices on energy resources. The disease was driven inward, and it has broken out every time in the form of an acceleration of inflation when the government has periodically raised fuel and energy prices. It appears that the economy cannot be cured with half measures. "The only way we can force the other branches to produce competitive products is by means of a shock," said Yuriy Shafranik, "or by ruining them, and that is the turn that would be the cruelest for the country. We have come to the point that existed in 1991: to the point of a new revolution. The economy depends to a huge extent on the fuel and energy complex, which already stands on the threshold of a second liberalization, but we are still psychologically unprepared for that."

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## *Kemerovo Misses Administration Reduction Goals

*954F1968A Kemerovo KUZNETSKIY KRAY in Russian 14 Feb 95 p 3*

[Article by V. Naletov, Legislative Assembly deputy and chairman of Committee on Budget, Tax, and Financial Policy: "Are There Fewer Public Officials in the Kuzbass?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last spring M.B. Kislyuk announced his intention to reduce the oblast administration staff by 25 percent. The public was informed soon afterward that this reorganization had been completed and that the reduction of local administration staffs would begin.

The administration chief's initiative would have been highly commendable if all of this had actually occurred, but we know from experience that any administrative staff reduction in Russia usually leads to growth.

It appears that the present case is no exception to the rule.

In an attempt to substantiate this statement, we will begin by explaining to the reader that the oblast administration consists of the administration staff and of committees, divisions, and offices in charge of various branches of the national economy.

The latter include, for example, the Office of Public Health, the Department of Education, the Office for the Social Protection of the Population, and so forth.

The changes analyzed below pertain directly to the administration staff, because it was the subject of Kislyuk's announced reduction program.

The analysis was based on the administration Personnel Division's lists of oblast administration staff positions for the following periods: May 1992 (the start of the present administration chief's term in office), February 1994 (the period before the announcement of the 25-percent staff reduction), and November 1994 (the period following the reorganization), served as the basis for this analysis.

The results of the analysis are presented in the table.

| No | Staff branches (on May 1992 list) | Number of staff positions | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | May 92 | Feb 94 | Nov 94 |
| 1 | Staff of administration chief | 5 | 6 | 10 |
| 2 | Deputies of administration chief | 7 | 10 | 11 |
| 3 | Staff of deputies of administration chief | 15 | 20 | 23 |
| 4 | Military-Mobilization Division | 6 | 18 | 18 |
| 5 | Information Analysis Office (including press service) | 6 | 9 | 11 |
| 6 | Main Economic Office | 78 | 67 | 34 |
| 7 | Committee on Trade and Interregional Relations | 11 | 14 | — |
| 8 | Office of Industry, Transportation, and Communications | 11 | 12 | 14 |
| 9 | Office of Management of Affairs | 3 | 6 | 32 |
| 10 | Office of Information Resources and Technology | — | 7 | — |
| 11 | Division for Work with Territories | 12 | 14 | 13 |
| 12 | Legal Division | 4 | 8 | 6 |
| 13 | Other divisions and offices | 77 | 1,332 | 76 |
| 14 | Number of vacant positions | 34 | 44 | 17 |

According to the staff lists and the data in the table, the oblast administration staff had 235 positions in May 1992, and 34 were vacant—i.e., 201 people were actually working on the staff.

In February 1994 the administration staff already had 323 positions, 44 of which were vacant.

Between May 1992 and February 1994, therefore, the oblast administration staff grew by 88 positions (37.5 percent), and the number of people actually working on the staff increased by 78 (or by 38.8 percent).

The table indicates that the changes in the administration staff during that period essentially resulted in an increase in the number of positions in different branches. This seems contrary to elementary logic, because the denationalization of the national economy had progressed quite far at that time, and the staff of government agencies should have decreased accordingly.

In response to the increasingly loud criticism of the bureaucratization of the executive branch of government, the administration chief issued a directive on 30 March 1994 to announce the reduction of the administration staff to the 1990-91 level (or by 25 percent).

A superficial examination of the oblast administration staff roster submitted by the Personnel Division on 25 February 1994 suggests that the directive was implemented.

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In fact, however, there were 249 positions on the roster, but only 232 people were actually working on that date.

Besides this, 10 people were to be hired on contracts (5 of them were hired).

Therefore, the staff roster records the reduction of the number of administration staff positions by 74 (23 percent) and the number of personnel (with the exception of contracted employees) by 47 (16.8 percent).

The roster suggests that something finally had been done to reduce the size of government agencies. Now we have to see how the administration managed to do this. In principle, there were two possible ways.

The first would entail the elimination of "superfluous" positions in different branches of the administration (divisions, offices, and committees).

The second would entail the elimination of "superfluous" branches.

The dynamics of change in the number of specialists working for staff divisions and offices can be seen in the table. A comparison of data for November and February 1994 indicates that the number of staff positions in these branches mostly remained the same or continued to rise.

Only the Main Economic Office (No 6) reduced its quantitative makeup by almost half. This, however, was a result not of the elimination of "superfluous" people, but of the structural reorganization of the staff, during which the Office of Prices (19 positions) and some divisions were separated from the rest of the Main Economic Office. The dramatic rise in the number of positions in the Office of Management of Affairs should also be viewed as a result of this kind of personnel reorganization. For this reason, we can conclude that there were no appreciable personnel changes in the existing branches of the administration staff. The announced reduction of the staff was accomplished essentially by eliminating "superfluous" branches.

In addition to the Office of Prices, the Committee on Trade and the Office of Information Resources and Technology were not on the new administration staff roster, and neither were the committees on juvenile affairs (2 positions) and ethnic issues (3 positions), the Office of Liaison with Religious Organizations (2 positions), the Advanced Training Sector (2 positions), and some others.

What are the specialists from these eliminated branches of the oblast administration staff doing now? Were they dismissed because of "staff cuts," and are they now looking for jobs? Might they be collecting unemployment benefits?

It turns out that they are doing nothing of the kind. Believe it or not, all of them (a total of 49 people) are still sitting in their offices and doing the same work as before. In other words, although the announced staff reductions and the new administration staff roster would seem to indicate that their jobs no longer exist, virtually nothing has changed. They were simply transferred to the rosters of divisions and offices which are part of the administration, but are not part of the administration staff. This is absolutely brilliant. By using this method, the administration staff could be reduced to a single individual—the oblast administration chief—without making any changes at all. Then the oblast could be listed in the Guinness Book of Records as the region with the smallest government staff.

Of course, the average person in the oblast would have difficulty following this line of reasoning, but he should realize one thing: After the oblast administration had announced the reduction of the staff of the executive branch of government, it tried to pass off good intentions as facts once again.

In this context, we should recall Krylov's famous fable about the incompetent quartet: "You, my friends, however you seat yourselves, will still be useless as musicians." Seriously, though, the staffing table of the oblast administration has to be approved at an upcoming session of the Legislative Assembly. The work on the oblast charter has to be expedited, and the final decisions on the structure of the representative and executive branches of government in the oblast have to be made. As one of its immediate objectives, the administration must submit the actual staff roster, and not simply an ephemeral list, of all of its branches to the Legislative Assembly before the budget can be approved.

## "Sakha Internal Affairs Minister on Crime

*954F1957A Yakutsk RESPUBLIKA SAKHA in Russian 14 Feb 95 pp 2-3*

[Article by V. Fedorov, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) minister of internal affairs, major-general of militia: "On the Front of the Fight Against Crime There Are Changes. Small Ones, but for the Better: The Minister of Internal Affairs Analyzes the Results of the Work To Protect Law and Order in the Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Last year the ministry and city and *ulus* internal affairs agencies, increasing their fight against crime, carried out a considerable volume of work to guarantee the constitutional rights, interests, and safety of the republic's citizens. A positive influence on law-enforcement activity was exerted by the promulgation in May by the republic's president of the Edict entitled "Additional Measures To Reinforce the Fight Against Crime in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)," as well as the implementation of the republic program that had been approved by the president, entitled "Comprehensive Program for Fighting Crime and Reinforcing Law and Order in 1994-1995," the action of which has been extended to 1996.**

The operational situation during the year was constantly monitored and additional measures aimed at resolving specific tasks in the fight against crime were developed

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and employed. Special attention was devoted to improving the basic link in the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] system—the city and *ulus* internal affairs agencies—and to increasing their independence and responsibility.

As a result it proved to be possible to strengthen and develop the previously noted tendency to increase the crime detection rate. As compared with 1993, the detection rate rose and currently constitutes 73.3 percent. This is the fifth result among the regions of the Russian Federation. An improvement was achieved in the detection rate of aggravated assault, rape, robbery, holdups, thefts, automobile hijacks, and hooliganism. A number of audacious murders and attacks against owners of motor vehicles and citizens' housing were revealed.

In February of last year an operation was successfully carried out in the city of Yakutsk to find and detain a blackmailer who had demanded from agencies of authority a large amount of money under the threat of blowing up facilities providing vital services. At the present time he has been sentenced to incarceration.

However, the principle of irreversibility of punishment has not been guaranteed in full measure. According to the year's results, more than 4000 crimes remained undetected in the republic, and behind each one of them one should see not an abstract figure in statistics, but a specific person with his misfortune. Therefore, the detection of crimes is for us a matter of first priority in the work of our operational service, and the absolutely first professional duty in the year that has begun as well.

Internal affairs agencies have purposefully carried out work to prevent offenses. For this purpose, the MVD's methodology coordination council was created and is functioning. In the individual-preventive work, wide use was made of measures based on criminal law and procedural measures. Every month, preventive operations were carried out on the territory of the republic, during the course of which a check was carried out on 117,000 persons whose names were on file with the militia; more than 900 places of concentration of the criminal element was put under monitoring; 6576 firearms were confiscated as a result of various violations; and approximately 300,000 liters of alcoholic beverages were seized.

Administrative legislation was actively used for preventive purposes. A total of 145,000 persons were brought to responsibility, of whom more than 15,000 were charged with petty hooliganism, and 53,000 with abuse of alcoholic beverages.

As a result of the steps that were taken, the total number of crimes, as compared with 1993, decreased by 10.1 percent and came to 16,137. There was a 10.6-percent decrease in the number of crimes committed with the use of firearms. The number of robberies, holdups, thefts, and motor vehicle hijackings decreased.

At the same time it did not prove to be possible to stop the increase in premeditated murders, attempted murders, and assaults and battery that were linked with drunkenness, rudeness or moral depravity, the insulting of individuals, or senseless and vicious fights, basically in the sphere of everyday and family relations. The largest number of heinous crimes against life and health was recorded in the city of Yakutsk, in Neryungrinskiy, Mirninskiy, Khangalasskiy, Aldanskiy, Olekminskiy *uluses*.

One of the main sectors in the work was the prevention of the insufficient supervision of children and the prevention of offenses among minors. However, the criminalization of the adolescent environment is continuing to intensify, and this is causing serious concern among the population. The number of crimes committed by this category has increased by 7.6 percent. The largest increase in adolescent crime is noted in the city of Yakutsk, and in Aldanskiy, Tomponskiy, Kobyayskiy, Gornyy, and Tattinskiy *uluses*.

The reason is clear: there has been a universal reduction in the level of moral influence exerted on the younger generation. The movie theaters and television continue to show films that propagandize the cult of cruelty and violence. Numerous scientific-technical clubs and free sports activities for children have ceased operating. Proper attention is no longer being paid to finding jobs for adolescents.

Every fourth crime is committed by adolescents in a state of intoxication. A total of 405 adults have been brought to administrative responsibility for having encouraged minors to become drunk. A total of 164 charges were made against persons who sold alcoholic beverages to children, and 18 commercial stores had their licenses revoked for that reason. At the same time wine and vodka products continue to easily accessible for minors. In the city of Yakutsk alone, in the proximity of educational institutions there are 18 commercial sales locations that sell alcoholic beverages; in Aldan, 9; etc.

A problem that is becoming a serious one for the republic, and especially for the cities of Yakutsk and Aldan, and Namskiy, Khangalasskiy, Megino-Kangalasskiy, Amginskiy, Tattinskiy, and Churapchinskiy *uluses*, is the spread of drug addiction and the addiction to toxic substances among young people and adolescents. As a rule, heinous crimes are committed under the influence of those substances, and the unstable psychological state of children and adolescents is being crippled. Internal affairs agencies stopped the activities of 33 stable groups of drug dealers and users, and brought 216 citizens to criminal responsibility. More than 140 kilograms of various drugs were taken out of illegal circulation.

On the whole, the negative changes in the state of crime are the consequence of social problems, and it is complicated to resolve them without a comprehensive approach. Therefore, high hopes are being placed on measures of social prevention, that were stipulated by the republic's program for combatting crime, and upon cooperation with the agencies of education, public

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health, employment and social protection, the commissions on affairs of minors that have begun operating again, the Department to Protect the Genetic Fund of the Republic's Peoples, religious organizations, etc.

In order to resolve the preventive and law-enforcement questions, it is also necessary to have a reliable legal base. Today, in particular, the internal affairs agencies are especially in need of the most rapid adoption of an Administrative Violations Code. This is the basis for their preventive work.

When evaluating the state of the work to protect law and order, one cannot fail to mention that, thanks to an increase in the density of patrol-post detachments, a slight decrease in street crime has been achieved, including a decrease of 38.2 percent in the republic's capital. At the same time, the criminal situation on the streets and in other public places continues to be strained. Moreover, in such *uluses* as Neryungrinskiy, Aldanskiy, and Verkhnevilyuyskiy, street crime has increased.

In the current year additional organizational reserves for protecting law and order will be activated, and the demandingess with regard to the patrol-post service and OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] will be increased, as will their initiative and decisiveness in stopping infractions of the law. This is required by the situation, and we shall do it.

It will also be necessary to increase the personal responsibility of the militia's precinct inspectors for the state of law and order, the managing of the militia guards in the precincts being served, and constant communication with the public. For these purposes work will be continued in creating territorial points for the militia's precinct inspectors and the workers in the subdivisions to prevent offenses by minors, and permanent militia posts in places where there are large numbers of citizens.

The nondepartmental guard provides for the protection of citizens' property and items of all forms of property. Despite the increase in the number of criminal encroachments on the items being protected, the number of thefts committed there was reduced by 42.9 percent. A total of 350 thefts were interrupted, with the detaining of 233 criminals. More than 550 persons were detained as a result of administrative violations linked with the theft of output.

At the present time the nondepartmental guard has at its disposal modern means of signalizing and sufficient manpower. It has the opportunity to conclude contracts for the protection of commercial banks, offices, etc. All that is required is the self-interested attitude on the part of managers of all forms of property to cooperation with the subdivisions of the nondepartmental guard.

Today there is no foundation for satisfaction with the results of the work being done to execute the edicts of the President of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) concerning the guaranteeing of the republic's economic security. Despite the fact that, as compared with 1993, there was an increase of 56.1 percent in the rate of detection of crimes in large and especially large amounts by means of embezzlement, misappropriation, theft, and swindling, there was an increase by 26.3 percent in the number of instances of bribery and an increase by a factor of 2.3 in the number of instances of swindling.

In execution of edicts of the President of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) dated 19 March 1994, "Additional Measures to Assure Financial Stability," and 20 March 1994, "Responsibility of Individuals and Legal Entities For Inappropriate Use of Central Credit Resources," the internal affairs agencies, within the confines of their competency, rendered assistance in paying off and returning 146,702,000,000 rubles of credit indebtednesses. Twenty criminal cases involving instances of thefts of monetary funds in the credit and banking system were initiated.

However, for the time being, the steps being taken are insufficiently effective, and the process of criminalization in this sphere of the economy has not been stopped. To no small extent this is promoted by the weak legislative base of the credit and finance relations, the major shortcomings in organizing banking activity, and the poor monitoring of the specified use of the credit resources on the part of the credit commissions in the *uluses*, and the commercial banks. For example, Yakustroybank, Agroprombank, the "Yakutiya" Commercial Bank for Social Development, and the Yakutsk branches of the BAMkredit and Inkombank commercial banks frequently granted credit formally, without conducting any preliminary checking of the clients' solvency.

A struggle has been waged against counterfeiters. Law-enforcement agencies prevented counterfeit bills with a total value of 111,580,000 rubles from being put into circulation, and confiscated forged promissory notes with a total value of 1.3 billion rubles. Thirty-two criminal cases involving the sale of counterfeit bills were initiated.

A problem that is exceptionally important is the problem of guaranteeing the intactness of the republic's currency values, the execution of the requirements of the Edict of the President of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), dated 2 April 1994, "Additional Measures to Guarantee the Intactness of Precious Metals and Stones" A total of 134,247 karats of diamonds were confiscated from thieves and persons violating the legislation governing currency regulation.

Certain managers of gold-mining enterprises, taking advantage of the lack of uniform requirements governing the intactness of precious metals, and by unjustifiably economizing with the funds for carrying out the series of protective measures, are creating conditions for thefts of precious output. Last year the currency subdivisions in

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the outlying areas carried out inspections at 355 gold-mining entities, revealed 86 crude violations, and protected 115 kilograms of the mined metal from possible losses. A total of 18.5 kilograms of industrial gold was confiscated from thieves.

A definite volume of work has been done in the sphere of guaranteeing road safety. Last year 108,000 drivers were detained for gross violations of the Motor Vehicle Traffic Rules, including 13,000 for driving means of transportation while under the influence of alcohol. More than 14,000 motor vehicles and motorcycles were impounded. As a result of the steps that were taken, the number of motor vehicle accidents was reduced. However, the situation on the roads remains alarming.

Internal affairs agencies carried out an intensive struggle against fires. And although there have been definite positive shifts here, the situation remains complicated. People are dying and material values are being destroyed. This is chiefly the result of the failure by officials and citizens to observe the fire-safety requirements. A definite role was also played by the reduction in the size of the departmental fire guard, and the cessation of the activity of volunteer fire-fighting formations. The work of providing fire safety in rural localities is in a neglected state. Out of 80 fire-fighting detachments on former sovkhozes that were functioning in 1990, as of today only 26 remain in rural *uluses*.

There continue to be a large number of unresolved problems in the work of institutions that carry out punishment. This especially pertains to their economic-production activity. Enterprises at corrective-labor institutions, like the rest of our economy, are suffering from inflation and the recession. Certain of their business partners who do not have an economic self-interest in using the labor of prisoners are continuing to break the cooperative ties that had been smoothly established with the institutions. As a consequence, more than 70 percent of the prisoners have been left without paid work in individual institutions every day.

The resolution of the tasks of reinforcing law and order dictates the necessity of improving personnel work. In this regard, steps have been taken to improve the quality of training and retraining of the employees of the internal affairs agencies. We send employees to training in conformity with concluded contracts to Kemerovo and Yakutsk state universities. There they receive their legal knowledge. One question that has been practically resolved is the question of opening up in the city of Yakutsk of a branch of the Moscow Law Institute of the RF MVD, which branch will train specialists with secondary special and higher legal education.

Today the internal affairs agencies are having great difficulties with financing. This especially pertains to the public safety militia (the militia's precinct inspectors; subdivisions to prevent offenses by minors; the patrol-post service; units on duty; GAI [State Motor Vehicles Inspectorate]; guard-convoy service; etc.), which is maintained at the expense of funds from the republic budget. Thus, with a need to pay wages to the public safety militia in January of this year of 3.2 billion rubles, only 500 million were financed. We realize that the republic's financial situation is complicated. But we also see the necessity of something else: the government and the Ministry of Finance must take a more attentive attitude toward the needs of the internal affairs agencies and must render to them in this regard the necessary support as a basic condition for increasing the effectiveness of their work.

In January, at an expanded session of the board of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) MVD, with the participation of the chairman of the government, the deputies to the State Assembly (*Il Tumen*), the administrators of other law-enforcement agencies, the chiefs of MVD administrations and departments, the city and *ulus* internal affairs agencies, and the corrective-labor institutions, the results of the work by the operational service in 1994 were reviewed. The results of the work were subjected to complete, objective, and critical analysis, and the priority sectors and the strategy and tactics for subsequent actions were defined. Specific measures were worked out for increasing the effectiveness of the activity of the operational service, and for increasing the responsibility for the assigned work sectors.

Understanding of the importance of the tasks that have been entrusted to the militia employees provides assurance that those tasks will be persistently resolved in closer interaction with the other law-enforcement agencies.

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## *Nizhniy Novgorod Residents Polled on Main Concerns

*954F1847B Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No 11, 16-22 Mar 95 p 6*

[Article prepared using materials from Nizhegorod Scientific Research Sociological Center: "What Concerns Nizhegoroders"]
[FBIS Translated Text]

| Concerns and fears | Sample | Men | Women |
|---|---|---|---|
| Poverty | 49.5 | 54.8 | 42.7 |
| Loss of job | 47.6 | 48.3 | 46.7 |
| Possibility of losing additional earnings | 37.9 | 41.4 | 33.5 |
| Possibility of losing friends | 51.1 | 55.5 | 45.4 |
| Losing parents | 28.6 | 29.3 | 27.8 |
| Losing children | 18.2 | 17.6 | 18.9 |
| Losing husband (wife) | 19.5 | 22.1 | 16.3 |
| Becoming disillusioned with children | 28.0 | 34.1 | 20.3 |
| Becoming disillusioned with spouse | 21.7 | 25.5 | 16.7 |
| Becoming disillusioned with a person you care about | 17.4 | 17.6 | 17.2 |
| Disillusionment with yourself | 11.2 | 11.4 | 11.0 |
| Sickness in people close to you | 9.7 | 12.1 | 6.6 |
| Own sickness | 7.0 | 7.9 | 5.7 |
| Loss of people close to you | 10.1 | 11.4 | 8.4 |
| Physical violence to child | 33.1 | 36.6 | 28.6 |
| Physical violence to you | 25.7 | 33.1 | 16.3 |
| Insult and moral coercion | 29.6 | 33.8 | 24.2 |

People are not so much afraid for themselves as they are for those close to them: for parents or their children. They fear poverty, losing their jobs and additional earnings, something that is of significantly greater concern to women. These concerns are also shared by men, who also have significantly more self-confidence in society. However, men more often place the sources of their concerns at the top of the pyramid of power, especially mature men; family men are less loyal to the establishment.

"Disloyal" Nizhegoroders are less likely to believe that the situation in the city will improve, although "loyalists" don't have a very optimistic view of the future, either: only one-third of Nizhegoroders have hopes that living conditions in the city will not change in the next 2-3 years, while one-sixth have hopes that they will improve.

Corresponding to their concerns, Nizhegoroders also pick out a set of municipal problems that require first priority resolution: these are, most of all, restraining prices and maintaining public order.

| City problems requiring first-priority resolution, % | |
|---|---|
| Housing problem | 38 |
| Public services, the ecology | 32 |
| Organization of trade | 12 |
| Price increases | 70 |
| Medical services | 32 |
| Taxation | 21 |
| Operation of public transit | 24 |
| Maintenance of public order, bribe-taking, corruption | 55 |
| Provision of leisure activities for the population | 6 |
| Interethnic relations | 6 |
| Aid to the elderly, disabled, children, low-income | 29 |
| Functioning of local government | 12 |
| State of youth | 16 |

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## Kazakhstan

### *Edict Seen Affecting Arms, Military Trade

*95UM0377A Almaty PANORAMA in Russian No 13, 1 Apr 95 p 1*

[Unattributed article: "Edict of the President on Liberalization of Foreign Economic Activity Will Partially Effect the Export and Import of Military Equipment and Arms"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In mid-March, carrying out the edict of the president from 11 January 1993 on the liberalization of foreign economic activity, the Cabinet of Ministers passed a decree that recognized its own decisions on the export and import of military equipment and arms as being without effect and also making an addendum to it.

As far as is known to PANORAMA, the decision in question made by the previous cabinet of Sergey Tereshchenko proposed the sale of obsolete army equipment and property through a specific state foreign trade company. But since it cannot be a matter of a disruption of the monopoly of the Ministry of Defense in this area, it is natural to presume that what is being terminated is the monopoly of precisely the company in question to present a commercial agent in foreign operations.

Here it does not appear expedient to repeal a second decision made in November by the cabinet of Akezhan Kazhegeldin, which introduced the addendum that obsolete equipment and property must be presented in the form of specific models and also scrap ferrous and nonferrous metals (for the notion of "obsolete military equipment" may be treated very broadly).

## Turkmenistan

### *Niyazov on Turkmenistan's Role in OEC

*954E0833A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian 31 Mar 95 pp 1, 7*

[Report on interview with President of Turkmenistan Saparmurad Niyazov by ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Glazovskaya under "Pressing Subject" rubric: "Positive Neutrality of Turkmenistan—the Basis for Widening of Cooperation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **At the meeting of heads of state of the Organization for Economic Cooperation (OEC) in Islamabad a few days ago, Turkmenistan unexpectedly put forward a proposal on its willingness to act as a peacekeeping center in the region and to be affirmed in the role of a neutral state under the corresponding international guarantees. What motives are behind this initiative, what is the mechanism for its realization, how is integration proceeding in the scope of the OEC, and what is the destiny of Turkmenistan in it? President of Turkmenistan Saparmurad Niyazov kindly agreed to respond to these and other questions.**

I will begin with the fact that there is nothing unexpected in our proposal. We came to this logically, putting into practice the policy of positive neutrality that we announced immediately after attaining our independence. By the way, this is one of the basic principles of our constitution.

The first three years of experience in our independent development suggested to us that we have the right to take on the role of a peacekeeping center in Asia. It is no accident that representatives from Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Azerbaijan have stressed that Turkmenistan has earned such a right, because all of these years it has unswervingly followed the principle of positive neutrality. I must emphasize that this is not self-isolation. This is a constructive and positive position.

Why did we decide to put forward this idea in Islamabad? The logic here is obvious. Primarily we wanted to secure the support of our immediate neighbors so that we could then appeal to the broader world public.

We have developed a program for the realization of our neutral status that we will implement systematically and step by step. Besides the political motive for our initiative, there are also economic reasons. Today we have the necessary infrastructure to permit the normal functioning of a peacekeeping center in the region, or its "round table." We built an entire network of comfortable hotels, put into operation international cellular communications that meet the most up-to-date requirements, built an airport up to international standards....

The next meeting of the heads of the OEC member states will be held here in Ashgabat in the spring of next year. And we will be pleased to welcome all those who wish to join in the peace process in the region.

As for our participation in regional cooperation, in particular in the OEC, it also has a certain prehistory.

The destruction of Soviet borders—and this is one of the realities of the present time—set the world in motion, with the clearest changes in its Asian part. It was precisely here where a powerful new geopolitical formation of states arose that were once separated by ideological barriers but have now entered into direct ties with their closest partners. It suited history and fate for Turkmenistan to be at the center of these interests.

So as not to be like the miser who, as you know, pays twice, we invited those to share our natural wealth who had the good will and corresponding economic interest to be a partner in this. It is in our interests to have our resources serve our own people as soon and as effectively as possible. Hence the very positive direction of the policy of neutrality. It required, however, a certain technology of partnership and we worked it out in practice.

This made it possible to begin the realization of regional ties, including with the states that are united under the economic roof of the OEC.

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Having arisen as a structure that was called upon to unite the interests of neighboring countries of the region—Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan—this organization got a second wind when the independent Central Asian states of the former USSR, Kazakhstan, and Afghanistan joined it. This was promoted not simply by the desire to unite at whatever cost but by the need to have a greater possibility for trade and economic development.

We think that the positive process of economic cooperation that has become apparent in the framework of the OEC can and must be extended to the entire region. We also see the preconditions for this process becoming the basis for cooperation with Europe and the countries of the CIS.

Projects for the transport of Turkmen gas in the direction of Europe and toward the southeast subcontinent as well as other projects for the delivery of Turkmen oil and gas to international markets are in the stage of active study. These large transcontinental projects are objectively attractive for Russia, Austria, Ukraine, Great Britain, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Australia, and other states.

In the territory of Turkmenistan, they have recently finished contruction of the Tedzhek-Sarakhe branch line linking the railroads of Turkmenistan and Iran. Another steel road whose construction has already begun will connect Russia with Turkmenistan by way of the Turkmenbashi-Astrakhan ferry crossing and will go south to the Persian Gulf. In this connection, I would like to stress the special role that Iran has taken in the realization of these projects. Literally a few days ago, right after the conclusion of the Islamabad meeting, we were there at the opening of the railroad line crossing Iran from north to south and accessing the port of Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf. It is our plan that our railroad systems will be linked together as early as the spring of next year, permitting the transport of freight and passengers over enormous distances from the East to Western Europe, from the Arctic Ocean to the Indian Ocean.

I would like to note in this connection that Russia is directly interested in cooperation in the region under discussion and in closer interaction with Turkmenistan. Armenia is also expressing an interest in joining the OEC. By the way, President Ter-Petrosyan came to the opening of the railroad in Bandar Abbas, where together with Iranian President Rafsanjani we held trilateral talks on the establishment of a joint transport company for the movement of freight, on the integration of electric networks, and on the expansion of trade ties.

It appears that this example is very symptomatic. It graphically demonstrates the truly unlimited possibilities of partnership based not on ideology but rather on the technology of cooperation.

All of us must remember that a new age is coming and it expects new actions on our part for the preservation of peace on earth.

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